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Dr.  h.c.  O.A.  FRIEDRICH ll~TRODUCTION 
This  conference,  in accordance  with the preparatory reflections ot 
those participating, is to address iteelf to the task of 'bringing GUt the 
connections,  at Community  level, between various economic,  social and 
political problems  and  the advance  of indus try.  'lhe  theme  of the 
conference,  11Mm  in relation to the  firm11 ,  will therefore have  to take 
in a  number  of crucial points to bring out the  connection between social 
and  industrial developments.  The  starting point,  consequently, of what 
I  propose  to say is firstly the attitude of industry in Europe  to the 
Community's  industry policy and  secondly the views  of employers  on  the 
road to be  followed by social policies in Europe.  I  propose,  to begin 
with,  to touch briefly on  these two  issues in a  general way. 
Industry policy, in the view of the Union  of European  Industrialists 
(UNICE)  and  as set out in UNICE  statements of lOth September 1970  and 
1st June  1971,  is to be regarded as a  collection of measures  for the 
creation in all fields of the best conditions for an  optimum  expansion 
of firms  in industry.  I  am  not forgetting that Community  industry policy 
has  also the task of deepening  the general awareness  of the need of 
industrial advance but a  first endeavour of that policy must be to improve 
the possibilities for industry to seize and  make  use  of the abundant 
! 
openings  arising from  the  creation of a  wider market in order to remain 
abreast of its task of supplying goods  to people in the best possible 
conditions.  The  contribution of industry to the gross  national product 
being as big as it is, the  creation of favourable  conditions for smooth 
and  rational production is a  ~atter of thehighestimportance for economic -2-
expansion in the  Common  Market  as  a whole.  Successful advance  in industry 
is an unalterable condition of economic  and  social progress in the 
Community.  However,  an  industry policy directed to this end is not to 
be  conceived of,  and  the employers  have  repeatedly drawn  attention to 
this point,  as  a  policy of intervening in and  meddling with the decisions 
of entrepreneurs.  It must  be  an all-embracing policy and  one  adjusted 
to the state of things  in our market  economy.  The  main ende.avour  of 
Community  industry policy must  therefore be  the  improvement  of the  frame-
work  of conditions in which  firms  in the  Common  Market work. 
The  close connection between industry policy and  the  other 
joint policies,  in particular social policy, is plain to see,  for the 
aim  of industry policy after all is a  general improvement in living 
conditions in the  Community.  It is also the task which  the  Member  States 
set themselves  in the preamble  to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic  Community,  namely  "the constant improvement  of the living and 
vorking  conditions of their peoples  as  an essential objective". 
The  close connection betveen the objectives  sought after in 
other fields  and  the means  being used and,  on  the other hand,  the 
Community's  industry policy involves  as  a  matter of course  mutual  adjust-
ments  and  coordination.  Just as  industry policy has  its repercussions  on 
social policy,  in the  same  way  there are  connections  betwe:en measures 
taken under social policy and  decisions  under  industry policy.  These 
connections were  the subject of a  first clear analysis by the  Commission 
in 1969  in the so-called "Interim Report to the  Council  on  the correla-
tions between social policy and  other Community  policies  11 • -3-
Here  indeed a  danger  comes  into view and  one  that is not to be 
lost sight of.  The  sights of industry policy are directed to a  section 
only of the  economy  1  namely  indus try itself. Social policy by its very 
nature cannot  and  may  not concern one  section of the economy  alone, it 
must  be  all-embracing.  A social policy worthy of the  name  must  aim at 
the improvement  of ·working  and  living conditions of all workers  and  not 
only those in industry.  A properly understood social policy must  indeed 
also ask itself whether it is right ardconsistent 'With  the principle of 
the greatest possible measure  of freedom  to pursue  the continuous  exten-
sion of collective care and  continuous  increases in social-security 
benefits while  the real incomes  of all levels of the population steadily 
continue  to increase.  We  are of the view that community benefits,financed 
by compulsory  contributions or taxation, should as  a  matter of principle 
play only a  secondary role,  that is they should only play a  part when 
the person concerned is not in a  position to help himself. Social polic,y 
must  not lose sight of what  the economy  as  a  whole  is capable of.  This 
capacity is the source but at the same  time  the limit of every endeavour 
of social policy.  A successful industry policy, strengthening and 
benefiting the whole  economy,  also creates  the groundwork  for higher 
social-security benefits being paid. 
I.  THE  POSSIBILITIES  PUR  A EUROmAN  SOCIAL  lOLICY 
A.  Governments  as  autonomous  operators 
I  shall follow these basic remarks  on  industry policy and  its 
connection with social policy with a brief statement on  employers' 
views  on  the possibilities of a  European social policy,  since  they -4-
are the basis and  cause  of our attitude to the crucial issues. Since 
the BEG  was  set up,  whenever  European social policy was  under  discus-
sion there have  been  constant debates  on  whether  and if so how  far 
harmonisation of the social policies of the individual  ~mber States 
was  necessary and  what  the  Commission  should do  in the matter.  In the 
past repeated attempts  have  been made  to read more  into the  text of 
the  EEC  Treaty, which after all is clear enough,  than is to be  found 
there.  There  can be  no  doubt at all that the  Treaty as  a  matter of 
principle leaves  competency and  sovereignty in matters of social 
policy Yith the Member  States.  The  cooperation of'Member  States called 
for in Article 117  therefore is essentially based on  the voluntary 
principle. But this is in no  way  to be  looked upon  as  a  shortcoming. 
The  Treaty hare is merely taking account of the fact that a  joint 
social policy can only be  brought into being with cohsideration being 
given to the  circumstances of social affairs in their great variety 
and  as  they have  grown  up  in time  past and  the further fact that in 
1957  the Member  States with that in mind  were  not prepared to transfer 
to the  Community  the political responsability for the further develop-
ment  of social policy.  There  has  been little change  in the meantime 
in this initial position.  Even  tod~, with more  than a  decade  gone  by, 
social-securitybenefits in the  EEC  countries  show  considerable 
national or regional differentiation for reasons  of preference which 
are largely rooted in history.  An  example  of the varying emphasis 
of countries'  social policies  can be  found  in the fact that in Federal 
Germany  high priority is given to old-age  and  sickness  insurance while 
social policy in France  is marked  by a  purposeful  policy in favour 
of the  family with a  high level of benefits.  These  differences have 
been influenced by the varying social circumstances  and  brought about -5-
equally by differences in the ideas held on political aims  and social 
policy.  Arrangements  on the ground will for the  time being have  to be 
left to the individual States so long as  they bear political 
responsibility. 
B.  High  and still rising expenditure  on social security 
This  does  not caUse  distortions in trade and  the supply of 
services in the Community,  because  competi ti  vi  ty depends,  apart from 
other cost factors,  on the total burden of labour costs and here it 
is not a  matter of importance how  the total is made  up.  We  have  seen 
astonishingly rapid approximation of social security expenditure -
not the least of the assisting factors  has  been the economic  progress 
which has  been made  in the Community.  In 1958  expenditure on social 
security was  still accounting for between 12.4 and 18.6 per cent of 
national income;  in 1970, without ~  active harmonisation policy on 
the part of the Community,  the figures lay between 20 •  .3  and  2.3. 5 per 
cent.  We  can see that the margin as between the M9mber  States has 
narrowed,  the amount  of national income  taken however  has  gone  up 
considerably.  The  entry of new  members,  we  find, will change  the 
picture appreciably.  According to the available figures - and 
unfortunately we  have  no  figures  for later than 1966  - the margin 
between the Six  of the  EEC  and Great Britain is a  big one.  In 1966 
expenditure on  social security in the  EEC  took 16  to 17t ,P8r  oent 
of gross  national product  (I am  not any longer speaking of national 
income),  while in Great Britain the figure was  only 12.7 per cent. 
(The  margin may  have  changed in the meantime,  we  have  figures  only for 
the  EEC  as at present composed,  with the Netherlands leading in 1970 -6-
~th 19.1 per cent). But when  we  compare  ·the  EEC  figure with that of 
countries  outside we  find it well above  the figure for the most 
i~portant industrial countries with which it has  to compete.  Against 
the  EEC  figure  of 16  to 17t per cent and  Great Britain's 12.7 per  cent, 
we  have  7.3 per cent in the  USA  and 6  per cent in Japan.  These  are 
figures  that bring up  again the doubts  I  briefly touched upon  previously 
whether  we  are to give preference to an all-embracing social security 
system rather than to a  strengthening of personal responsibility with 
an increase in the means  remaining in the hands  of the individual. 
Any  arbitrary interference with the gradual alignment of the 
structures of the  EEC,  such as  was  demanded  as  early as  1962  by various 
participants of the European Social Security Conference  of that year, 
involves  the  danger  of an  alignment of cost components  on  the principle 
of the so-called raisin-theory, which  means  the best and  highest from 
each of the  Member  States.  This  would  push  the total burden of labour 
costs in Community  industry up  to such an  extent that we  should no 
longer be in a  position to compete  on  the world market.  There  has 
been,  as  I  have  said,an  approximation of the  costs of social security 
in the  present Member  States but we  cannot acquiesce in the way  things 
have  gone  to date.  With  the  coalescence  of the  enlarged Community  into 
an economic  and  monetary  union and  the  continuance of relations  as  they 
are between individual Member  States' social policies  and  the social 
policy of the Community  a  greater me~ure of coordination is called for. 
It is indispensable  therefore that those responsible for  the  creation 
of national social policy,  the governments  and  capital and labour, 
should put less stress on  their autonomous  status and  adapt their 
policies  to what is needed  on  Community  level and  allow it to be  guided -7-
by Community  aims.  Such  an attitude will be  increasingly needed  of them 
as  the merging  of the separate national economies  into the economic  and 
monetar,y  union vhich saw  its beginnings in the Council  of ~nisters' 
basic decisions of Februar,y 1971  proceeds  on  its way.  The  Treaty gives 
the  Commission  the important role of promoting integration in the social 
policy field, first and  foremost by means  of organised collaboration 
between  the Member  States.  That is the situation today and  that is vhat 
the Council of Ministers for Social Matters has  been guided by since 
1966.  It is a  concept which  the Commission  has  largely adopted,  as is 
demonstrated by the memorandum  it submitted on .17  March  1971  on  social 
affairs entitled "An  Interim Outline for a  Community Social Policy 
programme 11  and  the proposals it contains  for Community  measures  to be 
taken as  a  matter of priority. 
C.  The  Fundamentals  of a  Liberal Order 
Social policy in the  European  Communities  however  is not only a 
question of institutions and  their powers, it is first and  foremost a 
question of the basic conception of how  the economy  and  social affairs 
are to shape.  The  employers  hold  the viev that the European  Community 
must be based on  the liberal principle.  An  economy  based on liberal 
principles means  free  competition and  free and  independent entrepre-
neurs  and  trades-unions.  An  essential factor of such an economy  is the 
freedom  of movement  of workers,  capital, services and  goods  established 
by  the  EEC  Treaty.  We  in Germa:ny,  and  not we  alone,  have  le~nt that a 
market  economy  was  decisive for rapid economic  and  social progress after 
a  devastating war  which  threatened all human  values.  True,  the liberal 
economic  and  social order,  as  we  see it in varying forms  in all the -8-
Member  States, has  its shortcomings.  But it shows  itself in its 
achievements  to be superior to any  other system,  guaranteeing a  far 
-
greater extent of material well-being and  a  far greater measure  of 
justice with a  maximum  of personal freedom.  It is a  fallacy, a  dangerous 
fallacy,  to believe that these achievements  could be  preserved if our 
liberal economy  were  to  come  to an end. 
A liberal economy  and  a  liberal democratic social order are 
inseparably bound  up  together.  Do  away  with the  freedom  of the 
responsible manager  and  the freedom  of action enjoyed by capital and 
labour and in the long term you will see  the end  of your own  freedom. 
This  applies  today and it applies  to the Europe  of tomorrow.  In my 
view therefore the main  task of a  European  social policy is to watch 
over the  foundations  of the liberal order in Europe  and  promote  its 
onward  progress.  Part and  parcel of a  liberal order is ownership  of 
the means  of production.  It is the basis for all risk-taking in 
industry.  There  are  those who  forget that the productive process 
cannot be deprived of the right of ownership without harm  being done 
to the whole  community. 
II.  INDIVIDUAL  PROBLEMSOF  A EuROPEAN  SOCIAL  :roLICY 
A.  lnployment policy 
With  these basic views  stated, it will now  be  possible to 
deduce  the attitude of employers  to the question of  11!-fan  in relation 
to the Firm 11 •  I  shall not deal with this question in an abstract 
manner,  I  shall set it against the background of the present situation -9-
in the  Community  and  examine  the question whether there is a  possibil-
ity of joint solutions on  Community  level and  what  methods  and  ways 
are open  to us.  We  shall have  to deal with the  q~estion of labour 
relations in the broadest sense,  considering not only man  in relation 
to his  job but, much  more  generally, where  he  stands in the social 
order. 
On  the last point what  is of decisive importance  for him is 
his ability to earn a  living for himself and  his family,  whether he 
does  this as  an employee  under  orders or working  on  his  own  account. 
An  essential condition of course is that there should be  an opening 
for his labour or simply a  job.  Consequently one of the priority aims 
of economic  policy is the provision of employment.  Here  it is not 
to be  expected that a  given  job will be  created or kept in being -
industry as it develops  increasingly brings  changes  in the apparatus 
of production,  and  a  man  has  to adapt himself to these  changes. 
For this reason it is a  normal  phenomenon  in an expanding  economy 
that in some  sectors the numbers  of those employed  decline to the 
advantage  of other labour-intensive industries.  A forward-looking 
employment  policy facilitating these processes  of adaptation is not 
only good  social policy, it forms  part of modern  industry policy also. 
It is one  of the  conditions for steaqy and  healthy economic  growth 
that the apparatus  of production as it goes  through its successive 
transformations should be  able to call on  a  sufficient number  of 
workers  educated and  trained in the right skills. Methods  of forward 
•  planning  and  statistical data will have  to be  more  complete  and 
afford better comparison possibilities. This  the employers  have 
repeatedly pointed out. Whilst previously employment  policy had  to -10-
concentrate predominantly on  the removal  ex post facto of difficul-
ties affecting the  economic  situation,  nowadays  it has  to deal much 
more  with problems  of structures and  how  they are to be handled  and 
defeated with,  among  other steps,  measures  for increased mobility 
from  trade  to trade  and  from  place  to place.  This  being so, 
occupational training is  becomin~ a  key  question because of the 
double ·task it faces.  Correct occupational training must  not only 
give a  man  the proper skills to match  up  to the  job  he  now  has  to do, 
it must  also lay the  groundwork  for the  further training and  re-
training which more  or less certainly will become  necessary subsequent-
ly.  Yethods  will have  to be worked  out to  take  care of adult training. 
There  is hardly any other move  so t-rell  fitted to give  men  today a 
feeling of freedom  as  security and  the  conviction of beins equipped 
by their education and  training to meet  the demands  of life and  their 
work. 
There  is a  further  connected  question which  I  should like to 
touch on briefly.  In this world of ours, t-rlth  its increasing 
industrialisation and  its increasing technology, it is going  to 
become  ever more  difficult to give  the  man  at the work-bench  the 
feeling of being able  to  keep  a  view of the whole  and  see what  he 
is doing  as  a  rational part of the whole  process.  There will be 
many  jobs where it will not always  be  possible  to avert a  sense  of 
boredom  and  monotony.  On  the  other hand,  technical developments  in 
themselves  are a  factor providing a  counterweight here.  Automation 
in ver,y  many  cases is now  transferring precisely the monotonous 
manufacturing processes  and in particular those which  are particular-
ly highly labour-intensive to machines.  Nonetheless  we  shall still be -11-
very much  faced with the question of how  to minimize  as far as  possible 
the conflict between man  on  the one  hand  with his inner laws,  physical 
and  psychic,  and  his need  for experience of his own  and  for self-
confirmation and  certain forms  or work  and  organization on  the other. 
This  is also a  field where  studies by the Commission  would  be helpful. 
B.  Cooperation in the workplace  and in the firm 
The  place therefore which  a  worker  takes in the firm is to 
a  large extent determined by the degree of success  achieved in 
maintaining the best possible conditions for his activity at his 
job  and in his place of work  and  seeing to their further improve-
ment.  It is undisputed and  undisputable that how  he  stands as  a 
worker is or particular importance  for his fUrther integration, 
for where  he  works  is, so to speak,  a  second focal point in the 
worker's life and  generallY decisive for his position in the social 
order also. 
The  task we  are all faced with here is a  many-sided  one. 
The  main  thing is the improvement  of the situation of each worker 
as  we  see it and  as he  sees it. True,  with the division of work  to 
be  met  with in modern  industrial firms  there are relationships, 
conditions of sUbordination and  other obligations that are 
unavoidable for the worker  (and  not him  alone)  because arising from 
the nature of what  is being done;  they are toned down  as far as 
possible by limiting them  to what  is essential to the operations 
(we  should not forget also that the bosses  also find  themselves at -12-
the centre of a  field of tension created by various situations of 
subordination even if in part they are of another nature). It must 
be  made  easier for the worker  to see the necessary relationships 
clearly and  accept them.  He  must  in fUture be  given the possibility 
of developing in his field of duties his sense of responsibility 
and  his ini  t ~a  ti  ve.  There  must  also be  a  guarantee that full 
account will be  taken of his legitimate claim to recognition of 
and  respect for his personality at his work  as  elseYhere. 
Let us  not forget that as we  grapple l.J'i th these tasks  we 
are not at the begin.Liing  of an operation,  we  can build on  our 
practical experience and  the regulations which make  up  the law on 
labour and  social matters in all the Member  States of the  Community. 
I  grant you,  the solutions long ago  found  in the individual coun-
tries have  not led down  the same  road,  conditioned as  they were  by 
so  greatly varying past historical and  sociological developments 
and  the  equally differing conceptions  of social policy.  Nonetheless 
in all the six countries we  find modern  company-management  methods, 
rights and duties of industrial workers'  representative bodies laid 
down  in works'  constitutions,  over and  above  individual plants and 
firms  the  two  sides' work  on  collective  agreements,  and  general 
principles of labour law and  general safety regulations, all meshmg 
together into a  system of instruments serving to make  possible a 
further improvement  in the position of the worker  as  a  member  of 
the labour-force. 
Further developments  in the world of industr.y should be 
based on  the principle of the individual worker being a  co-
participant in the operations  and  co-responsable. -13-
In that case, what  must  be  guaranteed is the following: 
- Ever,y  worker must  be  precisely informed on  what his duties and 
responsibilities are.  He  must  be informed about any essential 
technical, organizational or-staffing changes  affecting his part 
of the operation and  be able to see clearly what  is the connection 
between what  he  has  to do  and  the overall operation of'  the  plant. 
- Every worker must  have  a  guaranteed possibility of making  his 
views  known  about measures  that affect him  and  of'  collaborating 
actively in the shaping of' his  job by means  of suggestions of 
his own. 
- Every worker  must  have  the right to discuss  how  he  stands in his 
job and  the assessment  of his performance with the competent 
superiors. 
- Every worker must  have  the right to approach his  competent 
superiors with personal requests and  complaints  and  have  them 
heard and  decided on. 
Social responsibility on  the part of employers  and  trades-
unions,  as well as  the law and  obligations on  plant-level, have  in 
this respect alreaqy made  considerable progress.  The  social responsa-
bility inherent in the business operations of an  entrepreneur of 
today directs him  first and  foremost to respect the individual 
dignity of'  those who  work  for him.  Measures  under legislation on 
safety at work  are taking additional account of'  the legitimate 
interests of'  the worker in his workplace.  Arrangements  under the 
provisions of' works'  constitutions facilitate dialogue between -14-
employer  and  employees.  The  trades-unions also,  through collective 
agreements,  are able to influence  the way  industrial working 
conditions shape.  Again,  a  style of management  which  is abreast of 
technical and  economic  developments  calls for devolution of responsi-
bility to those working  on  management  level.  The  successes in the 
matter of integration so reached must  be  safeguarded and  further 
built on. 
This  is not to be looked for in an attempt at the most 
thorough  adaptation possible to the regulations  followed and  the 
knowledge  acquired only in certain Member  States which  are 
appropriate only to the specifically local economic  and social 
conditions  and  accordingly are out of step with facts  in the other 
Member  States; it has  to be brought about  on  the basis of principles 
of workers'  integration enjoying  common  recognition in all the 
countries  of the  Community.  With  all their variations in form  and 
content,  settlements made  in any  Nernber  State under  the provisions 
of works'  constitutions  lay particular stress on  individual plant 
level.  They  assign priority of importance  to the worker being 
informed  and  consulted and  put social and  personal affairs in the 
forefront.  In so doing,  they take account of the fact that 
conditions  on  the spot and  in the workplace  are the most  important 
for workers'  integration and  most  directly affect them.  They  also 
take into consideration that one  of the most  important aims  of any 
works'  constitution settlement has  to be that of keeping  the worker 
informed and  that it is social and  personal questions  that have 
priority of interest for him. -15-
No  doubt  the conceptions  that have  arisen in this connection 
in Member  States and  regulations  framed  accordinglY will undergo 
changes  in same  details as further practical experience is gained. 
But  in any case it will be  necessary to observe the limits alreaqy 
mentioned which  are set by the capacities of a  private-enterprise 
economy.  I  consider it however  essential to hold on  to the 
convictions  jointly held in the  countries of the Community  and  to 
make  them  the guideline for further reflections. Whether  we  can 
achieve  the ends  in view depends  in a  decisive manner  on  whether 
all concerned are prepared to make  cooperative approaches.  Any 
tendencies to confrontation instead of cooperation for the reaching 
of these ends  not only put efforts towards  further integration of 
the workers  in doubt but also endanger what  has  been achieved 
already. 
It is to be  expected that in this ~  a  decisive contribution 
will be  made  to the improvement  of working  and  also living conditions 
in the Community  and  this much  more  e.f.fecti  vely and  dependably than 
via ~  self-reliant concepts  arising in the institutions of the 
Community,  these being exposed to the danger of being guided by 
single national patterns with little or no  relation to the facts  o.f 
social policy in the other countries of the Community.  This  is an 
objection which  can also be  made  to the proposal .for articles o.f 
agreement  for a  European  company. 
2.  ,!:!_~!!~-~~!~!~~-!!..!!!...£~~-th~~~~!!L22~.!l 
European  employers  are emphatically in favour  o.f  the 
introduction of uniform  European  company  law,  to facilitate - and -16-
further - collaboration among  firms  over existing frontiers  as well 
as  the mergers  that are necessary in the interest of economic  and 
social progress  in the  Common  Market  and  to strengthen the 
competitive position of firms  in the  EEC.  For  these  reasons  the 
Commission  initiative in the shape of the first draft of July 1970 
of articles of agreement  for a  European  company  is as  welcome  as 
the projected regulation on  the  creation of a  "European  joint 
business interests association". 
The  employers  however  do  not agree that the  rules  for 
workers'  participation proposed in the  "European  company"  draft 
are of the  kind likely to solve  the question of workers'  participa-
tion for Europe.  They  are in agreement  with the Commission  that 
the  composition of bodies inside a  firm must  be  on  the same  lines 
throughout Europe.  A standard solution however  for the participation 
of workers'  representatives in the proceedings  of the board of 
directors,  such as  the  Commission  proposes,  loses sight of the 
variations, at present still great,  in labour relations in the 
various  Member  States,  and  this not only from  the legal aspect. 
The  differing conceptions of the aims  and  functions  of the  two 
sides of industry over the whole  range  of labour relations  (of 
which relations at firm-level are of course a  part)  are of major 
importance  for the question of workers'  participation. It is for 
instance a  fact that in Germany  alone of all the  EEC  countries is 
a  seat on  the board for workers'  representatives recognized as  an 
institution. Also  when  we  look at workers'  representation on  plant-
level with all its variations in Member  countries as  to nature, 
composition,  functions  and  powers  exercized,  we  find in the other -17-
countries no  workers'  representation with such far-reaching duties 
and  such extensive rights of workers'  participation as works 
councils in Germany  possess.  The  solution to be fotmd  to the 
question of workers'  participation can nonetheless  only be a 
European one,  now  to cover also the new  Member  States, first and 
foremost Great Britain, which has  a  system of labour relations 
different from  that of aqy  one  of the original States of the 
Community.  The  Union of European Industrialists  (UNICE)  on 12 March 
1971 made  a  detailed statement - I  want  to remind you of this - on 
the representation of workers'  interests in the  "European company". 
C.  jpguisi  tion of property 
The  place of the worker in society today is largelY dependent 
on the extent to vhich he is enabled to acquire property. Facilitation 
of the acquisition of property by broad  sections of the population 
is one  of the big tasks of social policy in our times.  It is an 
essential part of any European incomes  policy as  defined for instance 
in the second medium-term  economic  policy programme.  It would be  a 
welcome  thing if in all J.Ember  States, as required by that programme, 
aa active policy were  followed of promoting the acquisition of property. 
The  programme  also provides for a  Community  comparison of what has 
been achieved so far,  to be followed by a  stu4y to determine which 
systems and forms  and methods  are particularly adapted to the 
achievement of the economic  and social aims  of the  Community's  medium-
term economic  and social policy. What  was  there called for has  not 
remained in the stage of theory and  some  first results of the comparison 
have been made  available. It turns out that the various  systems  are -18-
very  divergent in the aims  they pursue.  In Germany  for instance  the 
acquisition of property is promoted  primarilY for reasons  of social 
policy on  the basis of the recognition that property is a  guarantee 
for the individual of gre.ater spiritual and  material freedom.  There 
is at the same  time a  predominating  conviction that an economy  on a 
basis of private property can only be credible in the long run and 
free  of social tensions if there is the broadest possible spread of 
what  the nation owns.  In France  the accent,  apart from  general 
measures  for the encouragement of saving and  the acquiring of housing 
as  owner-occupiers, is on  the improvement  of employer-worker relations, 
to be achieved first and  foremost by means  of obligatory profit-sharing. 
Against this, in Italy the main  attention is obviously being paid to 
the provision of housing. 
There  is a  close connection between motives  of social policy 
and  the reasons behind the economic  policy decisions for the fostering 
of increased acquisition of property.  In the Federal Republic,  for 
instance, when  the  Law  on Savings Bonuses  was  passed, it was  also the 
purposes  of the capital market  that were  being pursued, with a  view 
to increased private savings  on  long-term deposit facilitating the 
financing of public and  private-sector investment.  In the case of the 
Law  on  House-building Bonuses  of course  the main  aim  was  the 
encouragement  of housing construction.  In France profit-sharing is 
tied up  with investment aid for firms  with a  view to the simultaneous 
stimulation of economic  expansion.  In the Netherlands what  is being 
aimed  at also is an anti-inflation effect, to be achieved by long-
term locking-up of purchasing-power. -19-
The  choice of this or that system in each }!ember  country,  and 
its details, depend  of course  on  the weight given to this or that aim 
in view.  Usually at any given time  a  whole  collection of measures  is 
in force,  some  of them  to the benefit of the population as a  whole, 
others only for lower-income  groups  or the working-class, particularly 
workers  on  low yages.  In most  cases various  forms  of encouragement 
such as  taxation allowances, bonuses,  loans at reduced rates of 
interest and  interest allowances  are in operation at the same  time. 
The  encouragement  of property acquisition in the Federal 
Republic by broad sections of the population, particularly by the 
workers,  takes  three forms. 
Firstly, tax allowances  and  the grant of bonuses  on  deposit 
savings  as  provided for under  the Law  on  Savings Bonuses,  then what 
is provided for under  the Law  on  House-building Bonuses,  and  favourable 
tax-treatment of life-insurance savings  and  steps  to acquire own 
homes.  These  are advantages which  ~one can put in a  claim for. 
The  second important area is arrangements,  in the scope of collective 
agreements,  £or allowances  of property-acquisition effect _for  workers 
in certain sectors.  Thirdly,  measures  taken by individual firms  for 
the benef'i  t  of their own  employees  play an  important part. Bonuses 
paid on  savings-accounts have  up  to now  resulted in deposits at present 
amounting  to about 20 thousand million Deutsche-Marks,  which  means  10 
per cent of all savings-deposits by resident private persons.  Savings 
deposits  under bonus  or tax-reduction schemes  for home-building at 
present amount  to around  40  thousand million Deutsche-Marks,  nearly 
three-quarters of the total being deposited by wage- and  salary-
earners.  This  is a  figure  to be  looked at against the background  of the 
total amount  spent on housing-construction in 1971, vhioh was  45  thousand -20-
million Deutsche-Marks.  It is not without interest in this connection 
that almost 40  per cent of households  in Western Germaqy  own  their own 
houses  or flats, which  can be  regarded as  visible evidence of the success 
of housing  policy in the Federal Republic. 
There  have  been interesting developments  in the encouragement of 
property-acquisition in the Federal Republic by workers  as  employees. 
The  number  of workers  receiving allowances  of property-acquisition effect 
from  their employers,  amounting  to 300  Deutsche-Marks  a  year on  average, 
rose in 1971  ~rom nine to twelve million.  To  these are to be  added 
1,600,000 State employees,  making  a  total in 1971  of 13,600,000 receiving 
allowances  of property-acquisition effect from  their employers.  With  the 
working  population of the Federal Republic at 22,400,000,  this means  that 
well over half of those employed  are benefiting by this  new  system of 
allowances. It also meant  that the private sector last year shouldered 
a  burden of about four thousand million Deutsche-Marks.  The  actual 
amount  of increase in workers'  holdings  so brought about, however,  was 
considerably greater. If we  consider that the workers  have  not limited 
themselves  to merelY  accepting the employers'  allowances  under the new 
system but that many  of them  have  also made  savings of property-
acquisition effect out of current wages-income,  taking advantage  of 
reductions  and  bonuses  allowed by law,  we  reach - and  this is based on 
figures  from  the banking world - a  total figure  for savings of about 
7,650 million Deutsche-Marks.  If to this we  add State bonuses  on  savings 
and  on  deposits for house-buildings  purposes,  which  together are to be 
estimated at about 30  per cent,  the accretion of workers'  holdings in 1971 
resulting from  the application of the legislation on  property acquisition 
comes  to just ten thousand million Deutsche-Marks.  The  great importance of 
what  we  have  just established lies above  all in the fact that it has  been -21-
possible,  thanks  to the existing freedom  of action in the matter of 
conclusion of collective agreements  and  the Third Law  on  Property 
Acquisition,  to stimulate also population groups  who  had  not before 
been in the habit of putting anything by to start out on  a  new  road 
or personal responsibility. 
The  new  development  we  have  been witnessing is due  to the 
readiness of the employers,  which  they made  clear in 1968,  to come 
to an agreement with  the trades-unions  on  allowances  of property-
acquisition effect.  The  unions  accepted the offer made.  The  new  road 
taken together by  the employers  and  the unions  has  led since then to 
successes which  can be  held to be  impressive.  The  task of German 
employers,  as  they now  see it, is to broaden the road and  build on 
the successes achieved. 
No  doubt,  with the multiple possibilities offering for the 
acquisition of property in the Community,  the picture is a  confusing 
one  and  the results are difficult to compare.  I  think however  serious 
attempts  should oe made  in the other countries of the Community  to 
profit by the positive experiences we  have  had in the Federal Republic 
with the encouragement  of property acquisition by the workers.  German 
employers  stand ready for an  exchange  of impressions and  to work 
together particularly on  this with their colleagues. 
For conclusions  to be drawn  from  the comparison  of Member 
States' systems  for the promotion  of the acquisition of property, 
I  refer you  to the views  expressed by  the Employers  Association 
Committee  at the Commission  hearing of 24.  November  1971.  They 
concentrated on  the following  points:Measures  for the promotion of -22-
property acquisition by the workers  should be  agreed on  in the  frame-
work  of collective agreements,  the collective agreement  method  being 
preferable as  a  matter of principle to any State-imposed coercive 
measures.  The  use  of collective agreements  provides  the greatest 
possibilities of adjustment to the needs  and mentalities of workers 
and  firms in the several countries of the Community.  Attention is also 
to be  paid to keeping  the financial load employers  have  to shoulder 
by virtue of these allowances  inside the limits of economic  capacity, 
so that harmful  consequences  are avoided for money-values  stability, 
full employment,  economic  expansion and  the balance of overseas 
payments. 
D.  Capital and  Labour in Dialogue 
Another  question coming  under the main  theme  of  "Man  in relation 
to  the Firm" is that of how  capital and  labour are to work  together on 
Community  level.  As  progress is made  towards  the achievement of the 
economic  and monetary union the need will arise of more  exchanges  of 
opinion on  social policy,  and  with the advance  towards  economic 
integration and its extension to cover currency policy and with the 
political consequences  that will well up,  there will have  to be 
intensified cooperation between the  two  sides of industry and  the 
institutions of the  Community.  The  dialogue between capital and labour 
on  Community  level will have  to be  adapted to the new  situation arising 
as will also the possibilities of their working  together on  the deci-
sions  that affect them.  Here  of course we  are not starting from 
Square One.  Ever  since the  EEC  was  established European  capital and 
labour have  been holding talks,  for instance in the bodies set up  for \  '' 
-23-
the purpose,  such as  the Economic  and Social Committee,  the advisory 
committees  of the  Commission  and  the Joint Committees.  They  have 
also had and  continue to have  direct contacts without the presence of 
third parties, at national-association level and  at industr,y level. 
The  question now  arises how  their relations and  discussions  can 
be  enlarged upon.  We  must  concur in the views  expressed by  the 
Commission  in its memorandum  on  social affairs  (Document  600)  to the 
effect that at the present time  the main  endeavour under a  European 
incomes  polic,y still to be  worked  out must be  to develop the dialogue 
between  capital and  labour.  At  present it is an open  question what 
form it is to take and  thought will have  to be  given· to the part to 
be  pl~ed in future by the Economic  and Social Committee  as  the 
meeting-place of all interested groups in the economic  and  social life 
of the Commtmity.  In no  case should any form  be  chosen for this 
dialogue which  infringed on  the freedom  of negotiation of capital and 
labour as  recognized in every co'lmtry of the Community.  The  Joint 
Committees  proposed by the Commission,  with their membership  being 
appointed by the Commission  even on  the proposal of the ·organizations 
coming  in question,  do  not meet  the principle of freedom  that we  must 
insist on.  In this context we  frequently hear a wish  expressed by the 
unions  for European  collective agreements.  It would  take us  too far 
from  the subject of the present text to go  in detail into the ver.y 
veighty legal questions which  this raises.  In the absence  of ~ 
uniform basis of law,  as our enquiries have  shown,  11European  collective 
agreements"  could only be  conceived of as non-binding models  or as 
agreements  of like content for application in single countries. 
Defining with any degree of clarity what  the content,  the material -24-
substance  should be,raises difficulties Which  are of equal if not 
greater difficulty. 
It is a  well-known  fact that inside each national economy  are 
to be  found  regional differences, which  can be very considerable, in 
wage-levels  and  other working  conditions.  They  come  from  differing 
locality aonsiderations, differing productivity levels  and  performances, 
differing cost of living levels and  in part from  differing degrees  of 
emphasis  placed on  certain remuneration factors.  The  bigger the area 
covered by the  economy  the more  these differences will be in evidence. 
It seems  neither realistic nor desirable to  ~ish to remove  the 
variations in wage-levels  and  other working  conditions which  these 
differences give rise to.  There  are other important variations which 
arise from  the varying wages-structures in the various  countries. 
In France wages  in the main are aligned to the necessaries of life for 
the incividual employee  and  the State system  of family allowances 
takes  account of this national wages-structure.  Wages  policy in the 
Netherlands  takes  into account that children's allowances  are lower 
than in France  and  bears  family  circumstances  in mind,  though  to a 
less extent than previously. If such structural variations  cannot be 
removed  any attempt at European  conformity must  lead to distortions 
arising. 
In the  same  way,  a  European  regulation of general working 
conditions, at least at the stage integration has  now  reached and, 
I  think we  must  presume,  for a  long time yet, must  in the main be 
regarded as  unrealizable.  To  begin with,  there are wide  areas of these 
general working  conditions,  and  we  may  take working  time  and  holidays 
first, which  are governed by the  Member  States'  law-books  and  their -25-
variations;  and  legal provisions make  it impossible, at least from  the 
practical point of view,  for the  two  sides of industry to make  any 
arr.angements  in respect of some  of them  in collective agreements. 
The  _individual  areas here, such as  the length of the working  week  and 
annual  and  paid legal holidays,  offset one  another and  are internally 
correlated. For this reason those  concerned are gradually realizing 
more  and  more  that the main  decisive thing for an assessment of the 
question of working  time in the different countries will be  a 
comparison of the actual time  worked  in the course of a  year.  This 
amount  of time however  cannot possibly be  the subject of any settlement 
under  collective agreements.  The  crucial factor is that wages,  general 
working  conditions and  social-security benefits, seen from  the point 
of view of the economy,  are all indissolubly bound  up  one  with another. 
They  are all outgoings  from  the  same  fount,  out of the stock of goods 
and  services produced by the economy  as  a  whole.  This  is an  undisputed 
and  undisputable fact and  one  that must be borne in mind  by all 
concerned in collective agreement  negotiations. 
Reflection on  these matters leads  us  then to the  conclusion 
that it  ~11 not be  possible in a~  foreseeable period of time  to 
arrive at binding agreements  of this  kind between  the two  sides of 
industry on  European level. One  of the necessary condi tiona would  be 
the harmonization of collective labour law, but labour law forms  part 
of a body of law which  takes on  highly varied shape  from  one  Member 
State to another and  is in part grounded  and  codified in constitutions 
and based on  differing historical developments  and  differing mental-
ities. The  idea of concluding European  collective agreements  should 
therefore be dropped  so  that the dialogue between capital and  labour -26-
is not put in peril from  the outset. 
A proper subject for talks between the  two  sides of industry is 
offered by the problems  of the  present day  that have  reached a  stage of 
importance  in all Member  States or will do  so and  are seen to require 
to be  dealt with on  Communi~ level.  Here  again employment  policy comes 
at the top of the list; for dealing with it the  Council of Ministers 
has  established a  forum,  which  employers  and  trades-unions had been 
calling for for years, with the appointment of the Standing Committee 
for Employment  Questions.  It affords  the opportunity of bringing the 
opinions  of capital and  labour to the notice of the  Council of 
Ministers before it takes  decisions.  Another subject for  talks  could be 
the possibility of a  European incomes  policy.  The  stage-by-stage 
achievement of an  economic  and  monetary union in the European  Communi-
ties makes  it appear desirable for the  two  sides  to talk over their 
ideas  on  what  an incomes  policy should do  and  aim  at and  on  the 
problems  that will be  faced in bringing it into being.  Many  trade-
union leaders,  we  know,  clearly see an incomes  policy as  a  means  to 
the redistribution of wealth;  the  employers  look on it first and  fore-
most  as  an instrument for  the  checking  of inflation, a  method  ensuring 
overall effect.  As  progress is made  with the economic  and  monetary 
union it will be  increasingly necessary for employers  and  unions  to 
frame  their wages  and  conditions policies more  than before in accordance 
with Community  aims  and  abandon purely national policies.  This 
presupposes  that each side will not only collaborate more  intensively 
with associations  and  unions  in the other countries of the Six but 
also be  ready to conduct  joint talks  on  Community  level.  A first 
beginr.ing was  made  in 1971  when  the Commission,  in compliance  with the -27-
resolutions of the Council of Ministers, staged a  discussion of the 
report on  the economic  situation with representatives of capital and 
labour, even if it vas in separate sittings. 
FINAL  OBSERVATIONS 
The  questions  I  have  been  touching on  have  a  bearing,  some  of 
them  a  more  direct one,  some  of them  a  very indirect one, but all of 
them  a  bearing that cannot be  neglected,  on  the place and  part of man 
in relation to the firm,  both as  a  worker  on  the  job  and  as  a  member 
of society.  We  must  address  ourselves to the sober analysis and 
discussion of the many-sided problems,  the satisfactory solution of 
which is what  peace  in industry depends  on,  as  well as  the personal 
well-being of each  one  of us.  We  know  from  experience,  and it has  been 
a  very bitter experience at times, how  intimate is the  connection 
between peace  on  the labour front and  peace  in the political sphere. 
For this reason the search for the right solution lays  a  heavy responsi-
bility on  the two  sides of industry and  on  the institutions of the 
Community  and moreover  they must  have  the aim  of the general good 
constantly before their eyes.  An  agreement  on  questions in dispute, 
going beyond what  the economy  is capable of or undermining  our market 
economy,  would  be  a  bad solution and  no  lasting one. CONFERENCE 
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MAN  IN  THE  ENTERPRISE 
We  are  obliged,  now  as  always,  to develop  our 
views  of things in a  succession of analyses  and 
syntheses,  of facet-by-facet  approach and  panoramic 
~rvey, of part and  whole.  On  the  one  hand,  the  subject 
that has been allotted to us,  i.e.,  "Man  in the 
Enterprise",  fits into the  larger context  of the 
subject  of the  Conference  :  "Industry and  Society 
in the  Community".  Furthermore,  we  have  been asked 
to deel with the  subject as  trade unionists,  eo  that 
we  have  confined  ourselves to treating it from  the 
standpoint  of the  trade  union movement.  Even  seen in 
this way,  the  reader should know  that al the  level of 
the European trade  union movement  there exists both 
unity and  diversity of views  concerning the  subject 
in question.  A Conference  such as  the  present  one  has 
the great advantage,  seen against this background,  of 
submitting for discussion,  in their general features as 
well as in their componant  parts,  the  subject  "Industry 
and  Society"  and  the  sub-division  •Man  in the 
Enterprise",  to a  large number  of  persons  concerned 
drawn  from  a  wide  variety of professional circles 
within Europe.  May  this confrontation engender 
light which  can  serve  to illuminate  our action 
for the  development  of a  European  society in the 
service  of European man. 
* 
It is not  a  difficult matter to situate the 
subject  "Man  in the Enterprise" in the  bread  theme 
"Industry and  Society in the  (European)  Community". -2-
We  could  say that  the  former is a  transposition of 
the latter within the  microcosm  of the  enterprise.  In 
the  final analysis,  it is here  a  question of the  same 
thing twice  over  :  the  confrontation of technique, 
organisation and  economy  with Man,  in the first  case 
in the  wider context  of Society,  and  in the  second in 
the  narrower  framework  of the Enterprise.  Furthermore, 
the  mutual  relatione between both  "worlda"  are  so 
intense that  we  could  almost  say that industry is the 
sum  of the  ent~rprises and  that the  community  of 
people  in the  enterprise  - the  workers  - is then  the 
most  important  componant  of society. 
* 
The  term  "Man  in the Enterprise"  obviously refers 
to the  workers  in the  enterprise.  When  we  speak  of 
workers,  we  have  in mind  all workers,  each  separately 
and  all collectively.  Consequently,  the  term also 
includes the  supervisory staff,  the  engineers  and  the 
whole  group  of senior executives,  the  laboratory and 
research staff,  the  headquarters  personnel  •••  We 
shall indeed have  something to say in due  course  about 
the  place  accupied  by  the  management  itself. Lastly, 
it should  be  pointed  out  that  we  are  concerned here, 
quite  obviously,  with  "the  enterprise"  !  Por the 
workers,  this is of course  the  great,  everyday 
reality  •••  but  "legally"  and  "institutionally" it 
hardly exists in our various national legislations. 
At  this level,  only the  joint stock company  exists  ! 
However,  no-one  would  dream  of formulating the  subject 
in the  following  terms  :  "Man  - or workers  - in the 
joint stock company".  And  a  good  thing,  too  !  However, 
is it not  typical,  at the  same  time  ? -3-
The  subject  "Man  in the Enterprise" also divides 
up  into three  sub-sections.  In consultation with the 
rapporteurs  concerned  and  the  EEC  departments,  we 
should  confine  ourselves  to three  sub-divisions  of the 
subject.  The  choice  may  seem  arbitrary to  some,  but 
a  selection had  to  be  made.  We  have  selected these 
subjects not  only because  they are  important,  but also 
because  they are  located before  us  rather than behind 
us.  They still need  to be  thought  over and  they still 
have  to be  implemented.  They  provide matter for 
consultation,  exchange  of wiews  and  confrontation. 
Experiments  are  desirable  for each of the  subjects. 
The  three  subjects are  : 
- Profit-sharing and  Investment  Wage  schemes  as  a  means 
of arriving at new  relationships between worker and 
enterprise  and,  seen more  widely,  between  society 
and  industry within the European  Community. 
- Collective  agreements  at  the  European level. 
- Participation in the Enterprise. 
All three  of these  subjects are  of importance 
for the workers,  for all three  change  existing 
structures.  They  are  therefore  also socially 
important  and fit excellently into the  wider 
perwpective  of the  Conference,  i.e.,  "Industry 
and  Society"  according to our European way  of life. 
It is however  obvious  : 
- that profit-sharing and  investment  wage  schemes, 
depending  on  the  formulas  and  systems  chosen,  can 
deeply affect both income  distribution and  income 
appropriation; 
- that the  implementation of collective agreements at 
the  level of the  European sector or of the European 
company  (multinational enterprise)  may  be  very 
important for social and  political Europe; -4-
- that  participation of the  workers  in their enterprise, 
at  the  level of the  workshop,  the  department,  the 
enterprise  and  the  company,  may  considerably  change 
the  capitalistic and  anonymous  system itself within 
the European  framework. 
Thus,  Man  in the  Enterprise is to  a  large 
extent  determinant for Industry in Society  ! -5-
Profit-sharing and  Investment  Wage  schemes  as 
a  means  of arriving at new  relationships between 
worker and  enterprise  and,  seen more  widely, 
between  society and  industry within the European 
Community. 
It must  be  pointed  out first of all that I,  as  a 
trade  unionist,  can regard profit-sharing and  investment 
wage  schemes  as interesting only insofar as  they are  a 
means  of arriving at new  relationships between worker 
and  enterprise  and,  seen more  widely,  between  society 
and  industry within the  European  Community.  These  new 
relationships must  be  firmly anchored  in new  structures, 
contributing towards  a  more  human  world  for workers  in 
the first place  and  for the  whole  of society in general. 
All forms  of direct profit distribution to the 
workers  of the  firm as well as all forma  of workers' 
shareholding or of people's capitalism therefore  do  not 
suit us,  either from  the  workers'  point  of view  or from 
a  European  point  of view.  I  am  well aware  that these 
forms  exist here  and  there,  that they are more  widespread 
and  appreciated in the  United States,  but for our 
European  wor~ers these  forms  merely result in promoting 
the  existing capitalistic system. 
This also amounts  to saying implicitly that for our 
workers neither profit-sharing nor the  investment  wage 
is a  legal title or a  legal means,  on  which  the workers' 
right to co-determination must  be  based.  The  right  of the 
workers  and  their trade  unions  to have  a  say in the 
enterprise  or in the national economy  is not  to be  based 
on  property titles •••  for we  should  then not  only 
legalise a  contested  system,  but even forge  a  company 
law  system after the  event,  which in fact is already 
overtaken.  The  workers'  labour is a  more  than adequate 
basis for their right to have  a  say in matters  ! -6-
General definitions 
Very generally,  we  understand  by  profit-sharing a 
system whereby  a  share  in ownership  of the  growth in 
assets in the  enterprise  or company  resulting from  surplus 
profits or self-financing is granted  to the  workers,  in 
the  form  of ordinary or special shares.  Self-financing 
implies that  a  part of the  profit - the  surplus profit -
is not distributed but is appropriated  to  reserves  and 
used  in the  enterprise itself. Surplus  profit precedes 
self-financing and  could  be  defined  as what  remains  after 
a  reasonable  remuneration has  been  paid  to the  ca~ital in 
the  form  of dividends.  In this way,  the  notion of  "profit" 
is implicitly changed  :  on  the  one  hand,  it is acknowledged 
that the  capital is entitled to a  reasonable  remuneration  -
dividend  - which may  be  regarded  roughly as  a  "cost", 
after the  wage;  on  the  other,  there  remains  thereafter a 
possible  "surplus profit",  to which certainly labour and 
capital,  but  possibly also the  consumers  and  the  govern-
ment,  are  entitled.  This  growth  of assets is distributed 
and,  depending  on  the  formula,  may  or may  not  remain in 
the enterprise. 
Either the  "surplus profit" is paid  out without 
restriction to the  parties entitled,  which for the  workers 
amounts  to saying that it will largely go  to  consumption. 
This is an  ordinary profit distribution. 
Or  the  "surplus profit" is added  to  the  firm's  own 
resources in the  name  of the  workers  concerned  in the 
form  of ordinary or special shares  and  the  sums  serve  for 
the  self-financing of the  enterprise.  They  are  then 
blocked for a  certain time  and  are  then  a  form  of 
compulsory  saving  and  investment,  which each year gives 
a  normal  "yield" for the  workers  concerned. -7-
Or  else  the workers'  share is compulsorily re-
invested  outside  the  firm itself in mutual  funds  :  per 
branch of industry,  per area or at  the national level. 
In this case,  too·,  these  blocked  funds  must  each year 
give  a  normal  "yield" for the  workers  concerned. 
The  way  in which  these  dire-ctly shared-out  surplus 
profits or these normal yields of the  invested  surplus 
profits are  divided  among  the workers  may  be  very 
divergent  :  they may  increase,  maintain or decrease  the 
existing inequalities of remuneration  among  the  workers. 
Various  options are  consequently to be  exercised 
here  •••  depending  on  our wish to create  or not to 
create new  relationships and  new  structures. 
The  same  applies to the  investment wage. 
By  investment wage  we  unde•atand that  componant  of 
the  wage  or of a  wage  increase that receives  a  special 
destination by  collective  agreement  or by  law  :  i.e., 
for asset formation  or investment  and  not  for  consumptio~. 
The  investment  may  occur in the enterprise itself or in 
a  community  of enterprises via an  investment  company  or 
a  mutual  fund.  The  extent  of this investment  wage  is 
generally conceived  as  relatively small,  as  an extra or 
as  something marginal  :  e.g.,  1  %would  already be 
substantial. It should  be  pointed  out  that the  investment 
wage  is determined  proportionally to and  in function  of 
the  wage,  and  not  of the  profit. Here,  too,  the  formula 
implies that these  funds  as  a  general rule  and  for  a 
certain period- e.g.,  5  or 10 years- are  blocked  and 
thus withdrawn  from  consumption.  This  investment wage 
will,  in respect  of the  workers,  normally take  the  torm 
of bonds  or claims  on  which  an annual interest payment 
is due. -8-
For profit-sharing as  well  as for investment  wage, 
it must  then  be  ascertained how  the  workers will receive 
guarantees  and  how  they will be  able  to exercise  the 
power  to  have  their say,  respectively in the  case  of 
ordinary  or special shares  from  profit-sharing in their 
own  enterprise  or in a  mutual fund,  or else  in the  case 
of bonds  from  investment  wage  in their own  enterprise 
or in a  mutual  fund.  Here  too  recognition  and  guarantees 
must  be  present  and  that  cannot  happen  without  the  recog-
nition of  the  representative,  acknowledged  trade  unions. 
What  is aimed  at with profit-sharing and  investment 
wage  schemes  ? 
Originally,  the  idea of profit-sharing was  mainly 
developed  from  considerations of  justice at  the  level of 
the  separate  enterprises.  Indeed,  people  had  come  to 
realise  that  justice vis-a-vis the  workers  was  not  served 
once  wages  had  been  paid  - even if they were  relatively 
high - if at  the  same  time  it was  seen that the 
shareholders not  only  received  a  reasonable  dividend 
but  also also laid exclusive  claim to  the  growth  of the 
capital via all kinds  of appropriations to reserves  and 
depreciation techniques in an ever increasing practice  of 
self-finan'cing.  In  the  interests of  justice in 
distribution,  the  workers  should  also have  their share 
in the  increased assets.  This moral  recommendation is 
made,  inter alia,  in the  social encyclical  •Mater et 
Magistra"  (1961),  in which it is argued  that  the  workers 
contribute  labour to  the  formation  of these  increased 
assets. 
Thus  far this micro-approach of a  social and 
ethical nature. 
However,  a  macro-approach is  just as valid,  from 
the  economic  and  social as well as  the  ethical standpoint. 
It is based  on  a  new  social vision. 
Prof.  H.  Deleeck  summarises  this point  as  follows 
in an article  : -9-
"Profit-sharing and  investment  wage  schemes  are 
techniques  whereby,  in an  institutional way,  it is desired 
to change  the existing structures of the  distribution of 
income  but  above  all of assets,  in the  direction of 
greater  sp~eading and  diminution  of the  distance  between 
a  large  group of  owners  of capital. It is the  aim,  at 
least to  some  extent,  to di·stribute  the  proceeds  of the 
production in another way,  and  to involve  wider groups 
of the  population,  more  particularly the workers,  in the 
investment  function.  In this connection,  it is the 
endeavour to bring about new  institutional relations 
concerning the  application and  di·stri  but  ion of profits, 
the method  of financing industrial expansion  and  the 
relevant relationships between capital and  labour, 
which are  more  in line with the  social conceptions  of 
the  second half of the  twentieth century. 
•we  cannot  go  further here  into the fact  that the 
incomes  and  assets are still to a  large extent unequally 
distributed in our Western  society.  Reference  must 
indeed  be  made  to the  remarkable  phenomenon  of the  cons- · 
tancy of the  share  of wages  in the national  income  : 
seen over a  fairly long period  (and  taking account, 
naturally,  of the  growth in the  number of wage  and 
salary earners in the  active  population),  this share 
(direct and  indirect wages  together)  always  remains 
equally great  throughout  cyclical fluctuations. 
"This  phenomenon  may,  in simplified form,  be 
explained as follows.  If the  wages  level  (the  labour 
cost)  is pushed  up  higher than the  labour productivity, 
then we  arrive at an inflationary process whereby  the 
price  rises will cancel  out  the  advantage  of the  wage 
rises.  For ita part,  the  share  of the  capital proceeds 
cannot  be  reduced without  thereby impairing the 
foundation  of economic  growth.  The  shares of labour and 
capital in the national income  may  indeed  increase  in 
absolute  volume,  but  the  relative  shares will remain  the 
same.  If now  it is desired to increase  the  share  of wage 
and  salary earners in the national  income,  then this is 
only possible  by causing them to  share  in the  capital -10-
yields  and  thus  in the  capital ownership. 
"Profit-sharing and  investment  wage  schemes  are  thus 
techniques whereby it is desired  to  break  out  of a  twofold 
circuit  :  increase  of the  share  of  the  wage  and  salary 
earners in the national  income  (wider distribution of 
assets  and  income)  without  inflation and  without  reducing 
the  total volume  of capital goods.  Positively speaking, 
in view  of the  increasing need  for investments,  in 
particular risk-bearing investments,  a  social and  economic 
structure will be  set up  whereby  the  entire population 
is involved  in the  investment  function.  Just as  they are 
now  (through the  social security structures)  involved 
in the  social security of existence,  the  working 
population  could  thus  also be  structurally involved  in 
the  economic  security of existence".  (1) 
And  I  should  like  to  add  something further  not  only 
in the  economic  security of existence  but  also in the 
economic  expansion,  which is rendered  possible  by  these 
extra savings  and  hence  extra investments.  Furthermore, 
this economic  expansion will have  to be  implemented 
according to the  targets and  the  directives of a 
democratically developed  economic  planning. 
As  stated,  the  profit-sharing and  investment  wage 
schemes  are  placed  in a  wide  general  and  structural 
social framework. 
The  trade  unions  in the  European  Community  ask  them-
selves many  questions  and  lay down  even more  conditione. 
It is quite  common  knowledge  that  the  trade  unions  in 
Europe  do  not  agree  on  this question  and  that there  are 
ardent  advocates  as well as  opponents  of the  idea.  The  fact 
that,  for instance,  some  see it as  an  important  means  for 
structural reform,  and  others find  that it is an  integra-
tion into the  capitalistic system,  is at first sight 
indeed  paradoxical  ! 
(1)  Deleeck H.,  "Vermogensaanwasverdeling en investeringe-
loon"  in  "Synopsis"  (BDOP),  March-April  1969,  pp.72-73. -11-
Much,  however,  is explained  by  the  following 
considerations  : 
- even  though  the  same  words  :  profit-sharing and  invest-
ment  wage,  are used,  they do  not refer to the  same 
thing.  The  form,  conditions,  context  and  system under 
which profit-sharing and  investment wage  schemes  can  be 
developed are  so divergent  that it may  in fact  be  a 
question of very different things,  concerning which 
one  will in some  cases be  "for"  and  in others  "against"; 
- in each of the  countries concerned,  the  basic  conditions 
for profit-sharing and  investment  wage  schemes  are not 
always  present.  We  refer here  to prior conditione which 
have  to be  implemented.  We  merely have  to think of the 
basic wages  and  the  basic  social security  •••  or of the 
reliability of the  basic  accounting data in the  case 
of  profit~sharing. 
However  this may  be,  the  trade  unions  in the 
European  Community  ask themselves many  questions  and  lay 
down  even more  conditions.  (2) 
·,, 
Thus,  we  know  that the  three Netherlands trade  union 
federations  and  the  German  DGB  are definite  advocates  of 
the  profit-sharing and  investment  wage  shaemes.  But  this 
does not  prevent  them  from  being critical and  from  laying 
down  conditions.  The  DGB  thus rejects all measures  : 
- which  jeopardise  social security and  co-determination; 
- which adversely affect a  reasonable  growth  of the 
workers•  standard  of living or hinder their mobility; 
- which  form  a  serious danger to full employment, 
economic  expansion and  price  stability. 
The  attitude of the  French trade  unions is very 
much  determined  by  the  concrete  system that was  introduced 
in France,  mainly by  the  decree  of 17  August  1967. 
According to the  CGT,  any  system of encouragement  ot 
capital formation  by  the workers  must  be  subjected to 
(2)  See  •standpunten van de  verschillende milieus"  -
V/252/71-N  - memorandum  by  the  EEC  departments. -12-
certain conditions  such as increase  of the  wage  income 
with guarantee  of the  sliding scale  of wages,  expansion 
of  the  supplementary  pension  systems,  based  on  profit-
sharing,  improvemeut  of the  whole  system  of social 
security. 
Furthermore,  the  stimulation measured  would  also 
need  to  aim  at  social targets,  and  mainly  at  saving for 
homebuilding. 
The  Confederation frangaise  democratique  du Travail 
(CFDT)  thinks,  in principle,  that  the  community  must  be 
owner  of the  growth in assets created  by  self-financing, 
i.e.,  an enterprise,  the  consumer,  the  worker  and  the 
state  cooperating in the  formation  of these  assets. 
Moreover,  in the  French  system  of  1967,  the  investor 
remains  free  in his  investment  decision,  while  the  worker 
is obliged  to make  savings  from  hie wages,  without  the 
workers  and  their representatives being able  to exert 
any  influence  thereon. 
~  is  opposed  to  any  measure  whereby  the  workers 
are  obliged  to  save,  Such  a  system for  the  promotion  of 
property-formation  cannot  be  accepted  as  long as  the 
resources  of  the  majority  of the  workers  remain  inadequate. 
F.O.  is also  opposed  to stimuli  aimed  at making  the 
workers  shareholders  of the  companies  in which  they work. 
The  workers  then  run  a  twofold  risk  :  in case  of bankruptcy 
of the  firm,  they may  lose  both their  job  and  their 
savings.  Furthermore,  the  ownership  of  shares in the 
company  where  one  works  forms  an  obstacle  to the  geogra-
phical mobility  and  the  occupational mobility,  which  are 
promoted  by  the  government. -13-
In Belgium,  the  ABVV  which  "is against any  form  of 
incomes  policy,  is also opposed  to arrangements for 
property formation which force  the  workers  to eave.  It 
considers,  on  the  other hand,  that a  study needs  to be 
made  of the  factors which determine  the  savings  sense  and 
the  consumption  impetus  :  rather than stimulating the 
workers to save,  the  consumption  of useless products needs 
to be  checked,  especially if the  latter is a  consequence 
of advertising via modern  mass  communication media". 
In Italy,  for instance,  "the  CGIL,  which rejects 
any  form  of incomes  policy,  is in principle against  a 
policy aimed at property formation  which  forme  part 
thereof.  This workers'  organisation is also  opposed  to 
all systems that lead to workers'  participation in arrange-
menta  aimed  at capital accumulation,  arrangements which 
are  dominated  by  major concentrations.  It is of the 
opinion that the  most  important  problem is not  the 
formation  of property with the  workers,  but  that it 
would  be  necessary to go  more  deeply into the  distribution 
of the  increase  in the national wealth  (with a  view to 
ascertaining the  extent to which  the workers  derive 
benefit therefrom)  and  in the  development  of consumption, 
more  particularly into the distribution between private 
consumption  and  public  consumption.  The  tax reform, 
which is now  being called for  by  the  Italian trade  union 
federations,  will have  to make  possible  a  policy of 
government  expenditure to promote  social investments, 
whereby  the  lack of equilibrium in the  Italian economy 
will be  overcome". 
This  concise  summary  illustrates the fact that 
apparently paradoxical positions of the  various  trade 
unions within the  EEC  may  largely be  explained -14-
- either by  the  formulas  concretely proposed,  which may 
be  better,  good,  or bad; 
- or by  the  absence  of the  prior basic  conditions. 
My  own  organisation - the  Belgium  ACV  - has  only 
incidentally expressed  an  opinion  on  this whole  group  of 
problems  at  the  time  of its orientation congress  in 1968. 
In the  report  "Responsibility for  the  Future"  - ("The 
social  programme  of the  ACV"  -Part III - Chapter II), 
under the  heading  t'The  wage  remains  the  core  of the 
workers'  income  - Other forms  of workerat  income  are 
becoming  more  important",  we  read  the  following  :  "These 
ideas have  been disseminated  in recent years for diverse 
and  partly fundamental  reasons,  and  have  been  implemented 
here  and  there  in  one  form  or another. 
"We  too shall be  confronted with this in the  near 
future  and  we  are  prepared  to fall in positively with 
this idea. 
"However,  we  formulate  a  fourfold  reserve  : 
- these  formulae  cannot  be  imposed  on  the  workers  against 
their will; 
- in any  case,  they  remain  supplementary vis-a-vis the 
ordinary  pay  and  acquisition of  income; 
- they are  not  regarded  by  us  as  a  "legal title" in order 
to  be  able  to have  a  say in the  joint stock company  : 
the  workers  wish to  have  a  say in the  enterprise 
directly on  the  basis of their work; 
- the  introduction of this system must  contain sufficient 
solidarity elements  so  as not  to increase  further the 
existing pay differences  between  strong and  weak 
enterprises". -15-
An  attempt at concretisation in the  case  of Belgium. 
A rather modest  application of profit-sharing and 
investment wage  schemes  in a  country  such as  Belgium would 
nevertheless have  a  considerable  structural significance 
in the  long term.  In this connection,  it should  be  borne 
in mind  that Belgium has  a  high wages  level,  relatively 
and  absolutely,  that the  industrial profitability is 
certainly not  on  the  high side  and  one  form  of property 
spreading among  the  workers  is highly develope·d  by 
comparison with other countries  :  50  ~ of the  workers' 
homes  are  their own  property. 
According to the  calculations made  by Prof.  Deleeck 
on  the  basis of 1965  figures,  "with an annual distribution 
of claims  on  assets to the  amount  of 5,000  F  (which 
more  or less corresponds to  two  weeks'  wages  for the 
average  Belgian industrial worker),  an  amount  that belongs 
to the  field  of realistic possibilities in case  of 
allotment  of half of the  growth in assets to the  worker,  a 
worker after 40  years'  service,  and  subject to capitali-
sation of an interest rate  of 6  ~' would  have  assembled 
assets of nearly 775,000  F.  In the  same  hypothesis,  after 
20  years the  capitalised assets would  amount  to  approx. 
184,000 F.  If only  the  claims  on  assets themselves  remained 
saved,  and  the  interest would  have  been used,  then these 
assets after 40  years would  amount  to 200,000  F  and  after 
20  years to 100,000 F.  This  amount  is valid in the  case  of 
unchanged  value  of the  annual growth in assets; it would  be 
realistic to take  account  of an annual growth  percentage  o~ 
e.g.,  3 %,  whimh  over a  period  of 40 years would  yield 
almost  double  this amount.  The  extent  of these  individual 
amounts  (both of the  assets  and  of the  capitalised 
interest) is indeed  impressive".  (1) 
Although the  yield of these  capital amounts  remains 
small  by  comparison with the  wage  income,  reasoning on  the 
one  hand  on  the basis of the  figures  just mentioned  and 
on  the  other,  of the  basic statement that - regarded  in the 
long term - the  relative  share  of the  income  from  labour 
remains  constant in the national income,  then it remains 
(1)  Deleeck H.,  "Vermogensaanwaedeling en Investeringsloon-
Ben  terreinverkenning",  een  SESO-studie  in opdracht  van  de 
Christelijke Centrale  van  de  Houtbewerkers  and  Bouwvakar-
beiders"  - 1967  - pp.  180-181. -16-
equally true  that  according as,  with the  passage  of 
the  years,  the  workers'  share  in the  overall  saved 
assets  of  the  nation increases under the  influence  of 
profit-sharing or investment  wage  schemes,  the  relative 
share  of the  workers'  income  in the national  income 
will also increase  considerably. -17-
For what  purpose  could  profit-sharing and  investment 
wage  schemes  serve  structurally ? 
Other introductory reports  on  the  same  subject will 
also reply to this question.  In this respect,  much 
depends  on  the  formulae  and  methods  selected. 
I  shall therefore deal with this question rather 
swmaarily.  (3) 
Profit-sharing and  investment wage  schemes  could  be 
used  structurally  : 
first and  foremost  in respect  of production, 
then in respect  of income  distribution, 
and  lastly in respect  of income  appropriation. 
This  influence will make  itself felt  on  the  margin 
of social and  economic life. Major shifts in social and 
economic life are not to be  expected  in the  short term  : 
abrupt  changes  are  indeed neither possible nor desirable. 
The  charm  of living is like  the  charm  of a  woman  :  a 
little something extra makes  all the  difference  ! 
In respect  of production,  profit-sharing and 
investment  wage  schemes  could exert action on 
~.the strength of economic  expansion because  the 
investment  volume  is sustained via the  savings voiume 
and  - in the  case  of investment wage  schemes  - is 
directly increased; 
2.the  orientation of economic  expansion because,  in 
national investment  fund  formulae,  certain qualitative 
targets can be  aimed  at 
(3)  See  "Basiscriteria voor de  vastetelling van  de  lonen 
en  de  daarmee  samenhangende  vraagstukken van  een loon- en 
inkomenspolitiek",  report drafted  by Prof.  G.  Bombach 
(Basle,),  Prof.  L.  Baeck  (Louvain),  Dr.  Merli  Brandini 
(CISL,  Rome),  Prof.  Sellier (Aix-Marseilles)  and  Prof. 
D.B.J.  Schouten  (Tilburg)  on  instructions from  the  EEC 
Commission.  "Studies"  in the  "social policy series", 
No.  19  - 1967. -18-
- either the  strong points  of the  economy 
- or the  sectorial goals  of  an  indicative  and  democratic 
economic  planning 
- or certain collective  arrangements 
- or regional economic  develo~ment 
- or social infrastructure works 
3.certain aspects  of inflationary tensions in the  wages-
prices spiral could  be  attenuated via the  investment 
wage-.; 
4.  the  cyclical policy in general,  as  regards both anti-
inflation and  anti-deflation measures.  National 
investment  funds  can  be  used  for cyclical control 
purposes; 
5.the  democratisation of the  economy.  All the  previous 
elements  together can be  developed  into a  concrete 
instrument  of democratic national economic  planning in 
countries  of the  workers'  collectivity and  of the  natioA 
nal  community. 
In respect  of income  distribution,  profit-sharing 
and  investment  wage  schemes  could  be  used  structurally 
1.in order to  revise  partially the  overall distribution 
of  the National  Income  between  income-from-labour  and 
income-from-capital in favour  of the  wor~ers by  provi-
ding the  workers with an  income-from-capital as well 
as their income-from-labour;  this redistribution effect 
is exerted at  the  very basis of the  income  distribution 
and  not  subsequently,  such as  occurs,  for example,  via 
taxation; 
2.within the  workers'  group itself,  to make  of the 
profit-sharing and  the  investment  wage  a  redistribution 
income  among  all workers,  thanks  to  one  or another 
technique.  In this way,  the  differences  in direct wages 
among  the  workers  are  attenuated  by  these  equalising 
investment  yields; 
3.  via the  investment  supplement  and  the  nature  of these -19-
investments,  to exert indirectly an  income  distribution 
effect.  Indeed,  these  investments may  lead to new  and 
better employment,  i.e.,  labour income.  They  may  also, 
via the  collective  arrangements  and  the  social infra-
structure which  they bring about,  have  very real  income 
redistributing effects for the  workers; 
4.via their contribution to price  stabilisation, either 
to protect the  real wages,  or to leave  more  scope  for 
real wage  increases. 
Lastly,  in respect  of income  a~propriation, the 
profit-sharing and  investment  wage  schemes  would  in a 
first stage  as well as  permanently contribute to the 
development  of the  savings function with the  workers. 
Naturally,  this aspect  comes  after the  voluntary savings 
by the workers,  after the workers'  saving for homebuilding, 
after voluntary savings  as  a  supplement  to the  compulsory 
social security by the  workers.  However,  this form  of 
compulsory but  temporary  saving,  by  collective agreement 
or by  law,  also promotes  the  savings function with the 
workers.  In the negative  sense,  one  may  oppose  to this the 
compulsory  saving with the  workers  - with the  active 
population - via taxation imposed  by  the  government,  either 
directly or indirectly via the  taxation of goods  and 
services. Positively speaking,  this form  of compulsory but 
temporary  saving by  collective  agreement  or by  law may, 
by  the  manner in which it is tackled  and  worked  out, 
make  the workers more  aware  of the  fact  that they are 
actively involved in the  economic  events  of their country 
and  of their enterprises  and  that they perform an  active 
and  autonomous  role  of their own  therein. 
Seen in this way,  I  think that,  by  and  large,  we 
can  and  must  approach the  problems  of profit-sharing 
and  investment wage  schemes  in a  positive way,  from  the 
point  of view of the  labour movement,  on  condition that we 
safeguard  - in an unprejudiced way  - the  prior conditions -20-
therefore,  that  we  aim at the  form  which is structurally 
most  favourable  for the  workers  •••  and  that we  continue 
to bear in mind  its relative nature.  Only  then is it an 
element  of fundamental  progress  and  development  of the 
workers  as  a  whole. 
To  contribute  to this end  is the  role  and  the  proud 
task of the  trade  union movement. 
* 
*  * -~-
COLLECTIVE  AGREEMENTS  AT  THE  EUROPEAN  LEVEL 
The  development  in the direction of the  progress of 
social law and  in particular of working conditions in the 
six Common  Market  countries in recent decades has  been 
determined to no  small extent by  the  collective 
agreeaenta. 
In the  other sub-sections of social law which 
traditionally belong to the  competence  of the legislator, 
inter alia in the field of social security,  consultation 
between the  social partners has to a  considerable  degree 
pl.,ed a  trend-setting role. 
Baturally, all this has not  proceeded without 
difficulties.  Sometimes,  the  conflicting interests were 
only reconciled after long and  bitter conflict and  even 
aore  laborious consultation. 
In general,  however,  it may  be  observed that the 
social partners have  come  to  show  a  greater openness 
toward• each other and  a  readiness to talk things  over. 
Thia  open  approach and  this readiness  are  found  most 
markedly in those  countries where  both parties are 
aware  of the  positions of strength acquired  and  of their 
common  responsibility for the  social and  economic 
progress of the  country and  of the entire  population. 
Cannot  the experience  gained at the national level 
be  aade  use  of with a  view to enabling the  economic  and 
social integration and  development  of the European 
Eoonoaic  Community  to proceed in a  peaceable  and 
harmonious way,  in the light of a  constant  improvement 
of the living and  working  conditions of the  entire 
population concerned  ? 
We  wiah to seek a  reply to this question,  whereby -22-
we  have  in mind  above  all the  worker,  and  man  in the 
enterprise.  In particular,  we  wish to place  the  attempt 
to  achieve  collective  agreements  at the  European  level 
directly at  the  service  of the  worker,  of man  in the 
enterprise.  The  connection between  the  two  is obvious. 
The  fact  that  the  problem is not  so  simple  may  be 
seen  from  the  historic observation that  the  very idea of 
European  collective agreements was  disseminated with  some 
enthusiasm by  the  trade  unions  as well  as  by  the  European 
Commission  at  a  quite early stage  already,  i.e., in the 
early 1960s. 
How  is it that  so little came  of it ?  Certain 
reasons  are  quite evident. 
It is no  secret that the European employers have, 
in an  overall and  persistent way,  opposed  the  conclusion 
of European  joint collective agreements,  whatever their 
content might  be.  Nor is it a  secret that  the  Council of 
Ministers was  just as  assiduous  in checking any initiative 
in this direction and  certainly did not  promote  a  positive 
framework  in which European collective  agreements  could  be 
concluded. 
Does  the  Commission  alone  bear all the  blame  for 
this ? 
Must  not  our trade  union  organisations  do  some 
soul-searching in this respect  ? 
The  Vice-President  of the  European Organisation of 
the  WCL,  J.  Alders,  formulated  in a  memorandum  on 
European Social Policy dated  20  December  1968  a  number 
of critical observations  about  the  attitude  of the  trade 
union movement  at European level. 
Two  quotations  from  that note  are  given below  : 
"Certainly,  we  have  our social programme,  but is it our -~-
intention to execute this programme  ?  Is it not  a  tact that 
only the  trade  union officials who  are  professionally 
concerned with the EEC  are  genuinely interested in it, 
while  those  on  the  domestic front  go  no  further than 
discussing the matter with interest from  time  to time,  but 
do  not arrive at converting the  trade  union structures and 
activities in such .a  way  that there  are real chances of 
impleaenting the European Social Programme  ?  What  avout the 
unanimity of the  trade  union movement  on  fundamental 
social demands  ?  on  priorities  ?  We  often reproach the 
Commission  for lack of vision and  power  of action in the 
social field,  while  we  paralyse  ourselves through lack 
of unity of views". 
A second  quotation  : 
"Have  we  already an adequate  vision of what  the  society 
of tomorrow will need  to be  like if it is really desired 
to make  possible human  progress in the  broad  sense  of the 
word  ?  And  if here  and  there  people  already have  a  view 
of these  fundamental  questions,  have  these wiews  already 
been  compared  with each other ?  Has  an effort been made 
to arrive at a  common  view  ?  Have  we  considered what  means 
need  to be  applied in order to convert this vision into 
living reality ?  And  what  needs  to have  priority ?  I  am 
sorry to have  to  say that experience has taught me,  alae, 
that in the  case  of consultations of the  social partners 
in the  EEC  context  the  influence  of the  trade  union 
movement  was  often reduced  to nil,  on  the  one  hand  as a 
consequence  of the fact that the  trade  union movement 
presented  an impressive list of desiderata without 
indicating priorities. 
Subsequently, il clearly emerged  in the  discussions that 
there was  no  mutual agreement,  sometimes  even  on  matters 
that are  of fundamental  importance•. 
Focussed  on  our demand  for collective  agreements at 
European level,  from  the  trade unions'  point  of view, -24-
"the essential prior conditions which determine  whether  or 
not European collective  agreements will come  about  are  : 
1.  the  existence  of autonomous,  strong,  integrated  and 
adequately equipped European Trade  Unions  and  Trade 
Union Federations,  which are  in a  position to  o~lise 
the  employers  and  governments  to sit down  at the 
negotiating table; 
2.  the  definition of the  goals which  are  valid for the 
whole  of the· European  trade  union movement  and  in order 
to  achivve  which the  whole  trade  union movement,  both 
at the  European  and  the national level,  is prepared 
to use  every means,  including strixes". 
"The  question  of European  collective  agreements is 
primarily not  a  juridical problem,  but  a  question of 
power relationships  and  in connection with specific 
conflicts of interest with respect  to working  conditions 
between  one  or more  employers,  whether or not  grouped  in 
organisations,  and  on  the  other hand,  one  or more  groups 
of workers  organised  in unanimous,  strong organisations. 
The  social history of the  six countries  shows  us 
that,  long  before  the  collective  agreements  were  included 
in the legislation as  a  legal institution,  arrangements 
were  reached  for  the  purpose  of settling these  conflic-
ting interests,  arrangements which have  all the  charac-
teristics of a  collective  agreement  as now  recognised 
in law,  the  only difference  being that the  ap.plication 
thereof was  exclusively decided either by  the  strength 
of the  trade  union movement  or by  the  good will of the 
employers  and  their respect for their word.  In Bel«ium. 
this de  facto  situation even lasted until 1970". 
Over the  past  two  years,  however,  some  rays  of 
light have  been  observable,  which may  give  us  grounds for '. 
-25-
hoping that the  trade  ubdons  want  to tackle  the matter 
seriously. 
Very generally,  they base  themselves for this on  the 
new  approach to social policy in the EEC  which  seems  to 
be  eaerging siaoe  the  Conference  of EEC  heads of gover.naent 
at !he Hague.  A  concret'e  indication of this is the tact 
that the  EBC  Commission  wants  to  promote  the establishment 
of more  European  joint committees  per industrial sector. 
!he trade unions,  however,  base  themselves  on  other 
elements.  !here is obviously a  stronger and  renewed 
awareness  and  ••tempt  by the various national trade  unions 
-howeve~ they may  be  organised at the European  level -
to set theaselvee up  at the European level as a  single 
group and  to act as a  single front.  !his ie undoubtedly 
the  consequence  ot the  growing Europe,  but in particular 
of the  crowing Europ·ean  oapi  tali  em  :  multinational 
enterpriaea, European  concentrations and  ~deratandings 
among  enterprises and  European eaployers'  organisations. 
We  observe  the first reactions in this direction  r 
- in the  renewed  will of our European  trade  union 
organisations to arrive at European collective agreements 
via European  j~int committees  (Trade  Union  International& 
of the European Ouganiaation of the  WCL  on  25  and 
26  October 1971  at Straabourg)  and in accordance  therewith 
"to develop a  formal  professional European  structure to 
which a  part ot the national autono_, of the  trade union 
organisations would  have  to be  transferred"; 
- in the  joint standpoint of the European Organisation of 
the  WCL  and  the  EC~!U, laboriously arrived at, with 
respect to the dratt directive  on  the European Company, 
in which is also included  a  chapter on  the  collective 
agreement  per Buropean  Company; 
- in the first trade  union contacts,  consultation,  exchange 
of ideas,  intervention and  campaigns at the  level of the 
European aultinational enterprises. !he latter is 
important. -26-
A.  The  Collective  Agreement  in the European Enterprise. 
It is obvious that the  demand  for collective 
agrwements is located in the  fire~ place  at the  level of 
the  existing de  facto European enterprises and  - in the 
near future,  it is to be  hoped  - at the  level of the 
de  jure European  ent~rprises  :  the European  companies. 
1.  The  European enterprise exist•,even although it does not 
exist in law  or it already exists  on  the basis of 
complex  combinations  of national legislations  (NV  Agfa-
Gevaert  AG).  In the  eyes  of the  workers  and  the  trade 
unions,  but  also in the  eyes  of natioaal or European 
political and  official bodies,  the European enterprise 
appears more  and  more  as  a  threat  :  the multinational 
enterprise.  "Somewhere"  they carry on  a  policy which 
makes  them inaccessible  to a  large extent for the 
national or local  "powers"  :  the  social,  economic, 
fiscal and  financial public authorities,  as well aa  the 
power  of the  organised workers in the  separate enter-
prises or the national trade  unions.  How  they do  this 
we  shall not  analyse here.  It is an  important fact  in 
our argument  that at least at the European level it is 
necessary to arrive,  in this  "organised  jungle",  at 
collective  agreements  based  on  unity of vision,  goals, 
method  and  action  on  the  part  of the  workers  concerned 
and  their trade unions.  The  handicaps  are great,  but the 
need is just as great  ! 
2.  A European  company  law is a  twofold necessity.  In the 
constructive  sense  as  a  juridically structural and 
political contribution to the  development  of  a 
Europe  of prosperity and  well-being.  In a  defensive 
sense,  as  a  compulsory  juridical structure for all 
multinational enterprises at  the  level of their activity -V-
within the EEC.  Defensive  in the  following  sense  :  the 
European  and national public interest as well as the 
workers'  interest demand  it. A European  company  law is 
necessary for the  sake  of legal security,  of the 
European industrial and  social policy,  of the  definition 
ot the  rights and  duties of capital,  of the  place  of the 
workers in this whole,  of the  o8ligation to make  the 
"accounts"  frank  and  reliable,  of the  need at this level 
fo~ arriving at collective  agreements  together with 
the  trade unions,  in a  word  of the  reality of the 
European  "enterprise". 
I  shall develop  our views  on  the  Commission's 
proposal concerning the European  Company  in the 
chapter on  participation in this report.  In this 
context,  I  wish to confine .yself to stressing the 
fact that in trade  union circles we  are  in general 
in agreement with the  views  of the  Commission  in 
this respect. 
Art.  146  of this proposal provides that the 
working conditions of the  workers  of the European 
Company  may  be  arranged  by  means  of a  collective 
agreement,  concluded  between the European  Company 
and  the  trade  unions which  are  represented in the 
different fixed  institutions of the  company. 
Lastly,  it ia superfluous to point  out that the 
context in which collective  agreements must  come 
about  is entirely different depending  on  whether it 
is a  question of the  "organised  jungle"  of the 
multinational enterprises or of the European  Company, 
such as the EEC  Commission  proposes  and  such as we, 
from  the  point  of view of the European trade  union 
organisations,  propose  by  way  of  supplement  ! -28-
The  trade  union  strategy for  arriving at good 
collective  agreements will therefore  be  entirely 
different in the  two  situations  ! 
In the  case  of the multinational enterprises 
within Europe,  a  unitary technocratic  and  capitalistic 
"power"  seeks  to profit,  over the  entire field  of  a 
European free  market  of goods,  services,  capital and 
of 188  or 256  million people,  from  the  combined 
"weakness"  of national governments,  European  political 
institutions,  (Commission,  Council  and  Parliament)  in 
respect  of industrial policy,  planning,  labour 
legislation and  industrial relations,  regi~nal policy. 
fiscal.  financial and  monetary policy,  and  furthermore 
to profit from  the  combined  "weakness"  of workers 
scattered  over many  technical industrial unite  and  of 
national and  European  trade  unions  in dispersed  order 
and  without  a  view  of the  whole.  Gradually,  a  trade 
union  strategy comes  into being here  around  a  few 
enterprises  •••  but  there  are  not  yet  any  tangible 
results  •••  unless it be  via the  "national" enterprises 
concerned. 
In the  case  of European  Companies  (and  of National 
Companies),  according to the  combined  views  of the 
European  Commission  and  of the European trade  union 
organisations,  we  thus  come  in principle  to  other 
relationships,  to clarity in accounts  and  responsibili-
ties,  to shared  and  balanced  "power  structures" within 
the  company  •••  and  thus to  obvious  confrontation of 
interests in European  collective agreements.  Trade 
union  strategy and  trade  union responsibilities will 
thus also be  different  •••  and  man  in the  enterprise 
will do  well  in the  process  ! 
B.  !he European  collective  agreement  per industrial sector. 
Doubts  have  predominated here  for the  past  ten years 
mong  the  trade  unions.  We  have  already developed  the 
reasons for this. -~-
"The  International Fedration of Christian Metal 
Workers  Unions  has made  a  start with the  study of the 
possibilities and  ways  of arriving at European 
blankat  agreements which would  contribute to a  gradual 
harmonisation of the working and  living conditions in 
the  EEC  countries. 
In a  provisional report, it advocates  the establish-
ment  of mixed  committe•s  per sector which would  act as 
forum  for consultation between  the  social partners. 
In order to prevent the  consultation from  occurring 
and  proceeding  "outside  the  autonomous nationar organis-
ations and  to prevent the  democrativ opportunity to 
express views,  which ie definitely  presen~ in the national 
field,  from  being lost at the European level",  the 
rapporteur P.Brussel, in the method  of work  proposed  by 
him,  includes  the national organisations in all stages 
of the  consultation and  more  particularly in the  fixing of 
the  agenda,  the negotiation,  the deliberation on  the 
agreeaent  reached,  the final conclusion of the  collective 
agreements  and  the  special mandating of the negotiators 
with a  view to the  signature thereof. 
Apart  from  the  legal questions in connection with 
the  possibility of concluding binding collective 
agreements at European level,  questions which  are not 
touched upon  in the  preliminary report  by  P.Brussel, it 
is mainly  the  circumspection and  anxiety that have  to be 
stressed in this report;  circumspection and  anxiety about 
treading on  the  toes of the  organisations,  as  regards 
national autonomy". 
In the  already quoted  resolution of the  Trade  Union 
Internationals of the European  Organisation/WCL of 25  and 
26  October 1971,  it is howeyer  desi~ed to go  further: 
"They note with satiefaetion 
-that the EEC  Commission  has decided  to promote  the 
establishment  of  joint committees per industrial branch 
as_auch aa possible;  they think 
-that these  joint bodies must  in the first instance 
accompany  the dialogue; -30-
that the  trade  union move·ment  must  be  able  to dispose 
of the  powers  and  means  of carrying out its campaigns 
at European level,  with the  adjunction of the 
necessary  power; 
- that in order to arrive  at  an efficient consmltation at 
European level,  the European  organisations must  be  able 
to dispose  of the  necessary powers,  both for holding 
free  discussions  and  for negotiating and  concluding 
agreements; 
- that the national trade  union  organisations must 
proceed  to develop  a  formal  occupational European 
Structure to which  a  part  of their autonomy  would 
have  to  be  transferred". 
In this context,  we  are  of the  opinion that the 
EEC  Commission  can  and  must  do  more  in future. 
The  Commission  has  certainly already done  useful 
work  by  issuing studies and  reports  on  this subject. 
"The  Commission  organised  consultations of the 
social partners whereby  they regularly had  the  opportunity 
of taking note  of the  development  of social law  by  the 
collective agreements  concluded  in the  six countries. 
In order to  be  able  to make  this information available 
in a  more  efficient and  continuous  way  to  the  parties 
concerned,  the  Commission  may  go  further and  prepare  a 
European card-index of the  collective  agreements  of the 
six countries". 
Still more  important  are  the  collective  agreements 
at  the  level of the  sector or of the  whole  of industry. 
As  a  first step,  the  Commission  must  develop a  field of 
common  interest that is obvious  and  which it knows  well  : 
the  field  of "fair competition"among the  Member  States 
in all domains  where  the  actual life of the  workers is 
involved.  There  is no  competition about  working 
conditions in the  sense  of living conditions.  Large  and 
small employers,  large  and  small Member  States must 
be  able  to  agree  on  this point with the  workers  and -31-
the  trade unions.  The  Commission  can  and  must  promote  an 
arrangement  of this via collective  agreements  which it 
can  subsequently make  compulsory for all concerned,  even 
those  who  did not  cooperate.  Indeed,  recommendations  of 
the  Commission  with respect to occupational diseases, 
employment  of  juvenile  and  female  labour,  invalidity 
and  industrial medical services,  already point  in this 
direction.  These  fields  can  be  expanded  parallel with 
the  conception  about  "living conditions - working 
conditions"  in various sectors as well  as interprofession-
ally.  The  fact that thought  was  also given to this point 
in the  Treaty of Rome  is proved  by  the  provisions of 
"French origin"  about  working hours  and  equal  pay for 
men  and  women. 
"In its blueprint,  the  Commission  suggests collective 
agreements  on  the  determination of the  levels of 
professional skill,  the  establishment of compensation 
in case  of closure  or conversion of enterprises,  and 
the harmonisation of working  conditions". 
!hue,  the  Commission will render credible what it 
wrote  itself on  page  80  : 
"The  implementation of the  social goals must  likewise 
stem from the negotiations between  the  social partners. 
The  autonomy  of the latter,  which is recognised  in the 
Member  States,  must  come  to expression at  community 
level,  more  particularly by the  conclusion of European 
collective agreements,  or at least by European  collective 
agreements which must  serve  as guidance  when  concluding 
aatianal collectiTe agreements". -32-
In this last sentence  the  Commission  proposes  a 
method  to which  the European  and national trade  unions 
can  and  must  subscribe.  Indeed;  it seems  to be  advisable 
for the  sake  of trade  union  strategy that the European 
collective  agreements  should  rather be  worked  out  as 
"guidance"  for the  conclusion of national collective 
agreements.  The  advantage  of this method  is manifold  : 
- the  formula is flexible  vis-a-vis the national trade 
unions; 
- the•formula makes  it possible,  at  the  level of the 
enterprises,  of groups  of enterprises or of sub-sectors, 
to base  oneself  on  concrete  situations whereby  account 
can  be  taken  of the  rank-and-file workers. 
However,  this method  also  implies that  the  national 
unions  and  federations  should  come  together beforehand, 
sectorially or interprofessionally,  at  the  European 
level,  and  thus  reach agreements  about  what  they will 
proceed  to negotiate  at national level. 
Lastly,  the  same  trade  union  organisations must 
subsequently meet  regularly at European  level in order 
to  compare  the  results in the national field  and  to 
assess the  progress made. -33-
PAB!ICIPATION  IN  THE  ENTERPRISE 
1.  The  third theme  that we  should like to develop in this 
report is that of participation in the enterprise  by  the 
workers.  We  are fully aware  that we  are here  using an 
,expression that is contested,  not least of all in 
certain trade  union circles. If we  nevertheless use it, 
this is not  only because this subject,  thus formulated, 
was,proposed  to us  by  our principals in the  EEC 
departments,  but  indeed  because  we  should deliberately 
like to take  issue with this contestation  !  In fact, 
we  could easily circumvent this contestation and 
carefully limit  our terminology 
- either to  "democratisation of the enterprise",  against 
which expression no  one  can  or dares react  ! 
- or to  "workers'  control",  which expression is indeed 
sometimes  advocated  by  the  trade unions with respect 
to the  given situation and  the existing system. 
We  shall thus  be  dealing with "participation".  As 
will indeed appear from  the  report,  the  expressions 
"democratisation"  and  "control" will also be  used  ••• 
In any  case, it is our intention to avoid  a  war of 
words 
2.  This  subject is divided into two  parts. 
In the first part,  we  wish to develop the  philo-
sophy  of "workers'  participation in the life of their 
enterprise~. In this  w~y,  we  hope  to be  able  to develop 
a  sufficiently general- i.e., European- approach to 
the  subject,  so that we  shall rise above  "national" 
situations,  achievements  and  obstacles,  legislations 
and  experiments,  implementations  and  proposals. -34-
In a  second  part,  we  should  like  to  adopt  a  more 
concrete  approach,  but  then at  the European level.  We 
should  like here  to develop  the  standpoint  of the  European 
trade  unions  with respect  to  the  proposal of the  EEC 
Commission for a  Council  regulation concerning the 
Statute for European  limited  companies. 
3.  As  trade unionists,  we  would  wish to base  our argument 
on  three  recently published  standpoints  from  the workers' 
point  of wiew. 
In the first place,  the  standpoint  of our  own  national 
organisation.  !"'je  Belgian  Algemeen  Christelijk Vakverbond 
(ACV)  published its official standpoint in the  form  of 
a  report bearing the title "Democratisation of the 
Enterprise". 
We  should  then like to  draw  heavily  on  a  report that 
one  of our colleagues  - G.  Be  Swert  - has written,  under 
the title "Components  for a  Participation Theory",  for 
the  forthcoming  Congress  of the European  Organisation 
of the  World  Confederation of Labour  (WCL). 
Lastly we  shall.,  as  we  have  already announced,  base 
ourselves,  for the  draft  "European  company",  on  the 
almost  parallel standpoints of the European Organisation 
of the  WCL  and  of the ECFTU. 
* 
A.  Philosophy of participation in the enterprise. 
4.  The  demand  tor participation is a  general demand  in our 
society of the  1960s  and  1970s.  But  the  demand  for 
participation in the  enterprise is an equally general 
demand  of the workers  in our enterprises of the  1960s 
and  1970s. 
In this connection,  it is noteworthy that in recent 
years we  haTe  heard the  demand  by  the  workers for 
participation in their enterprise  - in these  very terms  --35-
not  only in the  Western  countries but also in the 
Eastern countries.  This is not  of a  nature  to surprise 
us for the  Western countrfes,  where  the enterpr;se 
system - insofar as it is dominated  by  capital-ism, 
Taylorism and  technocratic  power  - has for long regarded 
the  workers  as  "hirelings"  or "foreigners",  "coat-
incurring producers"  or "expensive  constimers", 
"underdeveloped"  or "irresponsible"  .. :. not  as normal 
people with normal expectations  ~normal skills.  We 
are  of the  opinion that  Presid~t De  Gaulle  also realised 
this and  thought  of genuine  ... participation structures  ••• 
but  the distrust was  t.oo  great  on  all aides. 
Would  not  the entire  phenomenon  of the  so-called 
wildcat  stri~es in our Western countries also be  a 
reyerse  expression of the workers'  demand  tor 
participation ?  Would  not  the  so-called unreasonable 
wage  demands  of the workers  be  a  prolongation of the 
employers'  practice,  whereby  they fob ott the workers' 
demand  tor human  working  conditions and  tor participation 
with wage  increases and  bonuses  ?  Would  not all the 
repugnance  of the  young  workers tor the work  system be 
found  to Driginate in the  absence  of any participation 
in the enterprise  ?  Whereas  these  young  people  feel 
themselves to be  "adult"  and  are  "adult",  they coae 
to. discover that not  only, they themselves,  but all 
workers,  are  conaidered to be  -well-paid - "adolescents". 
Our  surprise is however greater when  we  learn from 
the  Polish press that the workers'  revolts of December 
1970  in Poland  are  to be  explained,  inter alia,  by  the 
neglect of the  workers'  rights of participation in 
their enterprises,  although the  official enterprise 
structures in that country recognise  this participation. 
Sociologists are  able  to tell us  the  same  about  the 
workers in Czechoslovak enterprises.  The  centralistic, 
state-run and  collectivist structures here  apparently 
meke  their effects felt more  strongly than the 
participation structures for the workers  in the 
enterpriseai -36-
We  could  straight  away  link a  provisional conclusion 
with these  considerations:  participation in the  enterprise 
presupposes  structures as well  as  people.  Or  in other 
words:  people-promoting structures  and  structure-based 
people! 
It is, however,  superfluous here  to uphold  our first 
assertion with a  lengthy explanatory comment:  the  demand 
for participation is a  general  demand  in our society of 
the  1960s and  1970s.  In recent years,  no  other word  has 
been  in such common  use  :  in the  church,  in politica, 
in the university,  in the  mass  media,  in the  cultural world, 
in adult education,  in operation with marginal groups  in 
regional development •••  and  in the  trade  unions  themselves! 
Provisionally,  we  may  also  conclude  from  this: 
-on the  one  hand,  that  the  trade unionists who  jib at this 
"word"  cannot  swim  against  the  general tide; 
-on the  other hand,  that  the  employers  who  jib at this 
"reality" will nat be  ~ble to swim  against the  general tide 
either.  The  enterprise is not  an island in society! 
5.  "This trend is a  general reaction to disillusion.  Once  a 
democratic  system was  installed,  as  in the Western  countriee 
the  democratic  ideal was  minimalised;  it is now  being 
maximalised again.  Parliamentary democracy is regarded  as 
a  great acquisition,  but  an  acquisition that now  calls for 
concretisation,  for supplementing by  participation and  b~ 
a  democracy  that makes  its way  upwards  from·the  grassroots. 
My  newspaper must  become  our newspaper,  my  school must 
become  our eahoml,  and  my  enterprise must  become  our 
enterprise. 
The  history of democracy is neither more  nor lese than 
the  process  of increasing co-determination and  co-operation 
of eyer wider groups  in society in the  creation and 
execution of decisioDs  which affect this society.  The 
present-day class struggle is the  struggle  between  those -~-
who  have  a  say and  those  who  only have  to listen,  between 
the  bourgeoisie  of the articulate  and  the  prol~tariat of 
the  inarticulate".  (1) 
6.  What  do  we  understand  by  participation? This question must 
be  asked,  because  for a  few  years now  politic 
publicists,  trade unionists,  employers  and  lawyers have 
mastered  an  idea.  This has not  made  matters  any  clearer. 
We  Bbould  lose  our self-confidence  into the  bargain! 
However,  we  all know  very well what  Pope  John XXIII 
meant  just ten years ago  when  he  said in plain eyeryday 
language  that  "the  workers'  desire  to participate 
actively in the life of their enterprise is justified". 
Active  participation in life 
This is no  legal  jargon,  but human  language  ! 
In principle,  this embraces  everything and  nothing 
is excluded  :  certainly not  the life of the  enterprise. 
In principle,  this is valid at all levels. 
Participation takes  as  point  of departure  the  fact 
that there  are  people who  act  as  such,  who  keep their 
human  personality,  freely and  responsibly,  who  have  thair 
own  autonomy  of thought,  speeck,  consultation and  action. 
Thua  workers'  participation in the enterprise  includes 
the  group as well as the  individual,  t~e workers  of the 
enterprise as well as the  workers  of the  workshop,  the 
workers who  say  "yes"  as well as  those  who  say  "no",  the 
workers who  contest as well as those  who  associate,  the 
workers  as well as  the workers'  groups  :  the  trade  unions. 
Purthermore,  workers'  participation in the  enterprise is 
\ 
characterised by  the  twofild way  in which all forms  of 
participation are  expressed  :  by  the  recognition, 
valorieation and  development  of the  worker in his work 
and  in hie enterprise and  by accompanying  guaranteeing 
structures ot participation. 
(1)  Report  by  De  Swert  G.,  quoted  in the  introduction. -38-
One  and  the  other inseparably together!"  (2) 
Stated in yet  another way:  participation is the  endeavour 
of the  workers to acquire  influence  on  decision-making and 
thereby  on  the  progress  of the  enterprise,  or of the 
economy.  The  nature  of this influence,  the  form  of this 
influence,  the  level of this influence  may  differ  •••  but 
must  be  tangible.  Exerting influence  presupposes  power  and 
counter-power·,  but  equally well dialogue  and  reciprocity, 
recognition of oneself and  of the  others reciprocally. 
Acquiring influence is not  a  question of countervailing 
powers  which  cancel each other out  but  ~hich set each 
other in motion  in order to act  correctly.  Obviously,  the 
workers  can  acquire  no  influence  and  hence  wield  power if 
they are  not  informed,  not  correctly informed  and if they 
have  no  means  o~ checking the  information.  Workers'  control 
in this  sense  is a  ~ecessary condition for workers' 
participation. 
"With  a  sense  of reality and  through years  of 
experience,  the workers  know  that this participation will 
not  be  granted easily and  that the  participation in power 
will not  be  allotted to  them  benevolently.  In the  strongest 
sease  of the  word  it is a  question  of  "taking"  a  share, 
i.e.,  of conquering,  wresting,  getting bak what  has  always 
been refused  and  denied  them:  a  genuine  participation in 
real  power". 
"Hence,  we  can  then  say negatively that participation 
-is not  to be  reduced  to  a  new  form  of  a  human  relations 
movement; 
-but nor is it to  be  reduced  to  structural changes  which 
are  alleged to  be  the  sole  salvation. 
Participation is 
-not  the  elimination of the  trade  unions  or the  trade  union 
representatives; 
-but nor is it the  organisation of a  trade  union 
guardianship over  the  workers. 
Participation is 
(2)  ACV  report,  quoted  in the  introduction. -39-
-not  only a  question of a  top structure; 
-but  just as much  of a  basic structure. 
Participation is 
-not the  · incorporation of the  workers  in the  system; 
-but nor is it the  "revolution" ex nihilo.!  ••• 
Participation is 
-not the  elimination of the  trade  union struggle,  o~ the 
"no",  the  "veto","contestation"  or the  "strike"; 
-but nor is it the  declaration of the  "veto",  "contestation' 
or "strike" to  be  a  regime  or system. 
"The  demand  for participation in our modern  world  is 
a  general reaction against  the  general alienation which 
the  workers have  already been experiencing for a  hundred 
years in their work! ••• 
Participatio~ is a  movement  which constantly seeks to 
valoriee man  in his responsibility  •••  even as far as  the 
structures! 
In this sense,  participation is just as much  a  menta-
lity,  an attitude to life,  a  set of values. 
This is not  an easy process  ••• it calls for constant 
effort on  the  part of those  concerned,  even with the  best 
accompanying  structures. But  it is a  process  of 
liberation of the  worker  •••  and  the  trade  union movement 
is precisely the  instrument  of this liberation!"  (3) 
7.  Swords  into ploughshares!  We  must  apply this biblical 
image  to the  counter-arguments against participation. 
We  must  make  arguments  against into arguments for. 
"In the  employers'  and  financial world,  participation 
is repeatedly contested on  the  pretax that  the  workers are 
(3)  op.cit. -40-
not  ripe  for participation.  But  how  can  they be  prepared 
for it if they are never put  in a  position to exercice 
it ?tt  (4) 
A hundred  years  of  joint stock  companies  and  nearly 
a  hundred  years  of Taylorism must  indeed  mark  deeply 
the  mass  of workers,  while  on  the  other hand  they have 
known  only fifty years'  universal franchise,  twenty 
years'  full employment  and  higher schell-leaving age. 
Industrialisation,  automation,  thorough division of 
labour,  Napoleonic  organisation of the  enterprise,  the 
atmosphere  of the  hierarchical  system,  the  limited 
perspective  inherent  in the  work  of  an  operator or office 
employee  - the  worker lives for  the  greater part  of hie 
life in a  social  "underground".  He  can exert no  influence 
on  his working  conditions,  he  can  develop no feeling for 
the  goal  and  function  of his work  in the  whole  organisa-
tion of production,  he  can  acquire  no  relationship to 
the  work  as  form  of self-expression. 
The  tJpical form  of  an  authoritarian structure in 
modern  industry fails to cater for the  individual need 
for self-respect  and  self-confidence. 
The  problem is however not  only the  absence  of 
development  chances.  The  problem has  a  social and 
collective  character  :  legally,  he  hires his labour 
to  a  joint  stock  company;  hence,  impotence  and 
impossibility to  change  this situation,  via participation 
in the  decision-making in the  enterprise.  This 
cumulative  effect has  an  influence,  over a  certain 
period,  on  the  work  satisfaction,  on  the  value  and 
meaning  of the  work".  (5) 
Thus~ if we  wish radically to  reforge  this argument 
(4)  op.  cit. 
(5)  De  Swert  G.,  op.  cit. -41-
against into an argument for,then we  should have  to go  to 
the  other extreme  and  postulate  the  self-responsibility 
of the  workers'  community  of the enterprise.  The  term 
"workers'  sell-management" is somewhat  misleadingly used 
for this.  We  shall revert to this point later. It will 
suffice  to stress the  fact here  that this neither can 
nor may  occur outright,  in a  turn through 180°  from  the 
present unilateral domination  of the  capital factor to 
a  total domination  of the  labour factor.  But all feams  of 
participation,  high or low,  great  or small,  which move 
in this direction are  liberating for the  worker and fit 
into our trade  union  strategy. 
A second  counter-argument is of recent  origin and  is 
valid for the  countries with a  more  or less capitalistic 
economy  as well as  those with a  collectivist economy.  It 
is strikingly reflected by  the  following  remark  by 
Prof.  Galbraith on  Belgian television.  He  replied to 
the  question  :  "What  is your view of the  participation 
problem ?"  as follows  :  "Entirely hopeless.  I  advise  you 
not  to take  any further action  on  this reform  •••  The 
very nature  of the  organised,  bureaucratic management  of 
a  big concern monopolises  power in the  hands  of the  people 
who  share  in the  information  :  specialised technologists 
and  managers.  Both the 
11capitalist"  (6)  and  the worker 
are  excluded  from this". 
After such a  remark,  what  is there still to be  said 
about  participation ? 
(6)  For this part,  Bernard  Snoy  writes in  "Recherches 
Economiques  de  Louvain"  (Dec.  1970)  :  "The  ever growing 
interposition not  only of the  big limited  company  but 
also of the  financial intermediaries between  ownership 
of savings and  their productive  appropriation is acting 
increasingly as  a  screen to any  power  relationship 
proceeding from  one  to the  other. 
For its part,  the  power  to decide  the  specific form which 
will be  assumed  by the  accumulation of means  of produc-
tion seems  to be  concentrated more  and  more  every day 
in the  hands  of the  managers  or,  more  generally,  of the 
technostructures 
The  latter is all the more  absolute  insofar as the  enter-
prise is in a  position to engage  in self-financing, i.e., 
to combine  the  functions  of saving and  investment  in 
equivalent proportions,  which is the  dominant  situation 
in the United States". 
At  the  same  time,  this amounts  to saying that the  legal 
basis of the  whole  system of the  limited company  rests 
on  nothing more  than that  ! -42-
We  should  point  out first  of all that this  remark 
applies equally well  to the  whole  of social and  political 
life.  The  basic question is:  "What  then  remains  of  the 
whole  notion  of democracy?"  Our first reply is therefore 
a  moral  reaction:  t~is may  not  hap~en •••  in the  name  of 
democracy.  We  do  not  want  to  allow ourselves to  be  domi-
nated  by  the  technocrats,  even not  by  the  beneficent 
technocrats  •••  simply because it may  not  be.  Furthermore, 
Prof.  Galbraith makes  a  caricature  of participation, 
presenting it as  though it is a  situation in which  a  trade 
union  secretary simply walks  into  a  Board  of Directors  from 
outside  and  starts discussing the  policy to be  followed 
with the  managers.  Moreov~r,  the  workers  do  not  ask to  be 
assimilated with the  professional expert  funetion  of the 
management,  but  they wish to exert  influence  on  the  policy 
of the  management  for important  and  long-term decisions. 
We  shall  see  how  below.  But  the  workers'  participation must 
be  conceived  as  an  overall,  dynamic  process  of many  and 
diverse  forms  of participation in an  upward  direction, 
taking as  point  of departure  a  broad  basis at the  lowest 
level.  The  workers'  participation in the  enterprise must 
finally be  regarded  in the  whole  context  of participation 
of the  citizens in society. 
A third  argument  agains~ connects  up with the  two 
foregoing  ones.  As  the workers'  participation in the  enter-
prise is either excluded  by  the  capitalistic system,  or is 
impossible  from  the  point  of view of the  imperatives  of a 
complex  technology  and  organisation,  or else is,  allegedly, 
not  desired  by  the  workers,  then  - eo  the  reasoning goes  -
"compensation"  must  be  granted  to  the  workers  in leisure  time 
and  in the  consumer  society! 
This reasoning must  be  turned  around  as well,  for put 
thus it strongly resembles  a  flight  from  the  problem and 
even  a  guiJ.ty !light!  The  problem  of labour  and  of the 
labour  system is not  solved  thereby.  Furthermore.  production -43-
system and  consumption  system are  one,  and  labour system 
and  leisure  time  system are  linked with each other.  This is 
not to be  denied.  Consequently,  the ills as well  as  the 
health of the  one  also affect the  other,  and  the  medBcine 
for the  one  also serves for the  other.  If this is not  so, 
theA  there would  no  calling-in-question of the  consumer 
society. 
Thus  we  come  to a  general conclusion:  logic demands 
that those  who  defend  democracy  as  a  general principle or 
in ita parliamentary form  should  therefore  defend  democracy 
in the enterprise in principle.  The  forms  and  conditinns 
can be  discussed  subsequently. 
8.  "Participation in the  enterprise  thus implies  a  change,  to a 
greater or lesser extent,  of the  orthodox  structure of 
authority,  in which decision-making has  become  the 
"prerogative• of management.  Modern  management  theories 
also make  no  careful distinction between various  forms 
of participation,  for the  simple  reason that participation 
for thea is simply a  management  technique  like any  other, 
which  can act as a  stimulus for the  specific goal of the 
enterprise:  organisational efficiency.  For them  participa-
tion ia not  a  method  of decision-making,  but  a  number  of 
techniques that are  aimed  at getting the workers  to accept 
decisions that have  already been  taken.  The  form  assumed 
by this participation all too often involves absolutely no 
decision-making and  must  be  stigmatieed as  pseude- partici-
pation,  the  purpose  of which is merely to create  a  feeling 
ot participation via a  technique  aimed  at convincing  people. 
g. Participation,  on  the  other hand,  whereby  the  workers  have 
the  possibility of influencing the  decision-making,  while 
the ultimate  power  of decision remains with the  management 
is partial participation. Participation at the  place  of work 
is in moat  cases partial participation,  and  at the  same  time 
participation at the  lower leval:  supervision of the 
daily activity at the  place  of work.  un  the  other hand, -44-
participation at the  higher level points to decisions with 
respect to the  running  of the entire enterprise,  decisions 
concerning investments,  marketing,  etc.  Partial participation 
is possible at both management  levels.  There  is yet  another 
form  of participation at the  lower level  :  groups  of workera, 
who  themselves  arrange  their work,  virtually not  under the 
leadership of the  mangement  and  who  take  their own  decisions 
in connection with the  daily work  process.  This  form gives 
a  complete  participation  :  a  process whereby  each individual 
member  of the  decision-making body has  the  same  power to 
determine  the  outcome  of decisions.  In the  same  way  as 
partial participation,  complete  participation is possible 
t 
at the  higher as wall as  the  lower management  level,  or 
at both levels. 
10.  Examples  (in Great Britain,  Norway  and  Yugoslavia)  prove 
that it is possible,  at least at the  level of the  daily 
work  process,  to change  considerably the  structure  of power 
in the  enterprise,  so  as  to  gi~e the  workers  almost  complete 
control over their work,  and  participation in a  wide  range 
of decision-making,  even without  any loss of  productive 
efficiency - on  the  contrary. 
A structure  can  be  set up which,  with the  support 
of the  trade  unions,  renders  possible  control in all fields 
that directly affect the  world  of labour  :  right  to work, 
income  guarantee,  promotion,  no  dismissal without  prior 
reclassification,  employment  in accordance  with qualifica-
tion,  adjustment  of the  workshop  to  the  ~eople working 
there,  respect for the health and  safety conditions, 
checking  of time  and  pace  of work,  elimination of differences 
in statue between the  various  categories  of workers. 
In all fields  of work  arrangement  and  work  environment, 
a  worker must  either exert  supervision,  if not  partial 
participation,  in respect  of at least those  decisions -~-
which directly affect his  own  work,  or must  himself 
arrange,  in a  system of labour consultation,  for the 
execution of the work,  which we  then call complete 
participation. 
There is at present a  widespread desire  among  very 
diverse  categories of workers for  such participation. 
There  are not  only empirical experiences.  There  are  the 
reason•  of labour dissatisfaction,  which point in the  same 
direct~on. And  there is an indirect  proof of this in the 
trend which strikes have  taken. 
11.  This possibility of  "low  participation" is the nodal 
point for the  reply to the  question about  the number  of 
workers who  may  be  expected,  in the  long term,  to valorise 
the  possibilities afforded  in a  democratised  system.  Labour 
consultation seems  to us to  be  the  appropriate  form  of 
"low participation" whereby  the  greatest number  of workers 
can be  directly attained.  Furthermore,  we  are  of the 
opinion that  once  participation is set up in the  workshop, 
the  process become  self-sustaining,  because  the  human 
qualities required for its successful operation,  are 
precisely those  which  are  developed  by  the  participation 
process itself. People  become  fit for participation 
by  participation. 
12.  In the  absence  of this primary paactical scho•l,  of this 
vital practice  ground,  the  introduction on  a  large  scale 
of  "high participation" will probably,  at the  very least,  . 
spontaneously trigger off a  wide  response  among  the 
workers.  On  the  other hand,  the  ever greater demand  for 
"low participation" suggests that more  workers would 
ultimately participate actively in a  democratised industrial 
system at a  higher level than the majority of sceptics  · 
about  industrial democracy  commonly  think.  Some  support 
for this can already be  found  in the  increased participation 
such as  can be  observed in the  economic  and  political 
institutions in Yugoslavia and  Norway. -46-
In this direction,  we  are  also  convinced that the 
participation process,  installed at the  workshop  level, 
is an irreversible  process. 
"Low  participation" will indeed  form  the  training 
par excellence for participation in decision-making at the 
higher level.  Experiences with decision-making at the 
lower 1evel will make  the  workers  realise  the  limitations 
of purely  "low participation", will cause  them to 
experience  the  fact  that their participation is 
circumscribed,  inter alia,  in the  juridical structure  of 
the  enterprise,  which has still not  recognised  labour or 
the  worker.  "Low  participation" must  be  linked with 
"high participation". 
The  enterprise,  a  social institution,  cannot  possibly 
continue  to function  as  personal enrichment  for the  owners 
ot capital or as  private  organisation ground  for a 
management  acting in  an  ever more  autonomous  way.  The 
joint stock company  must  be  converted,  in a  first stage, 
into an  enterprise  company,  whereby  the  capital factor, 
now  regarded  aa  primary,  will only  be  valoriaed as  one  of 
the  factors to be  .recognised in the  enterprise,  and 
whereby  the  labour factor will acquire  an initial right 
of legitimation and  control over the  management,  leadership 
and  power. 
This high participation,  this influencing at the 
high enterprise level,  may  be  established in various 
proposable  forms  of  "equilibrium"  between  labour and 
capital. 
13.  Whatever form it may  assume,  this high participation 
may  not  imply  any strict co-management,  positive,  direct, 
in the  leadership of the  enterprise,  but  indeed  co-
suprevision of the  management,  limitation of the  right 
to dispose  of the  property.  Indeed,  it could not  imply 
these  things in a  modern  enterprise.  In this connection, 
we  are  faced with the  management's  own  development, 
legally and  structurally recognised  as  the  Board  of 
Directors  ("Bestuur"  in Dutch,  Directotre" in French, 
or "Vorstand"  in German).  In this discussion,  indeed, -47-
the  advocates  of participation and,  a  fortiori,  of 
self-management,  are  often pitchforked into a  caricatural 
form  of direct democracy.  It is indeed not feasible  to 
allow all workers  to pass  judgment  on  each technical 
problem in the enterprise.  But  nor can  one  still defend 
the  point of view that efficient business man1gement 
presupposes  rapid  decision-making  (by  one  man  or a  few 
people).  The  most  important decisions in a  large enter-
prise are  already taken in an  interdisciplinary process 
of long-term planning.  This evolution therefore makes  it 
quite  possible  to hive  off the  entrepreneur's function  : 
the  long-term decisions can be  transferred,  for example, 
to a  Supervisory Board  (participation)  and  the  management 
(staff) will then  operate within this proposed  framework. 
What  is indeed  involved  in this group of problems is  : 
how  the  expert knowledge  is applied,  how  control over 
the  activity of the  experts can  be  built in  : 
- at the  place  of work  in a  system of labour consultation; 
- at the  level of the  large  department via a  departmental 
council; 
- via the works  council at the  level of all workers 
employed  in the enterprise; 
- via a  kind  of supervisory board,  in which all interests 
present in and  around  the  big enterprise are  placed 
in a  balanced way. 
In the  framework  of these levels,  the management 
will need  to exercise  a  well-defined policy,  and  will 
need  to lay down  responsibility therefor,  from  which 
the  consequences  can be  drawn".  (7) 
14.  Diversity,  degrees  and  evolutions in participation 
Without  entering into concrete  formulae  and 
whitout  pronouncing an  opinion  on  the  various existing 
(7)  De  Swert  G.,  op.  cit. -48-
national forms  and  institutions of participation within 
the enterprise,  we  must  nevertheless emphatically postulate 
that in participation as well,  diversity,  degrees  and 
evolutions are  both desirable  and  necessary. 
We  have  indeed  already repeatedly referred to 
Furthermore,  we  have  emphatically developed  value,  need, 
connection and  dynamics  of  "low  participation"  and  "high 
participation" as well as  of  "part:...al"  and  "complete 
participation"  in the  extreme  examples  of labour consulta-
tion  on  the  one  hand  and  of a  supervisory board  - even 
of workers'  self-management  - on  the  ether. 
We  should  like  to refer concisely here  to a  few  other 
aspects  of the  general statement  :  diversity,  degree  and 
evolution are  desirable  and  necessary. 
There  are  various types  of enterprises  and  thus there 
must  also be  various degrees  and  forme  of participation. 
Although  there is room  for labour consultation in all 
enterprises, it will differ as  to content  and  organisation 
in small  and  large enterprises,  in enterprises that are 
strongly developed  organisationally in the  light of mass 
production or the  delivery of mass  services,  in 
decentralised enterprises and  in new  "craft" enterprises, 
in government  institutions and  in public departments.  A 
supervisory board  juxtaposed with a  board  of directors 
(Vorstand)  and  in which representatives of labour 
interests have  a  seat alongside  those  of capital and  of 
the  general interest  seems  to  be  suitable  only for large 
enterprises with,  e.g.,  one  thousand workers.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  supervisory board is aevertheless necessary in a 
financial  or industrial holding  company  •••  but its 
composition will be  broken  down  otherwise  because  the 
interests are  different  :  for axample,  the  general interest 
and  the  interest of all workers.  And  what  about  a 
supervisory board  in a  public enterprise  •••  here  too  there -49-
must  be  one,  but it will be  different.  The  participation 
structures in small  and  medium-sized  enterprises must  be 
otherwise,  not  only because  of their dimension,  but  often 
also because  there still exist personal  {property) 
relationships and  corporate  relationships which  do  not 
exist in a  big enterprise.  The  enterprise that is 
beginning,  newly incorporated  and  growing up must  also 
have  its own  structures  :  recognition and  protection. 
And  what will be  the high participation structures for the 
"workers"  of the  government  departments  ? 
15. !here would need to be  works  councils everywhere,  but 
in order to be  genuine  participation organa,  they would 
have  to be  based  on  the  various dimensions which the 
enterprise assumes. 
A large enterprise has in fact various dimensions, 
to which in each case  a  works  council must  correspond. 
!here must  be  a  works  council at the  level of the  legal 
unit  :  enterprise,  industrial or financial holding 
company.  Within the  same  country,  enterprises operate 
as legal units,  in which enterprises are  included as 
technical industrial units.  At  the European level,  we 
speak then of a  European  company  and  of separate national 
fixed  establishments.  These  are  various dimensions,  to 
which in each case  a  works  council with its own  task must 
correspond.  But  the  same  anxiety to set up participation 
bodies tor the  various dimensions  of the enterprise is 
just as valid for the  various internal organisational 
and  operational  ~asic structures of the  large enterprise. 
We  mean  here  that consultative  bodies must  exist there, 
e.g., at the  level of the  sections and  departments  : 
sectional councils and  departmental  councils,  where  the 
representatives of the workers  concerned  meet  the head 
of section or departmental manager. 
In this way,  an  organised contact is created  almost 
obviously with the  participation at the  level of the -50-
workshop.  What  we  aim  to achieve,  in the  large  and  medium-
sized enterprises,  is a  pyramid  of participation with 
a  broad  base  and  an  apex.  If this does not exist in an 
organised  and  structural way,  then not  mueh  will come  of 
a  participation movement  in the  large  and  medium-sized 
enterprise.  In this way,  we  hope  to link permanently 
apex  and  base  with each other,  obtaining a  movement  in 
both directions,  while  the  participation is developed 
organically,  participation chances  are  created in 
accordance  with the  measure  and  interest of  the  various 
workers  and  the  whole  can  be  made  into  an  instrument  of 
democratic  selection,  indication and  supervision within 
the  workers'  group itself.  Quality will gain thereby 
We  know  that in the  big steel concern  "Roesch 
Stahlwerke"  in Dortmund,  52,000 workers  are  in principle 
involved each week  in a  downward  and  upwart  circuit in 
an  information and  participation process.  While  the 
"Vorstand"  meets  each Monday,  the  worker  chairmen  of the 
various works  councils meet  w~th the  labour manager each 
Tuesday.  On  Wednesdays,  the  works  councils  of the  concern 
hold  a  meeting  and  on  Thursdays  the  various members  of 
the  works  councils meet  the  "delegates"  of their 
respective  groups  and  sections  :  1,200 in all.  On  Fridays 
there is consultation with the  rank-and-file. 
At  first sight,  this appears  to  be  German  organisa-
tional mania.  From  a  comparison with what  does  not  happen 
in comparably large  firms  in Belgium - which we  know 
well,  after all  !  - we  cannot  but  complain. 
16.  Participation in the  enterprise,  national planning 
.and national economy  must  be  interconnected.  This  may 
appear to be  obvious,  but nevertheless it calls for 
further explanation. -51-
As  the  enterprise is a  component  of the national 
econo~, there is incontestably a  close link between the 
two.  But  there is no  identification.  Furthermore,  we  would 
not wish for identification.  The  census  of the  enterprises 
does not give  the total of the national economy.  The 
operating conditions,  criteria and  objectives of the  one 
are not  the  same  as for the  other. 
There  is thus  a  problem of how  both must  affect 
each other.  We  should like to examine  this from  the  point 
of view of participation. 
Directly there is no  relation between  participation 
at the  lew level or participation of the  "works  council" 
type  and  the national  econo~. Indirectly,  this influence 
may  indeed  be  positive.  A closer link with the national 
economy  is already to  be  established in the  presumption 
of forms  of high participation by  the  workers in tije 
large enterprises,  in the  industrial and  financial 
holding companies  and  public enterprises. It would 
also be  an important  thing for the National Economy 
if the  law  on  joint stock eompanies were  to be  replaced 
by  an enterprise  law with a  dual  team  :  "enterprise 
management"  and  a  "supervisory board".  In the latter, 
depending  on  whether it is a  question of large enterprises 
or holding companies,  a  balanced  and  weighted  representa-
tion would  then be  Civen to all the  interests concerned  : 
those  providing capital,  institutional investors,  workers 
from  the enterprise,  trade  union  confederations acting 
in the interest of all workers,  representation of the 
general  (regional)  interests. 
Furthermore,  it may  be  assumed  that in such an 
enterprise structure  the  relationship with a  democratic 
national planing body  can be  made  easier than in the 
present  system of large  limited companies  or capital 
holding companies. 
But  a  problem also arises in another hypothesis 
of high but  complete  participation by  the workers.  We  mean -52-
the  workers'  self-management  or the  system whereby  the 
primary responsibility for the  enterprise is given  to the 
workers'  community.  Stated as  a  general idea or as ultimate 
goal,  we  must  in the  long  term follow this path and  there 
are  no  reasons for anxiety about  this,  for we  see  in the 
long term no  other alternative in order to  save  "free 
enterprise"  •••  unless  one  were  to  opt  for the  anonymous 
"technocracy"  under the  auspices  of the  limited  company 
or else for the  state-run enterprise,  embedded  in a  centra-
listic state  planning  scheme.  In the  hypothesis  of the 
"workers'  self-management",  a  solution must  also  be  given 
to  the  interplay and  the  incorporation  of other justified 
interests  :  the  trade  unions  acting for all workers,  the 
regional interests,  the  national economic  plan  •••  and 
even  the  capital interest,  even if this  should  be  "public" 
capital interest. 
We  thus  come,  quite naturally,  to  two  conclusions  : 
the  first relates to free  enterprise,  the  other to the 
position of the  trade  unions. 
17.  The  salvation of free  enterprise  resides  solely in the 
workers'  participation.  Conversely,  there  is also no  valid 
alternative for the  workers  other than  participation in 
the  enterprise.  Other alternatives are  to  be  rejected  : 
- flight  outside  the  enterprise; 
- the  joint stock  company,  even if it were  to  pay  high 
wages  and  be  controlled from without  by  the  trade  union 
or the  state; 
- the  technocratically managed  enterprise,  even if the 
technocrats were  to be  "enlightened monarchs"; 
- the nationalised enterprise  raised  to  the  status of 
system; 
- the  state enterprise,  included  in the network  of a 
centralistic and  collectivistic state  planning. 
But  the  defenders  of free  enterprise,  of free -53-
initiative,  of management,  of healthy  compe~ition, of 
normal  supply  ~d demand  relationships,  of innovation, 
of creativity •••  in a  word,  of all that is good  in our 
enterprise-wise  constructed  economy,  must  be  aware  that 
they will only be  a'ie to save  the  enterprise if the 
workers  can  speak,  de  jure  and  de  factor of  "their" 
enterprise  !  This  can  only happen  in a  bold  process  of 
low  and  high,  partial and  complete  participation. 
18.  In any  case,  the  trade  unions must  continue  to play their 
own  role  and  thus  remain  autonomous  •••  in the  optimum 
structure  and  the  optimum  practice  of workers'  participa-
tion in their enterprise as well.  The  autonomy  of the 
trade  union movement  must  remain  guaranteed,  even in  a 
system of  "workers'  self-management".  The  role  of the 
trade  union movement  is primarily external and  secondarily 
internal  :  in the first place, it will have  to act as 
"stimulus",  as  "executor"  of the  new  structures and 
attitudes,  as guide,  as teacher and  trainer,  as guarantor 
for the  system  •••  and  thus also as  "controller" or 
"supervisor".  An  important field for trade  union  supervision 
is located here.  The  trade  union movement  will be  involved 
in initiatives with respect  to labour consultation, it 
will  reques~ certain guarantees at the  time  of works 
council elections, it will continue  to stipulate collective 
agreements,  it will continue  to act  •••  to contest, it 
will be  present in a  minority position as ."guarantor"  and 
"supervisor" in a  "supervisory board"  and  thus at the  same 
time  defend  the  interests of all workers  and  not  only 
those  of the  local group  ••• it will create  and  settle 
conflicts 
This  role is sometimes delicate  and  ~ifficult. 
Suitable  forms will have  to be  worked  out  •••  but  the 
trade unions must  in any  case  remain  themselves. -54-
B.  Trade  union  standpoint  concerning the Buropean Company 
19.  We  have  already explained  in our introduction why  we 
also wish to deal in this report with the  proposal of the 
EEC  Commission  concerning the  Statute for European  limited 
companies.  This is a  concrete  proposal,  vis-a-vis which 
the European trade  unions  :  the  ECFTU  and  the  EO/WCL, 
have  published  an  almost  unanimous  standpoint. 
In this report  we  must  act  on  the  assumption  that 
the  readers are  familiar with the  proposal of the  EEC 
Commission,  at least in its broad  outlines and  its general 
philosophy.  It is mainly  our intemtion here  to  add  the 
trade  uniom standpoint,  so  as  to meet  the  demand  for 
information as well as  the  demand  for discussion  and 
confrontation.  In this connection,  we  shall base  ourselves 
mainly  on  the  statement  of position by  the  EO/WCL  of 
11  March  1971.  The  ECFTU  already did this previously 
on  19  October 1970. 
20.  General  statement  of positmon 
It is encouraging to note  that both organisations 
at the European  level have  to  such a  large  extent  reached 
a  unanimous  standpoint.  The  "Societas Europea"  - S.E.  -
is a  desirable  thing for European unification and  will 
indeed  come  about  sonner or later.  The  proposal for a 
regulation  on  the  subject,  originating from  the  EEC 
Commission,  offers us  an  opportunity to introduce  an 
"enterprise  law",  which will definitely move  away  from 
the  generally contested  "joint stock company  law"  and  to 
ensure  that  the  "European workers",  the European  recogni-
tion of workers,  the European workers'  interests,  the 
representation of the European workers'  interests,  European 
trade  unionism  and  European  collective  agreements,  find 
acceptance  in the European enterprise. 
Unity in the  European trade  union movement  about  a -~-
step to be  taken with respect to the  development  chances 
for the  workers,  by means  of an S.E.  in accordance  with 
our ideas,  will exert its ~nfluence at the  political 
level and  increase  the  chances  of the  acceptance  of our 
theories· at the  political level. 
The  European  organisations of trade  unions may  not 
now  run the  risk of giving our opponents  an alibi, 
through lack of European unanimity,  to miait as muah 
as  possible  or even entirely exclude,  at European level 
the  representation of the  workers  in the  S.E.  and  their 
influence  on  the  policy bodies  of the  S.E.  Por these 
reasons,  the European  trade union  organisations are 
seeking for as great  a  unanimity as  possible. 
The  leading national trade unions,  affiliated to 
the E.O.  of the  WCL,  can state their agreement  on  the 
following points  : 
- the necessity for the  enterprises to recognise  the 
trade unions  as  spokesmen  of the  workers  in the 
enterprise and  to guarantee  the  free  exercise  of 
trade union rights within the enterprises; 
- the necessity for granting the  trade  unions  the  right 
to negotiate  collective agreements  as well as enterprise 
agreements; 
- the  right for the  trade  unions to be  consulted  on  all 
important economic  decisions and  in particular on  those 
with consequences  in the field of employment  and 
working conditions; 
- the necessity for informing the workers  and  their 
representatives,  e.g.,  in the  works  council,  honestly 
and  in a  suitable way; 
- the necessity for granting the  workers  control rights 
in the  light of various autonomous  and  structured 
forma  of participation at all levels and  under trade 
union guarantee; 
- the necessity to humanise  work,  also under trade  union -56-
guarantee,  and  taking as  point  of departure  the  everyday 
work milieux  :  office  and  workshop,  even if this has 
implications for  the  labour structures now  existing; 
- the  need  for having  a  good  works  council; 
- the  refusal in the  present  circumstances of  co-management 
in the  strict  juridical sense  by  the  workers;  we  mean 
by  this the  right  to  co-manage  in a  positive  and  juridi-
cal sense  and  in a  direct way; 
- the  idea of  a  form  of workers'  self-management  as  an 
ideal to be  attained  and  as final prospect  of an 
evolution,  according to various  stages  and  in the 
longer term. 
21.  Critical comments  on  the  concrete  proposals  by  the  EEC 
Commission with respect  to  the  ''representatives  of the 
workers  in the  S .E.'' 
a.  The  European Works  Council 
The  EO/WCL  is obviously in favour  of the  setting-up 
of European Works  Councils.  There  is a  special reason 
for this  :  they are  composed  exclusively of representa-
tives of the  workers.  The  European  Works  Council  can 
consequently genuinely  represent  the  workers  in the  S.B. 
As  regards  ~he draft of the European Works  Council, 
we  give  below  a  number  of marginal  comments  and 
proposals  : 
Concerning the  field  of application 
Art.  100  provides  that  a  European Works  Council 
is only set up in an  S.E.  WAich  has  permanent 
establishmants in more  than  one  Member  State.  This 
implies that there  would  be  no European Works  Council 
in an S.E.  with  permanent  establishments in only 
one  country. 
The  EO/WCL  can  in no  case  agree with this,  because -57-
it is a  discrimination and  furthermore it is not  in 
accordance  with the European  objective  of the  draft 
regulation. 
Concerning the  number  of members  of the European 
Works  Council. 
Provision would  have  to be  made  that each country 
where  one  or more  permanent  establishments exist may 
delegate at least one  elected representative to the 
European Works  Council.  Furthermore,  provision must  be 
made  for permission to  add  up  the  establishments in oae 
country which have  less than  200  workers,  for the 
purpose  of determining the  number  of representatives 
in the European Works  Council. 
Concerning the  secrecy obligation 
This  may  go  too far,  because  the  management  may 
characterise  anything  and  everything as  "to be  kept 
secret".  The  following would  need  to be  added  :  "with 
the  approval of the European Works  Council".  In case 
of contestation,  the  matter would  then be  transferred 
by the management  to an appeal  body  "as  provided in 
case  of settlement of.dieputes". 
Concerning the  presence  of a  delegate  of a  trade  union 
organisation as representative  in one  of the  institu-
tions ot the  S.E. 
The  EO/WCL  deems  it sufficient that  one  sixth of 
the  members  of the European Works  Council ask !or this. 
The  majority of the European Works  Council need B2! 
decide  this point.  If one  sixth of the  members  eo 
request,  the  matter is in any  case  important  enough to 
admit  the  trade  union delegate  for an  opinion. 
Concerning the  obligation of the European Works  Council 
to inform the  workers 
Art.  118  - 1  is too general.  Provision would  have 
to be  made  expressly for at least  one  form  of informa-
tion and  consultation,  i.e.,  joint meetings with the 
general meeting of the national works  councils 
(workers'  delegatee),  whether or not  supplemented  by -58-
a  meeting with the  management  of the  S.E.  and  the 
leaders  of the  permanent  establishments.  The  law would 
need  to  provide  that  such a  meeting  should  occur at 
least  once  a  year.  This  appears  important  to the  EO/WCL, 
from  the  organic,  but  also from  the  trade  union  and 
European  point  of view. 
Concerning tasks  and  powers 
Art.  119  defines  the  general  powers  of the  European 
Works  Council  :  "To  promote  the interests of the 
workers".  In  principle,  this is possible  because  the 
European Works  Council is composed  exclusively of 
representatives of the  workers.  The  European Works 
Council  can  conclude  agreements with the  enterpri~es. 
T~se are  legally to be  regarded  as  agreements  bearing on 
internal regulations.  The  observance  thereof can  be  ••'-
forced,  if not  by  other means,  via the·  disputes  committee 
provided for in Art.  128.  But is must  be  made  clear that 
a  collective  agreement has priority over these  agreements 
bearing  on  internal regulations. 
Special powers  : 
a)  information  (Art.  120.2 - Art.  121  - Art.  122),  a 
right  of approval  (Art.  123)  and  a  right of opinion 
(Art.  124  -Art.  125).  We  can  agree  with this as 
attainable in the  present  circumstances. 
b)  to exercise  supervision over the  application of  : 
- the  existing legal provisions; 
- the  collective  agreements; 
- the  enterprise's  own  agreements. 
In general,  the  EO/WCL  can  agree  with this,  provided 
that the  field  of working  conditions,  concerning which 
collective  agreements  can  be  concluded,  is defined in 
greater detail with the  trade  unions  (Art.  146). 
The  s~ecial powers  of the European Works  Council 
go  further in various  aspects than is now  the  case  in 
one  or more  national legislations. -59-
b.  Concerning the  settlement of disputes. 
"The  disputes  committee  is composed  ot members 
who  are  appointed in equal parts by  the European Works 
Council and  by  the  management  of the  S.E.,  and  an 
impartial chairman who  is appointed  iB  joint consultation 
by  both parties"  (Art.  128). 
The  EO/WCL  is generally in agreement  wi.th this. 
It adds,  however,  that the European Works  Council  for 
its part would  nead  to designate  representatives,  chosen 
on  the  recommendation  of the  representative  trade  unions 
(at European level).  The  intention is to  promote 
European trade  unionism per industrial branch by  this 
means  as well. 
c.  Representation of the  workers in the  supervisory board 
The  supervisory board is a  general control board 
(Art.  73  +  78)  for authorisation of acts of the 
management  in specific cases  (Art.  66.1)  and  for aviee 
(Art •  7 3 • 2 ) • 
The  EEC  Commission  proposes that the  representation 
of the workers  in the  supervisory board  should  be 
arranged  in a  one-third proportion  (Art.  137-1).  Tije 
members  of the national works  councils elect the workers' 
representatives in the  supervisory b9ard  (Art.  139-1). 
The  European trade  union  organisations ECFTU  and 
EO/WCL  propose,  on  the  other hand,  the  following 
balanced  structure  :  1/3 representatives of the  general 
meeting of shareholders;  1/3 representatives of the 
workers  :  both together elect the  remaining 1/3.  The 
latter provision is made  in order to  oblige  the first 
two  groups  to  reach agreement  on  the  composition 
of the  third 1/3.  This  balanced  structure was 
conceived  in such a  way  that  : 
- it could  give  confidence; 
- it could  work  and  reach decisions. -60-
Another words,  the  establishment  of the  power to 
supervise  comes  about  in a  bipartite  power relationship 
1/3 to  1/3.  The  subsequent  confidence  is based  on  this. 
On  the  other hand,  the  exercise  of the  power is subsequently 
implemented  by  simple  majority in a  group,  which is 
composed  of three  times  1/3.  By  means  of this formula,  a 
normal  operation of the  supervisory board is ensured  and 
the  contrasts at  the  time  of establishment  of the  power 
are  more  or less blurred  by  the  execution. 
The  EO/WCL  is altogether opposed  to  the  formula 
1/3  to 2/3,  proposed  by  the  EEC  Commission. 
If one  really has  in mind  not  only  the  interests of the 
workers  but  also the  interest of the  enterprise,  and  thus 
not  only the  interest  of  those  providing capital or of the 
joint stock  company,  then  the  supervisory board  cannot 
be  developed  in  such a  way  that the  workers  are  organised 
unilaterally in the  minority  by  the  very  structure  of  the 
institution.  This is good neither for the  workers nor for 
the  enterprise.  On  the  contrary,  the  EO/WCL  interprets it as 
an  attempt  to integrate  the  power  of labour,  by  a  falsified 
participation formula,  in the  structures  of European 
capitalism. 
The  draft of the  EEC  Commission  expressly confers  on 
the  Management  the  task of  "promoting the  interests of 
the  company  and its staff"  (Art.  70).  If this is meant 
seriously,  then this management  must  be  placed  structurally 
in such a  position that it can  cope  with this twofold  task. 
It eo  happens  that  the  role  and  composition  of the 
supervisory board is such that  the  superiority of  one 
interest - the  capital interest - is organised in the 
S.E.  by  the  very  structure  of the  Supervisory Board.  How 
can even  the  best  management  be  free  vis-a-vis this 
structured pressure  in order to  perform its legal task 
(Art.  70). -61-
The  formula  of a  minority presence  of the  workers has 
existed for a  long time  in the  "Conseil d'Administration" 
in France,  as well as under the  "minor co-management" 
formula in Germany.  In this  connection~ there is general 
agreement  - even  outside  the  trade  union movement  - that 
this double  example  has yielded no  results.  On  the  othe.r 
hand,  the  experiment  of the  so-called  "major co-management, 
insofar as it is a  question of a  balanced  structure in the 
supervisory board,  is indeed  positive in Germany, 
although it is not  perfect  and  is not  a  final goal. 
This is confirmed  by  many  scientific and  parliamentary 
surveys in Germany. 
Lastly,  we  should  point to the  lack of logic  shown 
by  the  EEC  Commission,  when  it foresees,  for disputes 
between  the European Works  Council  and  the Management, 
an arbitration institution on  the  basis of a  balanced 
structure  (Art.  128),  but  on  the  other hand  provides, 
for the  relations a  minority structure to the  disadvantage 
of the  workers  (Art.  137). 
Furthermore,  the  EO/WCL  does not  agree  with Art.  139-6 
in which it is provided  that the list that receives the 
most  votes and at least half of the  votes cast shall win 
This method  of appointing the  worker members  in the 
supervisory board  oppresses  the  trade  ~.ion minorities. 
It would  amount  to the  introduction of a  kind  of closed-
shop formula,  which is altogether contrary to our 
European  trade  union traditions. 
d.  Arrangement  of the  working conditions 
Not  least in importance  in the EEC  proposal are 
Art.  146  and  147,  in which provision is made,  via 
collective agreements,  for the  possibility of arriving 
at an  arrangement  of working conditions  "between the  S.E. 
and  the  trade  unions  represented in its permanent 
establishments"  (Art.  146).  This is incontestably an -~-
advance,  especially as  these  collective agreements  "are 
directly valid  and  compulsory for all workers  of the 
S.E.,  who  are  members  of the  trade  union which is party 
to  a  collective  agreement"  (Art.  147-1) 
We  have,  however,  already dealt with this subject 
in another section of this report. 
* 
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FOREWORD 
This is a  free-floating  conference,  a  brain-storming 
session  rather  than  the  precise technical  examination  of 
clear-cut  alternatives.  Accordingly  I  report  in  a  less 
technical  style than  might  be  appropriate  at  a  later stage 
of  the  discussion  of  the Community's  social policy.  What 
we  have  to  decide is not  whether  some  specific  solution to 
a  given  problem is right  or wrong,  but  which  broad  groups 
of  problems  about  the  function  and  position  of  individuals 
in  the  enterprise are  most  likely to  deserve  the attention 
of  the Community  institutions in  the  years  ahead,  and  what 
types of  issue will -arise  in each.  We  must  not  look 
unrealistically far  ahead,  but  it is part  of  realism to 
recognise  that  Community  policy may  take  years  to  elaborate 
and  still more  years  to carry into  practical effect,  especially 
at  this  time  when  the  major  move  from  being  Six  to  being  Ten 
is still far  from  completed.  The  question  is not  which  issues 
are  relevant  now  in  1972,  but  which  will  be  relevant  towards 
1980  and  after.  The  three  rapporteur~ who  share  responsibility 
for  Report  No.  3  have  agreed  among  themselves  on  subjects  which 
are certainly likely to  be  relevant.  But  each  of  us is 
·treating these  subjects not  only  from  his  own  angle,  but  with 
his  own  emphasis,  and  is free  to  refer to  any  others that 
he  thinks appropriate.  The  Conference,  of  course,  is not 
bound  by  the  agenda  which  the  rapporteurs  have  drawn  up  for 
themselves. 
a  start. 
Our  business  is simply to  give  the  discussion -2-
I.  THE  CONDITIONS  IN  l.JHICf!  POLICIES  ~ILL HAVE  TO  BE  DEVELOPED 
AND  SOLUTIONS  SOUGHT. 
I  first  underline  four  general  conditions  which  are 
likely to influence  the  priority given  to  specific  problems 
and  the  types  of  solution likely to  be  acceptable:-
( i)  The  pressure  for  upward  harmonisation. 
(ii)  The  rising  demand  for  diversity  and  choice, 
and  resistance  to  standardisation. 
(iii)  The  challenge  to  growth  and  shift  towards 
quality of  living. 
(iv)  No  lessening  in  social  tension  and  conflicts. 
I  (i)  The  pressure  for  upward  harmonisation 
Pressure  for  upward  harmonisation  of  the  conditions  of 
employment  in  the  Ten  can  of  course  be  taken  for  granted. 
For  one  of  the  two  countries  of  which  I  am  a  national, 
Ireland,  a  main  attraction  of  joining  the  Community  is that 
to  do  so  should  end  the  tendency to  look  overwhelmingly  to 
Britain  for  models  for  the  next  step  in  social  policy.  You 
may  be  sure that  in  studying  the  experience  of  the  other 
Community  countries it is not  the  most  backward  practice that 
we  shall  borrow.  Trade  unions,  evidently,  have  a  particular 
interest  in  upward  harmonisation,  but  this  process  can  already 
be  seen  at  work  in  the  worlds  of  the Civil Service  and  of  public 
enquiries,  of  company  law,  of  employers'  organisations,  and 
many  others.  To  quote  my  own  country again,  I  note  for 
example  that  the  Irish Commission  on  the  Status of  Women  has 
been  influenced  by  the  facts  about  Community  practice  on  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  employed  mothers  recorded  in  the 
draft  Sullerot  Report  on  The  Employment  of  Women,  and  the 
Irish  employers'  organisations,  as  well  as  the  unions,  have 
sent  expeditionary forces  to  study Community  experience  on 
workers'  participation and  Mitbestimmung. -3-
1  (ii):  The  rising  demand  for  diversity and  choice,  and 
resistance to  standardisation. 
But  upward  harmonisation  need  and  must  not  be  taken 
to  imply centralisation or  standardisation.  No  dou-bt 
there will  be  particular cases  where  a  general  ruling  for 
all Europe is appropriate.  There will always  have  to  be 
co-ordination,  at  least  for  example  to  the  extent  of  ensuring 
that  a  worker  who  moves  to  a  job in  another Community 
country steps into  a  corresponding  place  in the hierarchy 
of  pay,  social security,  and  other rights.  But  a 
corresponding  place is not  necessarily an  identical place, 
and  in  the  area  discussed  in this report  attempts to ,impose 
identity are  likely to  be  strongly resisted for  three  reasons. 
The  first is the  diversity of  national  systemfi  of 
industrial relations  and  management  and  the  strength  of 
attachment  to  them.  A  most  revealing  example  in  recent 
years  was  the national  debate  in  Britain,  under  both  Labour 
and Conservative  governments,  which  led  up  to  the Conservatives' 
Industrial Relations  Act  of  1971.  The  case  for  changing  the 
British industrial  relations  system in at  least  some  of  the 
directions  envisaged  by  the  Labour  government  and  enacted  by 
their Conservative  successors  was  and  is admitted  on  all sides, 
and  by  many  trade  union  leaders  among  others.  But  the 
attempt  to  impose  reform  by  law called  forth,  not  a  coolly 
logical  analysis  of  the  prospective  gains  and  losses  to  each 
party  - this sort  of  logic  was  often  scarce  even  among 
academic  industrial relations specialists,  let  alone  in  the 
trade  unions  - but  a  deep  gut  reaction  whose  origins lie a 
century and  more  in  the  past.  The  industrial relations 
systems  of  the  Ten  are  in  a  number  of  ways  moving  towards 
one  another,  for  example  as  plant  bargaining  and  the  role 
of  the  shop  steward  develop  in certain continental countries, 
while  B~itain moves  towards  labour  courts  and  legally -4-
compulsory  plant  procedures.  But  anything  that  could 
rightly  be  called  the  standardisation of  industrial 
relations  systems  is not  for  tomorrow  nor  even  for  1980. 
Secondly,  in  a  sensitive area  directly touching  the 
ordinary citizen,  such  as  industrial  re~ions and  the 
conditions  of  employment,  there  may  well  be  resistance  to 
dictation  from  outside  the  country,  however  excellent  the 
intentions  and  however  legal  the  authority of  those  who 
do  it,  on  grounds  of  national traditions  and  national 
identity as  such.  Amid  the  crash  of  IRA  bombs  in  Belfast, 
it is  easy to  miss  something  of  even  more  long-term 
significance  which  was  happening  to  the  IRA  and  its political 
associate  Sinn  Fein  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland  before  the 
trouble in the  North  began.  A  current  of  public  support 
was  beginning  to  run  towards  these  radical nationalists out 
of  a  feeling  that  Ireland  was  going  too  far  on  the  road  to 
internationalising its trade  and  industry;  towards 
encouraging  foreign  rather  than  native  entrepreneurs,  towards 
importing  foreign  styles  of  management  and  accepting  the 
direction  of  multi-national corporations,  and  towards 
dismantling tariffs and  other  means  of  Irish  control  of  the 
Irish  economy.  A  vague,  not  always  clearly specified, 
feeling  was  growing  that  the  fight  to  maintain  Ireland's 
identity was  being  lost  on  the  business  and  employment  front. 
This current  has  not  been  strong  enough  to  stop  Ireland's 
move  towards  the  Community.  But  it could  quickly  become 
far  stronger  and  more  damaging  if Ireland's self-determinatior 
were  too  sharply challenged  in areas as  sensitive as  the 
conditions  of  work. 
Thirdly,  the  growing  diversity of  situations and  pace 
of  change  within  as  well  as  between  sophisticated  modern 
economies  calls at  both  the  national  and  the  international 
level  for  polycent~ic rather  than  centralised management. -5-
I  once  heard  a  management  consultant  describe  the 
history of  wage  and  salary systems  in  modern  societies 
as  beginning  with  hand-made,  and,  ~o to  speak,  going  on 
~ad 
to  standardisation/mass-production,  and  then  on  once  more 
to  hand-made,  but  on  the  basis  of  standard  procedures  and 
components.  Pay  systems  today are  not  individual  and 
hand-made  in  the  sense  of  early industrial laissez-faire. 
There  are  national,  regional,  and  occupational  standards 
to  observe  and  rules  of  good  pensonnel  practice.  But 
within  the  framework  of  these  rules  and  standards  pay 
systems  are,  increasingly,  tailor-made  to  the  requirements 
of  each  employer  and  occupation  through  plant  or enterprise 
bargaining  or  simply the  decision  of individual managements. 
The  situations of  individual ent•·rpriaee  differ,  and it 
is part  of  management  efficiency to  adapt  to this and  to 
be  free  to  do  so. 
To  this is added  the  effect of  the accelerating  pace 
of  economic  and  social change.  The  faster  and  the  more 
widespread  change  becomes>the  stronger  becomes  the  case 
for  polycentric,  participative,  "organic•9*methods  of 
management,  by contrast  with  the centralised,  hierarchical, 
bureaucratic  or "mechanistic"  methods  of  business  management 
and  national planning  appropriate  in  simpler  and  slower-
moving  situations. 
A  further  reinforcement  comes  from  the  growing  resistance 
of  people  in all countries  and  walks  of  life  - shop  stewards, 
students,  and  now  increasingly those  last  bastions  of  the 
bureaucratic  way  of life,  the middle  managers  - to standard 
and  stereotyped  rules  for  working  and  living  imposed  on 
them  from  outside  and  above,  whether  by  employers,  the state, 
or  national  union  leaders.  In  the  words  of  a  slogan  which 
I  saw  chalked across  an  Orange  street  in  Belfast  during 
the July 12th  celebrations  two  years  ago,  "We  are  people". 
*  The  term  coined  by  T.  Bur.De  and  G.M.  Stalker in The  Management 
of  Innovation,  Tavistock,  1961. -6-
"Bureaucracy"  has  become  a  major  term  of  abuse,  and  one 
of  the  most  effective arguments  used  by  the  opponents  of 
Europe  against  the  institutions of  the  European  Community.** 
None  of  this is to  say  that  the  day  of  central  planning 
and  upward  harmonisation  is past.  The  rule  of  Keynesian 
economics  applies  here  as  elsewhere;  when  all decisions 
are  taken  polycentrically,  on  the  basis  only of  local  and 
partial knowledge,  it is easy  for  a  decision  system  as  a 
whole  to  spin  out  of  control  and  to  produce  results which 
none  of its participants want.  The  trade  unionist  may  then 
find  himself  faced  with  unfair differentials,  wildly rising 
prices,  and  redundancy  with  no  arrangements  to  re-absorb 
the  men  displaced;  the  business  man  with  unfair  conditions 
ot  competition;  and  the  national  planner  with  runaway 
inflation  and  acute  and  unnecessary difficulties over  exchang 
rates  and  the  balance  of  payments.  In  future,  as  in  the 
past,  sound  policies are  likely to  emerge  from  co-ordination, 
based  on  an  overall  view.  But  whereas  at  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  accent  in  management  and  national 
planning  began  to  shift  from  decentralisation towards  central 
co-ordination,  today  the  pendulum is swinging  back.  One 
of  Marx's  most  successful  predictions  relates to this,  and  we 
are  seeing it verified.  In  the  world  of  work  as  in other 
spheres  the  role  of  central planners,  in the  socialist  as 
well  as  the capitalist countries,  is less  and  less to 
determine  trends  and  more  and  more  to  register,  promote,  and 
co-ordinate  those  that  emerge  from  polycentric  decisions.  It 
is less that  of  an  engineer  and  more  that  of  a  gardener  helpi: 
his  hundred  flowers  to  bloom. 
I  cannot  resist  adding  that  one  of  the  most  effective visual 
reinforcements  of  this argument  is the  glass  and  concrete 
reincarnation  of  a  mid-Victorian  prison  in  which  the  European 
Commission's  own  offices  are  housed. -7-
I  (iii).  The  challenge  to  growth  and  shift  towards  guality 
of  living. 
Refore  the  new  policies which  we  in this Conference  are 
beginning  to  debate  can  be  fully worked  out  and  applied,  the 
real  income  per  head  of  the  peoples  of  the  Ten  may  well  have 
risen  by  another  forty  or  fifty per cent.  Even  the  poorest 
of  the  Ten,  Ireland,  is already  by  world  standards  rich. 
The  richest  of  the  Ten  will  by  then  be  approaching  the 
present  level of  income  per  head  in the  United  States. 
Opposition  to  the  race  for still further  growth  is already 
obvious  in all our countries,  and  as  the  seventies  go  on 
is likely to  be  greatly intensified.  As  a  candidate  for 
the  British Parliament  in  1964  and  1966  I  found it a  good 
selling point  to  present  a  graph  showing  how  much  Rritain, 
under  both  Labour  and  Conservative  governments,  had  lagged 
behind  the  EEC  countries in  overall growth.  I  am  not  so 
sure  that  this would  be  good  politics today. 
The  challenge  to  growth  comes  from  two  sources.  One 
is the  feelin6  that  in  racing  for  growth  ih  gross  national 
how 
product  we  have  neglected  questions  about/the  product  can 
best  be  used;  problems  of  the  environment,  social  justice, 
culture,  participation.  The  other is the  findings  about 
world  population  and  resources  of  Jay Forrester's World 
Dynamics  anrl  the Club  of  ~orne  project  at  Massachusetts 
Institute of  Technology.  Given  the  level of  world  resources 
and  the  si~e and  rate  of  growth  of  world  population,  the  MIT 
investigators argue  not  only that  ttiere is no  possibility of 
bringing  the  vast  majority of  those  living in  the  developing 
countries  up  to  the material  standard  oP  living  enjoyed  in 
the  developed  nations,  but  that  the  developed  nations  themselves 
are  very likely to  see  a  marked  fall in their material  standard 
of  living  in  the  next  thirty or  forty years. 
For  the  problems  about  the  individual  in the  enterprise -8-
with  which  this  report  is concerned,  this  two-headed 
challenge  has  several  implications.  Upward  harmonisation 
of  the  conditions  of  employment  may  come  to  mean,  not 
simply that  the  countries  which  lead  in,  say,  pay  and 
fringe  benefits  race  ahead  while  others are  encouraged 
to  catch  up.  It  may  become  necessary in  the  interests 
of  Europe  and  the  world  to  say to  such  rich  countries  as 
Germany  or France:  "Stop~  You  have  enought"  - or  even  to 
tell them,  so  far  as  their  own  material  standard  of  living 
is concerned,  to  turn  back.  I  would  expect  in these 
circumstances  much  stronger  pressure  to  level  up  within 
as  well  as  between  countries,  and  much  less  readiness  to 
let  high  income  earners  and  the  wealthy  retain their 
existing  differentials over  the  rest  of  the  people,  even 
in  absolute  terms  and  certainly not  in  percentages. 
Rising  interest in  the  environment  and  the  quality of  life 
is likely to  lead  to  a  substantial  re-distribution  of 
finance  and  the  work  force  between  sectors  of  employment, 
with  all the  problems  of  training  or  re-training,  and  of 
taxation,  incentives,  and  incomes  policy to  which  this must 
give  rise.  Skilled  and  economical  use  of  resources will 
be  even  more  important  in  a  world  where  resources  are  seen 
as  limited  than  in  one  where  they  seem  abundant.  But  it 
will  be  harder  in  a  world  where  the  accent  is on  the  quality 
rather  than  the  quantity of  production  to  defeat  claims  to 
job enrichment  or  participation  on  the  ground  merely  that 
they might  reduce  the  physical  quantity of  output.  And 
I  would  expect  in  that  sort  of  world  to  see  a  great 
strengthening  of  the  tendency  which  can  already  be  seen 
developing  to  accent  the  social  responsibilities of  firms, 
which  in turn will  have  implications  for  such  things  as  the 
form  of  their accountability,  the  role  of  their chief 
executives,  and  the  structure  of  their  Boards.  I  share  the -9-
view of a  number of my collea,gues in management" education that,  just as such 
things as marketing,  quantitative methods,  and management by objecti-ves were 
the management themes of the last generation,  so the social responsibilities of 
business,  in the broadest sense business ethics,  will be  the theme of the next. 
I  (iv)  No lessening in social tension and conflicts 
From all that I have said so far it follows that there 
is absolutely no reason to predict any lessening in social tension or conflicts 
in the years to come.  Certainly,  as at present, many problems will continue 
to be solved by peaceful discussion and agreement,  and policies and institutions 
which are now controversial will come to be accepted as part of the common 
way of life.  German employers have rightly insisted through many years that 
provisions of the Works Constitution Law of 1952 which they regard as admirable, 
progressive,  and a good basis for relationships in the plant and office would in 
many other parts of Europe and the world be thought dangerous and revolutionary 
It is illuminating,  having noted this,  to turn back to the very different toae of 
their predecessors when these same provisions were first enacted in the 1920's. 
But  new problems will arise,  in the area with which this report is concerned as 
elsewhere,  and the background to their solution will continue at least as often 
as now to be one of conflict. 
Upward harmonisation of the conditions of employment 
can lead to conflicts of three kinds  0  One is over its pace  o  What rate of advance 
can each country stand?  The lines of battle here are not always what they seem 
to be.  If I look once more at Ireland,  I see a conflict over the rate of harmonisation 
between on the one side the Government and not quite so whole-heartedly,  the 
employers and on the other the trade unions  o  But the people most vitally involved 
are not visible on the scene of battle at all,  for they are gone on the boat as emig-
rants,  or will do so when they tire of sitting on uneconomic farms waiting for the 
industrial job that never turns up because harmonisation,  in this case principally with 
Britain  ,has been pushed too fast  o  There is also room for conflict over the strategy -10-
of harmonisation.  If standardisation is rejected and national traditions 
are to be observed or created,  just what are the practices which each 
country is to borrow from its neighbours?  And another ground for 
conflict again will be about how to go about harmonisation as growth 
slows down or even stops,  given the very tricky issues arising from 
this to which I have just referred. 
It is the same in other areas.  The battle 
over the extent and subjects of workers' participation,  and especially 
over sharing power at the top,  is likely to be with us for a long time 
yet.  It may acquire some interesting new angles as and when the 
middle managers,  the cadres,  the Leitende Angestellten get into the 
act.  It is not easy to play Louis XVI once the cahiers of grievances 
are edited by the nobility and clergy as well as the Third Estate.  I 
have seen it happen in a  recent industrial enquiry where I was involved: 
managers joining the rank and file in revolt against their Board,  and 
heads rolling at Board level as a  result.  And to see the conflicts that 
can and will arise over centralisation and decentralisation one has only 
to look at the history of incomes policy. 
In some societies it might be possible,  at 
least for a time,  to suppress conflict over issues like these.  At a 
time when prices in the advanced market economies were rising at 
about 3%  a year,  the governments of a group of Socialist countries 
dictated their price and incomes policies ruthlessly enough to keep the 
average rise in prices down to !o/o:  the rate of increase of real wages 
was the same for both groups of countries.>:<  The Japanese lifetime em-
plQyment system provides a great deal of security and freedom for exec-
utives who manage to enter the charmed circle of one of the big corporati.o~ 
*  H. A.  Turner and D:A. S.  Jackson,  On the Determination of the 
General Wage Level - A World Analysis,  Economic Journal,  Decem-
ber 1970.  The period studied was 1956-1965. -.11-
though at the expense both of confining their own careers within a Berlin wall 
and of consigning less fortunate competitors to chaos and outer darkness. 
There could be a temptation to adopt Japanese or Soviet  methods in the Europe 
of the ten,  but I make the assumption that,  because Europe is Europe,  this 
will not happen.  Organisation Man exists i_n  Europe,  but I do not see him, 
in Japanese or any other version,  being increasingly accepted as the model for the 
future.  Efforts will and should be made to damp conflicts on issues such as incomes 
policy.  But whatever may happen towards the East,  the Europe of the'Talis and will 
remain an open society,  and in the last resort c omflicts like these will be allowed 
to break into the open and take their· course. 
II.  SPECIFIC AREAS WHERE  POLICIES ARE  REQUIRED 
Against the background of the four general conditions 
which I have just described,  I take up now three areas in which new thinking 
and long-range policies are required.  These are :-
(i)  The job and career in itself: flexibility,  enrichment,  security. 
(ii)  The sha:ring d  income and wealth. 
(iii)  The sharing of power,  including the role of the chief executive 
and the question of company objectives. 
II  (i)  The job and career in itself: flexibility,  enrichment,  security. 
Of the three issues of security,  flexibility,  and job 
enrichment,  security is particularly important in a  number of ways,  not all of 
them obvious.  I shall therefore take it last,  bringing into its discussion issues 
relevant to  it which arise on the two other points . 
To start with flexibility; one of the most obvious changes 
in recent years,  and one likely to be carried much further in future,  is the decline 
in many occupations,  both manual and white-collar,  of the tradition of a straigh-
f~rward career in a  single profession,  based on an initial qualification plus 
experience on tlie job,  and sometimes also on commitment to a  single employer,. 
Several factors have combined to bring this decline about. -12-
One is the increased pace of technical progress,  which 
makes it necessary even for people who follow a  continuous career in a  single 
field or with a  single employer to re-train at intervals,  and not only by learning on 
the job.  The point is not merely that these people themselves have to re-train. 
It is that this re-training could equally be available to people switching from other 
employments.  People already in a  field,  or already employed by an organisation, 
still have an advantage over those who come from outside.  But  part of their advan-
tage is gone,  and a  further part is offset by the importance in today' s  conditions 
of thinking sideways and the fresh mind.  It may be precisely the man with different 
experience who can learn fastest in a  new situation and has the most positive 
contribution to make  .  It begins increasingly to appear neither efficient nor 
just to deny him the chance to make it.  New occupations are in any case now 
continually arising and have to be manned from scratch,  and here it is natural 
for the field to be open to all . 
.Another factor is an increase in job-changing in 
occupations where in the past both mobility and the risk of redundancy were 
small.  Partly this occurs by people's own preference)especially among younger 
workers.  By the mid-sixties a  British survey showed that graduates tended to 
leave their first firm after an average of no more than four years in the case of 
men and two in that of women*.  But technical and commercial change,  mergers 
and reorganisations,  have also led to much more compulsory job-changing in mid-
life than was usual in professional and managerial work even a  few years ago. 
A further factor has been the appearance in the labour 
market, at all levels of skill and responsibility,  of a growing number of married 
women.  A survey of recent British women graduates brings out that the great 
*  Graduate Appointments Register,  Salary Survey,  October 1966. -13-
majority of them intend both to work through most of their lives, whether 
married or single,  and  even in the case of those most strongly committed 
to a career at a level matching their qualifications - to drop out altogether or 
at least down to part-time while they have young children.**  The lives of most 
women run to a different timetable from men's,  and employers who wish to make 
effective and economic use of their services have to come to terms with this; 
with part-time, with careenthat break and re-start, and with able staff who 
qualify for promotion at what in a man would seem a  suspiciously late age. 
Fourthly,  a new appreciation is growing of the complexity 
of the problems of older workers on their way to retirement.  On the one hand 
it is now clear that able people are far more likely to retain and develop their 
powers into old age than had been realised,  especially if they are offered the chance 
to meet new challenges and are not left to sink into a rut.  It is also clear that 
it is often a loss both to the older worker himself and to the community to cut 
his work activity short at a predetermined retiring age.  But  on the other hand 
experience and research also show,  both for men and,  especially,  for women, 
that older workers at all levels of skill and responsibility often prefer to ease 
themselves out of work before standard retiring age, not necessarily or even 
normally by taking less skilled or responsible work,  but by working at less 
pressure or for shorter hours.  The case thus builds up  ~oth for more challenging 
work and more chance to continue beyond standard retiring age for those older  · 
workers who can use it and wish to use these opportunities,  and for more chance 
for those who so choose to move towards at least partial retirement earlier. 
Each of these factors has repercussions beyond its immed-
iate area of application  .  If  concessions are made to mothers because of their 
family responsibilities,  fathers tooare likely before long to make their claim, 
and rightly so.  If part-time is available for older workers or for women,  why 
not also for men who are stud~nts or have other non -work interests to which they 
wish to give a substantial part of their time?  Examples of both these extensions 
••  M.-P.  Fogarty and R.  &  R.  Rapoport,  Sex,  Career and Family,  Allen &  Unwin, 
1971. -14-
can already be quoted from several countries. 
Taking  all the factors together,  it is clear that the 
timetable and occupational pattern of careers is likely in future to be very 
much more complex than in the past,  and more flexibly adapted to individuals' 
situations.  For employing organisations and trade unions this implies a  need 
to press much harder and more deliberately than hitherto towards revising 
employment practices to accommodate the new more variegated pattern of 
careers.  Apart from the sheer organisational complication of handling the 
new and more varied pattern,  there are some tough industrial relations problems 
to be faced.  More flexibility and opportunity for people who do not conform to 
traditional career patterns - for married women,  for executives who must change 
jobs in mid-life,  for low-skilled workers seeking training in skilled crafts -
means less immediate security and opportunity for those who have been climbing 
straight up the traditional ladders.  In the end,  of course, greater flexibility bringf 
better guarantees and greater security to all.  The man who complains because 
the promotion to which he looked forward goes to an outsider too easily forgets 
that in coming years he may well become the outsider himself,  and will need the 
same chance.  But it is not easy to be so philosophical in the short run. 
There are two further implications for public authorities 
or industry-wide agencies concerned with manpower planning.  First,  the rising 
flexibility of careers underlines the need to push on with present developments 
in active manpower policies,  to anticipate the new trends and ensure that they 
can be handled without disruption to individuals or the economy,  and to make 
training available in convenient units and on demand.  Secondly,  it seems likely 
that these authorities will have to provide much of the initiative for change in 
the employment practices of individual employing organisations,  particularly -15-
in the market sector .  On these wider and longer-range aspects of manpower 
policy experience shows that directors and managers,  busy with what appear 
more immediate problems, are inclined not to look far enough ahead to provide 
even for their own long-term interest,  let alone that of the industry,  profession, 
or economy as a whole.  In the survey just mentioned of the job experience and 
prospects of highly-qualified women in Britain the investigators' dominant im-
pression was not that on that type of issue the managers interviewed were either  , 
forward-looking or reactionary.  It was that they had not thought about it at all. 
Coming next to job enrichment,  I raise two issues. 
I remember,  first,  being struck many years ago by a diagram which showed 
that half of all American wo.rkers could do a job requiring at least a full secondary 
education,  but only one in five of the jobs offered by a sample of industries required 
intelligence at this level.  Today in Europe we have a rising tide of gradt:tate 
and other highly qualified people,  and considerable doubt whether all can be used 
in work matching their qualifications.  There are several positive ways to 
approach this problem.  Jobs can be re-designed to raise their quality all along 
the line; a general upgrading of the technological and managerial con  tent of work, 
such as Europe's position  in the world economy in any case requires.  Action 
can be taken to expand services,  particularly public services such as teaching, 
the social worker services, or the health services, which are big users of highly 
qualified staff and whose development in many countries has hitherto had to be 
held back.  Hours can be shortened,  regular or sabbatical leave increased and encou-
ragement given to those who wish to move from full to part-time or into retire-
ment.  Whatever the mix of solutions chosen,  it is important they they should 
be of this positive kind,  in the interests not only of efficiency and personal satis-
faction but of social stability.  The past has left us some sharp warnings of the 
dangers of a massive population of people highly educated but under-employed. -16-
Secondly,  it is important for both efficiency and 
satisfaction to understand that the enrichment of jobs requires not only upgrading 
of the demands made by each job in itself but the incorporation of each job 
into a  demanding group process; and an improvement not only in the technical 
and intellectual capacity of job holders to cope with their job but in their motivation 
to make the best of it,  their achievement motivation.  Thorsrud's experiments 
in Norway show how the re-design of working groups can help not only to raise 
current efficiency and work satisfaction but to touch off a group learning process 
which raises performance to continually higher levels by a chain reaction within 
the group itself.  The success of this chain reaction is finally established,  as Thor 
srud has said,  when it begins to produce results which the authors of the re-design 
could not themselves have planned or foreseen.  The work on achievement 
motivation of McClelland and his followers shows how to give people an internal 
motivation not merely an external stimulus such as pay or an interesting job - to 
use their work situations to the best advantage: not exploiting or in a  bad sense 
profiting from their jobs but using their opportunities they offer to the full. 
Anyone who has worked in a  number of organisations 
will be familiar with the difference between an organisation that is dynamic and 
one that is soggy.  The  director of a  soggy organisation m\.S t drag or drive it. 
The director of a dynamic organisation rides high on a wive of initiative. 
Dynamism or sogginess is a  result of the whole structure and functioning of 
the organisation,  not of any one part of it alone.  But an essential and in the 
most literal sense basic component of it is the dynamism or sogginess of 
individuals at all levels in their individual jobs and their immediate work groups. 
It is this rather than routine efficiency or even short-term job satisfaction 
which is the chief target of job enrichment. -17-
The implications of this extend far beyond the 
individual firm or employing organisation.  My colleague Richard 
Lynn has explored in several studies the relation between tension 
or anxiety and achievement motivation,  and suggested how this can 
be related to national economic performance.  In a  rough and ready way 
one might set out the contrasting situations  of two types of economy:-
A - The Motivated Economy 
Strong,  autonomous motivation 
of individuals and work groups 
to achieve. 
Therefore 
Ahead of the competition 
Profits and investment capacity 
good. 
High growth,  little inflation, 
good balance of payments 
Government assists rather than 
harassed business 
Therefore 
Climate for enterprise improves 
still further : upward spiral 
B  - The Reactive Economy 
Individuals and work groups react 
only under pressure and induce-
ments. 
Therefore 
Always a step behind the com-
petition 
Profits and investment capacity low. 
Low growth,  high inflation,  weak 
balance of payments 
Government hard-pressed: drives 
and harassed business 
Therefore 
Deteriorating climate for enter-
prise: downward spiral. 
I leave it to readers to fit the names of 
organisations and countries to these cases. 
Security,  finally,  has a number of aspects, 
not all visible on the surface.  The cruder forms of insecurity are 
obvious enough,  for example redundancy or arbitrary treatment 
by superiors.  But there are also subtler forms of insecurity which 
may affect even those who are in no fear of losing their jobs or of 
crude discrimination.  Flexibility of careers means more security 
for those who wish or have to switch their careers,  but less for those 
who in its absence could have reliedon climbing straight up a regular 
career ladder.  Though. bureaucracy can be in many ways unsatis-
know 
fying to the bureaucrats,  they at leastfwhere they are in it.  A net--18-
work system of management,  where work groups anc lines of 
responsibility shift continually and unpredictably,  can be much 
more satisfying,  but at the expense of greater insecurity.  As 
always in human groups,  it is likely that some who take the lead 
will enjoy the satisfactions while others,  more passive,  experience 
chiefly the insecurity.  A wrong choice or ineffective use of a 
system of management means insecurity for those who have to 
work under it; perhaps in the sense of losing their jobs,  however 
humanely dismissals may be handled,  but certainly also in the 
sense of confusion and uncertainty about what is supposed to be 
going on. 
For some groups of workers insecurity arises 
before they come near the job at all.  The question is,  precisely, 
whether they are to be allowed to do so.  Are women,  especially 
married women,  to be allowed free access to jobs; actual and 
effective access,  bearing in mind that legal and constitutional 
rights are one thing and the practice of business and public organ-
isations is another?  What opportunities are to be left to older 
workers who seek promotion,  or wish to enter a new craft or 
profession,  or simply to change firms: how absolute is the rule 
of promotion from within?  How equal are to be the opportunities 
for immigrants,  or for late developers who did not acquire the right 
piece of paper from the right institution at the right age?  For 
these people insecurity means to be cast into the outer darkness) 
or to be in danger of being so at the fir~t sign of recession,  while 
the privileged feast within behind closed doors.  Their problem has 
always existed,  is aggravated in the down-swing of employment 
cycles,  and is likely to be intensified in future as awareness of -19-
the dangers of unlimited expansion of production grows. 
Some of the cruder problems of insecurity 
are being more and more Effectively tackled,  and this will no doubt 
continue in future ; for example by stronger protection against 
arbitrary dismissal or against discriminatory employment prac-
tices.  But when all the problems of insecurity are taken together, 
there is no reason to suppose that they will be less acute in future 
than in the past.  Specific problems of insecurity need specific 
solutions,  for example measures to improve tr.ai.nin~opportunities 
and the working of the labour market for displaced workers of all 
grades,  or measures,  legislative or other,  to guarantee more equal 
opportunity to women or older workers.  I stress particularly, 
howev~r, the more general point that,as in the past,  the best safe-
guard against insecurity will continue to lie in powerful and effective 
in. trade unions and professional associations,  and in effective 
machinery at the level of enterprises,  industries or professions,  and 
government through which unions and professional associations can act. 
This is not purely a trade union argument. 
Looking at the insecurities created by network or "organic" systems 
of management,  certain investigators have concluded that the 
answer is to emphasise the individual's "professional base". 
He has a place in the network of management,  but it is an ever-
changing one on which he cannot rely.  But he also,  especially if 
he is a qualified specialist,  has a more lasting and in any case an 
alternative base in association with others who share his line of -20-
work,  whatever their place in the management network.  The 
suggestion is that it will be even more necessary in future than 
in the past to emphasise and use this alternative base.  Developed 
purely from a  managerial point of view,  this argument underlines 
the traditional and correct view of trade unions that the first and 
best answer to insecurity is not to put all one's eggs in one basket, 
but to acquire through the union or professional association a 
separate and independent base of power and influence,  to be used 
either in the employing organisation or om:  of it,  for instance 
to promote legislation.  A significant change today is that this 
argument is increasingly seen as applying to the manager.>  scientis~and 
technologist as well as to the rank and file,  and the reality of this 
is underlined by the rapid recent progress in one country after 
another of managerial and professional unions. 
It is important that the role of the union 
or professional association should be wide enough to deal with 
all the main causes of insecurity.  I studied recently the back-
ground to the six months' stoppage of the Irish banks in 1970, 
which provided Ireland with one of its few world records.  It 
emerged that one factor contributing to the explosive atmosphere 
before this stoppage - I will not say the most important factor, 
but certainly a  contributory one - was the failure of the powerful, 
militant,  and in other respects efficient Irish Bank Officials' 
Association to come to grips with the business and managerial 
revolution going on in the banks and the impact of this on its 
members' psychological as well as material security. -21-
But it is important also that the "professional 
base" should not be stressed to the exclusion of other channels 
of action.  This is particularly true of those for whom insecurity 
arises not so much on or out of the job as from being excluded from 
it.  Unions and professional associations tend to be very much 
more effective in looking after the interests of those already within 
the charmed circle than of those looking in from outside.  There 
will be a  major battle to be fought in coming years over how to deal 
with problems of apparent over-supply of labour such as those already 
arising from the rising tide of educe.tion,  or which may arise as the case 
against racing for further growth begins to bite.  Are they to be 
solved by re-excluding certain categories,  such as older men, 
immigrants,  or married women from the opportunity to work,  or 
by more positive measures?  These more positive measure• could 
as I have said include expanding work opportunity or sharing it 
through shorter hours and longer leave and other work breaks. 
They will need also to include revisions in,  for example,  the 
system of social security and family allowances,  so as to blunt 
the argument that the standard of living of families can be upheld 
only by giving absolute priority for full-time and over-time to 
their chief earners. 
The trade union movement will certainly have its 
part to play in this battle.  But I do not believe,  on their record 
in any country of the Ten,  that the unions alone can be relied on to put 
the case of the excluded or potentially excluded categories with the 
force that is required .  Nor,  of course,  can one rely fully on 
management.  For this is once again the sort of area where_managers, 
preoccupied with keeping their organisations going here and now, 
rather than with 1 flnrr-+P""ll'  nl  ~nq  the needs of the economv as a -22-
whole,  or the welfare of particular interest groups,  tend to play 
it by ear and avoid positions of principle~  and actions not clearly 
and immediately necessary. 
II.  (ii)  The Sharing of Income and Wealth 
The starting point under this heading is the 
simple observation that no modern state can carry out fully its 
responsibility for guiding the economy unless it has a policy for 
incomes and wealth.  Whether it calls this an incomes policy 
or not is a  matter of political taste.  The present Government of 
Britain refuses to have an incomes policy.  But this does not in 
the least prevent it from having a  powerful policy for incomes, 
whose weight negotiators in a  number of fields have felt. 
Moreover,  policy for incomes and wealth 
cannot be confined to measures of redistribution through taxes 
or social security,  leaving the initial distribution of income and 
capital to market forces alone.  Market forces will produce some 
distribution and rate of growth of incomes and wealth,  but which 
distribution they produce depends on the parameters within which 
the market is made to operate.  To understand why differentials 
in earnings between different industries,  firms,  and occupations 
are what  they are,  and why earnings change as they do,  it is 
necessary to look not only at broad movements in the national 
economy or in supply and demand in particular labour markets 
but at such things as : --23-
- the limits set to market forces by custom,  practice , 
and -.pectations about differentials and about the fair 
relation between pay for different occupations and sectors, 
and the margins of tolerance accepted around these limits. 
- the limits set by oligopoly or by deliberate control of 
either product or labour markets. 
- the assumptions Built into  negotiating practice in 
particular firms or sectors, for example about the 
negotiation and operation of incentive schemes.  Given a 
knowledge of these,  a current British study shows,  it is 
possible to forecast the degree of wage drift in a firm 
or sector rather precisely. 
- current expectations about price and pay increases. 
In recent experience it has proved less easy than in the 
past to predict the rate of increase of salaries and wages 
simply from a knowledge of demand and supply in the labour 
market,  or of these together with the movement of prices. 
These factors explain part of the increase,  but a substan-
tial part remains to be explained in other ways. 
One cannot simply kick the market in the teeth. 
Once certain limits,  varying from country to country,  are reached 
the forces of ·supply and d-emand break through.  But these limits 
are wide,  and there is a choice to be made within them.  For a 
given economy or firm no one pattern of pay or degree of inequality 
in it is likely to be uniquely associated with competitive survival. 
It is for policy-makers to choose,  with a wide degree of freedom, 
and from the point of view either of efficiency or of social responsibility, 
whether to have a relatively flat or steep gradient of differentials 
and relatively wide or narrow margins between different occupations 
and industries; whether to encourage or discourage the use of piece-
work and incentives, or what rate of wage and salary inflation to 
tolerate. -24-
For some purposes the relevant policy-
makers will be those at the level of the firm or industry.  But 
many problems in this area can be solved only at the level of each 
economy as a  whole,  or indeed,  as where the balance of payments 
becomes part of the problem,  at that of Europe as a  whole or of 
the world.  The economics of KeyAes  and Pigou apply here as 
elsewhere.  Uncoordinated pay decisions can and do spin upwards 
into inflation.  They can fan  out into a  pattern of differentials which, 
as has been shown in a  recent enquiry in Ireland,~'<  people in all 
social classes regard as inequitable and would have rej'ected had 
ba6i 
theyf'the choice.  In a  case like this it may be easier to set out to 
change the system as a whole than to leave it to individual employers 
and unions to adjust case by case; for the employer who changes 
differentials on his own has to face the odium of disfavouring at 
least some of his staff compared to similarly qualified people 
elsewhere.  The trade-offs needed to win support for large-
scale reform of pay systems may well include items,  for example 
changes in taxes or social securit))  which are outside the control of 
ordinary negotiators altogether.  Knowledge which might encourage 
action by individual industries or enterprises,  for instance about 
productivity bargaining or the side-effects of payment by results,  often 
circulates less fast from firm to firm than a  country's or industry's 
situation requires)  and action at national or industry level may be 
:aeeded to speed its circulation up. 
Widely contrasting views about incomes 
policy are held within as well as between the countries of Europe, 
and it is neither likely not desirable,  seeing the variety of national 
problems and traditions,  that uniform policies will be established 
~:~  H.  Behrend,  A.  Knowles,  and J.  Davies,  Views on Pay Increases 
(two papers),  Economic and Social Research Institute,  1970. -25-
among the Ten.  But,  as I have said,  no country can avoid having 
some  policy for incomes and wealth - I reform to wealth on a 
moment - and this policy cannot be kept in narrow limits.  One 
of the lessons of incomes policies to date is that it neither use-
ful nor even practicable to separate,  for example,  policy against 
wage inflation from policies to deal with low pay,  prices,  unfair 
differentials,  unemployment or the position of pensioners.  I have 
already suggested,  to be still more the lesson of the future,  as and 
when growth slows down,  and there is no longer an expanding cake 
from which everyone can claim his extra slice without depriving 
others of theirs. 
Over and above these considerations about indiv-
idual countries,  the incomes policy of each country affects its relations 
with its neighbours.  It is hard to conceive how a European mone-
tary and fiscal union could work successfully without the help of 
coordinated - not,  as I have just insisted,  identical - policies 
for incomes and wealth in each of the Ten.  One of the major tasks 
of the European institutions is to help to bring this coordinated net-
work of policies for incomes and wealth into existence,  in a field still 
in many ways chaotic and experimental.  I return below,  under 
the heading of the sharing of power,  to the practical problems 
of bargaining an incomes policy into being and seeing that it is effec-
tively enforced. 
A policy for incomes,  if it is to be effective, 
must include a policy for wealth.  It has become increasingly clear 
in the last few years that in today' s  conditions no pattern of incomes 
is likely to be acceptable for more than a short time unless it is -26-
associated with an acceptable pattern for the ownership of capital, 
and especially of the equity capital of business,  with its voting rights and 
its ultimate and unlimited claim on profits. 
Till a few years ago a large part of any dis-
cussion about the wider ownership of capital,  and especially about 
employee share ownership,  was likely to be concerned on the one 
hand with ways and means and on the other with whether there was 
any demand for policies of this kind at all.  Choosing the right 
scheme to suit each case does stil.J..  of course,  remain important, 
but there is no longer any question that practicable schemes are 
available.  They include single-firm schemes and national schemes, 
traditional schemes to promote ownership or (as with British Savings 
Certificate$ long-term savings through state channels,  and more novel 
and variegated schemes such as,  in GermanY.,  the DM 624 Law and 
a variety of plans set up by collective bargaining,  or in France the 
decree of 17th August 1967 on employee participation in reinvested 
profits.  A powerful armoury of schem~exists, and there is today 
no longer any doubt about the demand for them.  At one stage the 
pressure for wealth-sharing plans came largely from employers 
and the political centre and Right,  and even from these quarters 
received only minority support.  Labour movements were more 
likely to be concerned with the taxation or nationalisation of wealth, 
not with sharing it directly among the workers.  But today support 
from employers in several countries has increased sharply and a 
growing number of trade unions and political labour movements 
have become actively interested in direct sharing.  The British 
Labour Party,  hitherto one of the most reluctant in this respect, -27-
is now examining schemes of the type put forward some time ago 
by the trade unions in Germany. 
The motives of the various groups interested 
in policies for wealth of course differ.  But in a general way the 
driving force has been recognition of two facts about the way in 
which modern economies operate.  One is the speed at which 
capital needs to accumulate in them~ the massive size of the 
accumulation~ and its effect on the distribution of incomes as well 
as wealth.  The problem of the distribution of wealth is not simply 
an inheritance from the past~ to be disposed of at leisure.  It is 
continually building up~ and must be dealt with as it arises.  Secondly~ 
there is the social nature of much of this accumulation.  A large part 
of it represents~ not personal abstinence giving rise to a clear 
personal claim to ownership by individual investors~ but an allocation 
by corporate executives of corporate funds~ derived from taxes or 
(what in oligopolistic conditions is much the same thing) price mar-
gins levied on the people as a  whole~ and from the efficiency of a 
corporation's whole work force.  Given these facts.,  it has become 
mare clearly ~  that it is not possible to arrive at a socially 
accepted distribution of personal resources~ and so at social peace~ 
simply by bargaining over income or taxing past accumulations of 
wealth.  There must be policies for the current accumulation of 
wealth as well.  But what sort of policies are these to be ?  The 
questions to be answered over the next few years are of four kinds. -28-
(a)  What for ?  Two broad purposes can 
be distinguished; to improve the distribution of wealth,  including 
familiarising people with the advantages and problems of holding 
capital: and to give them the control that goes with ownership, 
especially a share in the control of business by way of employee 
shareholding.  Is the purpose of employee shareholding to dis-
tribute wealth or to obtain control?  The practical implications 
are very different.  A small investor,  planning the optimum use 
of his personal resources,  will usually be advised to spread his 
interests.  He will in any case want to keep them flexible,  and 
to switch investments as his advisers indicate; and usually he will 
prefer to act as an individual,  or at most as a  member of a 
voluntary club.  If on the other hand the purpose of employee 
shareholding is to build up in employees  1  hands a  block of shares 
large and cone  entrated enough to obtain a  significant share in control, 
or at least to focus employees  1  attention strongly on the profitability 
of their own firm,  it is likely to be necessary to limit employees·' 
freedom to dispose of their shares,  and perhaps to focus their voting 
rights through a trust or other institution.  My own judgment would 
be that a share for employees in control,  and an active interest 
on their part in their firm,  can be obtained at least as well and 
probably better by other means.  The primary objective of employee 
shareholding as of other policies for wealth should therefore be to 
optimise the distribution of wealth,  not only by multiplying small 
investors but by encouraging them and putting them in a position to 
spread their interests as effective small investors should. -29-
(b)  For whom?  It would clearly be unjust 
if employees in profit-making business.,  and especially in sectors 
where there is heavy reinvestment of profits.,  received over and 
above their pay a share in capital such as would not be available 
to the staff of public and other non-profit services.  The question 
here is ff ways and means.  Is the answer to transfer part of the 
capital available for sharing among the employees of profit-making 
business to a trust for the non-profit sector?  Or to issue shares 
or capital certificates against the self-invested income of those 
publl.c concerns which have any?  Or are there other alternatives? 
(c)  Individual or collective?  Policies for 
the wider ownership of capital will always be concerned largely 
with encouraging individual ownership.,  for example of houses or 
personal savings.  But often there is a choice between promoting 
individual.,  cooperative.,  or fully collective ownership.  So far as 
work-based property is concerned.,  this arises especially over the 
ownership of pension funds and of companies' capital.  Pension 
funds can be controlled by employers.,  by an independent trust., 
by a fWlt¥  •  PArtieipanta:. 
cooperatively  f or under collective bargaining.  They can incorporate 
varying degrees of individual choice over contributions and benefits. 
They can simply pay pensions.,  keeping any underlying capital assets 
in the hands of the fund; or they can turn over part or (as in the 
scheme to which I belong myself) all the assets underlying a pension 
to the pensioner himself.  Companies' capital transferred to the 
ownership of small investors can be put at their individual disposal 
or> whether or not registered in individuala1  names>can be held and 
administered through a trust fund.  A number of trade union move-
menta have already made it clear that in the case of companies' 
capital they prefer transfer to a  national trust fund - or more than 
one fund.,  to avoid monopo~y:ts. rather than to personal ownership. -30-
If and in so far as companies' capital does become transferred 
to personal ownership,  the further question arises: how fast is it 
safe to move towards completely free personal ownership,  bearing 
in mind the need to educate new holders of investment and to avoid 
the dispersal of capital? 
(d)  How far and how fast?  In the past, 
policies for a  more even distributi~n of the ownership of capital, 
especially companies  1  equity capital,  operated on a  modest and 
marginal scale.  With the new and more powerful tools available 
todaY,,  for example the technique used in the French decree  of 
17th August 1967 - perhaps combined with the British Liberal 
Party's proposal to require companies to buy up and transfer 
to employees a  small percentage of their issued capital each year 
- it would be possible within a  generation to convert all large and 
established businesses into something close to Yugoslav communes, 
inv-est whe.r'e they like and to 
or, if it were preferred to leave small inve-etor.a free to/  Sl)read thetr 
interests, at least to make them by far the most important element 
in the capital market. 
There need be no reason to fear that a  shift in 
the capital market towards the small investor will  lead to a  shortage 
of capital.  A very substantial part of the saving credited to small 
investors  will  continue to be institutional,  and could well turn out 
to be not m.er,ely maintained Jau±:cincreased.  One classic and,  to the 
investor,  particularly attractive form of small saving is contributions 
to funded pension schemes.  It can be shown that this source of 
capital by itself is capable of enough expansion not merely to supply 
the capital market but to over-supply it.  There is no reason to 
suppose that crediting the value of ploughed-back business profits -31-
to small owners will reduce their volume,  and there is some 
evidence both from classic types of small ownership,  for example 
in farming or shopkeeping,  and from Yugoslav communes that it 
might lead to a demand to increase both profits and investment 
further.- Nor need a  shift from highly concentrated to dispersed 
ownership prejudice the continuation of a market economy,  whether 
in a capitalist or,  as in the Yugoslav case,  a socialist form.  I 
treat the Yugoslav case as one of widely dispersed ownership since, 
though the assets of a Yugoslav enterprise remain social property, 
the right to the profits arising from them is transferred by law to 
the members of the enterprise. 
There remains the question: given that a 
revolution in the balance between concentrated and dispersed 
ownership is now possible,  how far down that road do we in fact 
wish to go?  If the answer is that we wish to go a long  distance that way, 
other more technical questions arise about the way to operate a 
capital market in which the small investor predomin~tes.  What 
types of institution,  for example,  will then be needed to ensure 
that the shareholder's point of view is effectively brought home to 
managements,  seeing that the individual small shareholder is unlikely 
to be able to bring influence to bear except through disposing of his 
shares on the market?  How can stock markets be better organised 
to meet· the needs of the small investor?  At the level of Europe as 
a whole,  questions will arise about how to deal in the case of com-
panies operating internationally,  or of "European" companies,  with 
differing national rules about the dispersal of ownership.  Harmon-
isation,  or at least coordination,  of these rules is of marginal -32-
importance so long as the impact of the rules themselves is mar-
ginal.  The impact that I am envisaging here could be very sub-
stantial indeed.  But the first question is the crucial one.  We 
can have a  revolution in the ownership of capital: do we want it? 
My own answer would be decisively "yes". 
Whatever the course chosen,  it is clear that 
the profit and investment plans and policies of enterprises will 
increasingly pass out of the exclusive responsibility of owners 
and directors and into the area of bargaining and political decision, 
whether at the level of the enterprise itself,  of individual countries, 
or of Europe as a  whole.  There is a case for recognising this by 
moving from traditional profit and loss accounting,  in wb.ich profit 
is treated as a  category apart and other types of income - wages, 
salaries,  contributions to taxation or community enterprises -
as costs,  to net value added accounting in which all these cate-
gories appear as shares in an enterprise's net income after 
deduction of payments to outside suppliers of materials,  equipment, 
had 
and services,  and all  Jto  be planned for and bargained over on an equal 
footing. 
II (iii).  The sharing of p_ower- lncludipg  .tae rote af the clliei .ex-eeutive 
and the question of company objectives. 
I  set out here from the conviction that the four 
general conditions with which I began this report point severally 
and collectively to two trends.  One is towards a  further growth 
of participation by employees at all levels in controlling the con-
ditions and decisions under which they work. The other is towards 
basing participation not simply on consultation but on a  realistic 
recognition,  use,  and institutionalisation of power.  The rising -33-
demand for diversity and choice and resistance to standardisation 
and bureaucracy obviously points to the further growth of particip-
ation.  So does the rising accent on the quality and especially the 
human quality of living#  including the right to responsibility and 
participation.  People are as I have said likely to be less and 
less ready to be put off by the argument that material efficiency 
must come first#  and that participation should be resisted because it 
might interfere with it.  From the fact that social tension and con-
flicts are unlikely to diminish it follows that the accent of partici-
pation is likely in future to be at least as heavily as no~  and very poe-
sibly more heavily, on sharing power by way of bargaining and legal 
regulation.  And the pressure for upward harmonisation is 
likely to imply,  as it has already done in drafting the constitution 
of the "European" company,  that innovations and advances in part-
icipation in any one country are likely to be taken up rather quickly 
elsewhere. 
Before I come to particular areas where further 
development of participation is liked to be needed,  I make a general 
point.  One of the lessons of the past which is likely to apply still 
more strongly in future is that it is a  mistake to treat forms and 
problems of participation separately from each other or to argue in 
terms of either-or.  It is a  question of system-building,  of designing, 
in the admirable German phrase, the "works constitution" as a whole, 
arid of finding room within the works constitution for elements which 
could be contradictor~but if  handled rightly are complementary. 
It is not a case of national or industry-wide bargaining~ plant ~34-
bargaining; as I have already argued,  we must have both.  It is 
not a case of voluntary ~  statutory procedures.  One may argue about 
the balance between them,  but it is increasingly clear that here too 
we must have both.  It is not a case of representation on the board 
of directors ~  through a works council ~  through shop stewards and 
plant bargaining,  nor of choosing whether to have board represen-
tatives from within an enterprise ~  from outside.  As I argued 
in my study of German company law and co-determination,  Company 
and Corporation - One Law ?  ,  what has made the German  systems 
of works representation so effective is the multiplicity and inter-
weaving of the channels of representation used in them,  not any 
one element alone.  In the early years of co-determination in 
Germany it appeared that this was instinctively if not always clearly 
grasped by rank and file workers,  who cut through legalistic distin-
ctions  and tended to attach the label Mitbestimmung to the net-
work as a  whole. 
Nor,  again,  is it a  question of loyalty to the 
enterprise ~  to the union,  whether this be raised from the angle 
of the firm worried about union intervention or of union officials 
worried about overweening works conveners.  What experience and 
research indicate is that it is precisely those workers who are longest 
and most actively concerned with works representation who tend to 
be outstanding for their loyalty both to the union and to the enter-
prise.  Nor,  finally,  is it a  question of peaceful collaboration ~ 
contestation.  Collaboration is unlikely to be whole-hearted and 
confident unless it rests on the foundation of mutually recognised -35-
power.  But~  equally~  a power struggle and relationship which 
does not lead into peaceful collaboration to solve mutually interesting 
problems is sterile and destructive. 
It is useful to think of the areas of power -
sharing which will need attention over the next few years in two main 
blocks.  One is shop-floor and enterprise participation~ including 
control over "~conomic" decisions at board and lower levels~ 
and related questions about company objectives~ the role of chief 
executives~ and managerial unionism.  The other is vertical and 
horizontal integration: the link between participation at lower and 
higher levels -in an enterprise or between the enterprise's various 
~rtieil:z~tion in 
units: betwee.u/a ho1t11ng  company~ national or multi-national~ and ltt 
its subsidiary enterprises: or between bargaining and other 
participative arrangements at the level of companies and enterprises on 
one side and nation-wide arrangements on the other~ including 
bargaining over national incomes policy. 
(A)  Shop Floo1t and Enterprise Participation: Control and the 
Executive Manager. 
In thinking about future trends in shop floor 
and enterprise participation it is useful to distinguish between 
a large relatively uncontroversial area~ where there are estab-
lished national customs~ a  mild convergence between them~ and 
a steady trickle of evolutionary improvements,  and a ring of 
surrounding issues which are either unsettled or strongly dis-
puted. -36-
Till a few years ago there was a  sharp dis-
tinction between the systems of representation at this level in 
Britain and Ireland on the one hand and the Six on the other, 
aggravated on the Anglo-Irish side by a Channel fog of ignorance. 
The Anglo-Irish system rested overwhelmingly on collective agree-
ment in matters of procedure as well as substance,  and on repres-
entation through the union- in Britain notably through shop stewards, 
in Ireland still with the accent on the union official - rather than through 
works councils and similar bodies.  The activities of such works 
councils as existed were usually in principle consultative,  and kept 
clearly distinct from the exertion of power,  the business of union 
negotiators.  There was little interest in Board representation . 
The character of the Anglo-Irish industrial relations system was 
overwhelmingly voluntary.  Statutory authority was brought in 
only to fill gaps,  for example to fix wages in weakly organised 
trades,  and to promote and encourage rather than to regulate. 
The role of labour tribunals and statutory enquiries was strictly 
limited.  White-collar workers tended to be unionised in the 
public sector,  but very little in the private sector; in the case 
of managerial grades,  scarcely at all.  The industrial relations 
systems of the Six differed considerably from one another,  for 
example as regards the basis of trade union organisation,  the role 
of the union in the plant or the interest shown in different countries 
in employee representation at Board level,  but tended as a group 
to differ still more in all these respects from the systems in 
Britain and Ireland.  On both sides of the channel there was a 
growing interest in individual motivation at work,  the design of 
work groups,  and generally in human relations at work.  But 
often 
this demand waa  /  along side and sometimes in competition with 
official representation through unions and works councils rather than -37-
geared in with it. 
Today,  as I noted earlier# there is a marked 
convergence all along the line.  On the side of the Six there is a new 
accent on the role of the union in the plant#  and more reluctance to let 
the union disappear from view behind statutory works councils and 
similar machinery.  Works councils are not being re-emphasised: 
rather the contrary. But there has been a  move in the direction of 
two-channel representation such as has been usual in Britain#  with 
a works council and plant-level union negotiating machinery operating 
side by side.  In Britain at the same time there has been a  move in 
the opposite direction#  a growing feeling both in the labour move-
ments and among industrial relations specialists that a  single channel 
is best; or#  if it is thought convenient to keep two channels,that at least 
they should be operated by a  single body of people#  the shop stewards 
who are the workers' real and effective representatives.  On both 
sides of the Channel an interest is growing in building a link,  on lines 
already developed in Thorsrud'·S  experiments in Norway#  between 
trade union or works council representation and the movement for 
autonomous working groups. 
Britain has been given in the Industrial Relations 
Act of 1971 a  much stiffer legal framework for industrial relations 
than in the past.  It has acquired a set of labour court•  ,and the 
Act of 1971  permits,  though it does not require#  the imposition 
on firms and industries of statutory negotiating and consultative 
procedures.  There is a new interest on the political Left,  not 
necessarily in Board representation#  but certainly in stronger 
representation of workers at the points at all levels at which key 
management decisions are taken.  There are increasingly strong 
white-collar unions.  The fog of cross-Olannel ignorance is -38-
rolling back,  and not only the trade unions but bodies such as the 
Institute of Personal Management - notably in its 1971 report on 
Workers' Participation in Western Europe - at least take the trouble 
to find out what sort of procedures operate beyond the sea . 
The degree of convergence should not be 
exaggerated.  The industrial relations systems of the various 
countries of Europe keep their own characteristics,  and,  as I have 
already argued,  will continue to do so.  Nevertheless convergence 
between them is going on,  and will go furl  her.  So too will 
evolutionary changes in them,  such as the growing interest in 
autonomous work groups or the recent revision in a number of 
countries of statutory rules about works councils and workers' 
right to information.  In areas like these the problem for the 
Community's institutions is simply to help evolutionary processes 
forward,  not to impose a  direction on them. 
Meantime,  however,  two other areas stand 
out as centres of controversy where common assumptions have 
still to be established.  One,  with which I deal under the next 
heading,  is the relation between shop floor representation plus 
autonomous work groups - "shop floor power"  - and representation 
at the higher levels of the multi-unit or international enterprise, 
as well as of the industry,  the national economy,  or Europe as a 
whole.  The second is the question of control over the general policies 
and 11 economic" decisions of directors and managers,  whether on the -39-
Board or at lower levels,  along with related issues about the role 
of boards,  chief executives,  and the senior executive-.immediately 
below them. 
The second issue in the second case is the :relati€>n. to the 
executive manager,  and especially to the chief executive and entre-
preneur,  of control by any of the interests involved in a firm,  including 
shareholders.  One should not forget the admirable words of the 
Jenkins Committee on 'British company law,  discussing proposals 
for shareholder democracy:-
11 It may be theoretically desirable that shareholders 
should have a more effective voice in the management 
of their company's business .... As against this,  no 
company's affairs can be managed properly,  or indeed 
managed at all,  otherwise than through a board of 
directors with a  reasonably free hand to do what they 
think best in the interests of the company. 
11 
(Report of the Company Law Committee,  Cmnd. 
1949,  HMSO 1962,  par.  14) 
It was far from the Jenkins Committee's intention to deprive 
shareholders of control over their companies; most of the 
Committee's report was concerned with increasing it.  But in 
shareholders' own interests the form of their control must be 
reconciled with the freedom of manoeuvre for directors and 
executives on which the prosperity of the company and so of 
its shareholders depends.  Not even from the side of share-
holders is it tolerable to have committee government or inter-
ference With entrepreneurs' and executives' discretion by people 
not properly in touch with an enterprise's daily life. -40-
Clearly we want such things as executive efficiency~ 
entrepreneurial dynamism~ the unified direction of each enterprise~ 
and trade unions independent of management.  Most of us~whether 
liberal or socialist~  also want an effective market economy~ due 
attention to profit,  and a  system of decentralised (not necessarily privat~ 
ownership in which the rights and social role of decentralised 
property are respected.  There is by now enough experience to 
show that there is no need to rely for these things solely on the 
traditional type of organisation  in which control over an enterprise's 
general) and especially its "economic~ policy lies exclusively with 
private or State capitalists and with managers.  (There is a  genuine 
argument as to whether the German coal and steel industries have 
served the consumer~ the shareholder~ and employees any better under 
fifty-fifty co-determination than they would have been served without 
it,  but it is only by bending the evidence that it can be argued that 
they have served them worse.  There have been plenty of signs 
of dynamism and efficiency in Yugoslav communes,  and in the 
kibbutzim and the trade union controlled enterprises of Histadrut in 
Israel.  I am investigating at the moment cases of effective 
entrepreneurship in Ireland~  and find that among the most striking 
in recent years~ operating in strongly competitive markets and 
on a  scale substantial by the standards of any country~ are the meat-
packing and dairy enterprises of certain farmers' cooperatives. 
In all these cases equal or complete control by employees~  unions~ 
local communities,  or producers' cooperatives has proved compatible 
with the operation not simply of efficient and dynamic enterprises 
but of an effective market economy. -41-
It is certainly the case that profit is a central test 
of business#  in the interests of efficient service to consumers 
and of security#  opportunity#  and good conditions for e:r;;nployees 
as well as of dividends and growth for shareholders.  It is also 
the case that if one examines the tests of performance customarily 
used in6  let us say 6  a Yugoslav commune one finds that profit# in 
the sense of maximising the cash available to increase members' 
incomes currently or in the long run#  is only one of the objects 
in view.  Others might be the reduction of work strain and 
improvement of the working environment#  the personal and career 
development of members and improvement of local employment 
opportunities#  provision of social services and contribution to 
local amenities and local and regional development#  or simply 
technical and scientific achievement or economic growth as ends in 
themselves. 
But there is no incompatibility between these 
a 
two  findings.  On the one handjcommune#  or a non-profit enter-
prise in Western capitalist economies6  has still to earn its living 
in a market.  It must at least be able to meet its outside commit-
ments#  and so to avoid a loss •  If it wants more resources for 
these other objectives#  it has to earn enough surplus to cover them. 
And on the other hand#  though there are groups and individuals 
within Western capitalist enterprises for whom profit is the -main 
or even the sole objective#  they are likely in today's coBditions 
soon to find themselves in trouble even as profit-makers if they 
forget that an enterprise is a plural society#  and that other groups 
will collaborate only if their objectives are provided for as well; 
whether these objectives be external6  as with pollution and the 
environment,  or internal as with job security and enrichment. -42-
I said earlier that my impression as one who works in management 
education is that,  just as behavioural science and quantitative methods 
were the theme of management education in the last generation,  so 
the social responsibilities of business will be the theme of the next. 
It is not by accident or out of pure altruism that this is happening. 
Society is imposing new standards on business,  and both manage-
ment and management education reflect these.  The West moves 
towards social responsibility without abandoning profit and the 
moves 
market,  while Eastern Europe  /towards the market and profit 
without giving up its socialist objectives. 
It would be hard today to argue seriously that 
sharing the ultimate control of an enterprise with employees is 
incompatible with the rights and use  of private and decentralised 
property.  One of the oldest traditions of the private sector itself 
is the partnership into which one member enters on the basis of 
his capital and another on that of his work and professional skill. 
Nor is a  share for employees in "economic" control incompatible 
with an arm's length relationship between a  union and management. 
We now have working formulas showing how the two can be recon-
ciled·.  This seems for example to have been very successfully 
achieved under the British Steel Corporation's plan for employee 
directors at Product Division level.  There are formulas for main-
tainirig unity of a firm's directing authority while also incorporating 
into it,  or bringing it under the influence of,  employees as well 
as shareholders.  Germany has chosen to combine a  representative 
Supervisory Board with a unified,  professional,  Executive Board, 
The Netherlands have preferred a  unified,  self-coopted, Board of 
Commissars,  but with a  right tor employees aa well as shareholders to 
examples 
propose or veto candidates for cooperation.  And there are successful/ -43-
from several countries· of how to build Board representation'in to the 
Ylaole network of representa.tic:>n ·Of  employees Jay  works councils and 
unions  ..  and to avoid leaving it to hang isolated in the air. 
What then is mi,ssing - what are we disputing 
about?  It is not that we lack the elements of a  solution,  or rather 
of solutions geared to the circumstances of each country of industry. 
It -is  that,  whereas the relationship between shareholders and 
executives has been thought through and worked out in practice 
over generations,  in the case of employees' share in the final 
controlling authority of enterprises the necessary constitution-
making is only now getting under way.  Only one country>Germany, 
has a really long an~ substantial. tradition in this field.  The first 
concerted,  all..European,  effort to agree on an enterprise con-
stitution inc·orporating this element has been the debate over the 
European company,  and even this was confined for the most part 
to the Six.  The main task facing us in this area over the next few 
years is not to conduct basic research and experiment,  nor to 
debate principles.  For the reasons I have already indicated, 
we can take it for granted that the demand for an effective share 
in the final control of enterprises will continue and increase,  and 
we have by this time a pretty good idea of what sort of arrange-
ments for this purpose will be workable.  The problem now is to 
assemble from the elements already available a constitution to suit 
each country and,  if necessary,  each case. 
I do not want to minimise the difficulty  .. of 
this; of doing justice both to the complications of this sort of 
constitution-making and to the circumstances of different eases 
and the different interests involved in them.  But at least this is -44-
now a  practical~ down to earth~  task~  and it should be possible 
now to get away from the barren exchange of unsupported general-
isation and counter-generalisation so common in this area in the 
past.  Towards this next stage of practical achievement I contribute 
half a dozen rapid-fire points. 
{i)  We aan today assume a better under-
standing than in the past of the role of an executive and of the 
conditions necessary for him to fill it.  He needs to be more of a 
politician than in the past,  one who has insight into and can reconcile 
the various interests involved in his enterprise,  and can lead 
through participation rather than dictation.  He is also more of 
an employee~ one who needs the support of his own union.  In 
these days of mergers,  shareholder revolts,  and sudden redundancy~ 
I would not exclude from this even managing directors.  But he still 
and is by now eeeepted on all sides as having 
has/the same two basic characteristics which he always had.  He 
is,  first,  a  member or leader of a  management team,  not a  rep-
resentative.  His appointment may be approved by spokesmen of 
this or that interest,  but that does not make him a  representative. 
The debate over the role of the labour director in the German steel 
and coal industries has been particularly useful in clarifying this. 
The labour director is now accepted by all as primarily an executive 
whose appointment is subject to special formalities,  and not 
primarily as a union man.li.ke other executives,  he serves the enter-
prise,  n~t any one interest within it.  And secondly,  and not less 
important,  the executive like other workers continues to need a  sphere 
of individual autonomy,  limited neither by unnecessary rules and 
directions nor by committee government. -45-
(ii)  The idea of a Supervisory Board is 
essential to the right relationship between executives and employee 
or other representatives.  If these representatives are to have 
effective control they must be able to keep fully informed,  to call 
in key decisions for their consideration,  and if necessary to act 
to remove an executive,  but they must not have the right to impose 
committee government on him or take away his necessary autonomy. 
But the actual mechanism for applying this idea does not have to be 
a Supervisory Board,  even at the top level of an enterprise.  It can 
be a negotiating committee with the union,  a staff board,  or a works 
whichever  is used  has 
committee,  provided that 1  'lf these  I  appropriate and strong 
enough powers.  The structure and function of boards varies from 
one country and enterprise to another,  and so may the actual machinery 
for participating at board as at other levels. 
(iii)  The British trade union movement rightly 
insists that employee control over executives' actions and 
11 economic" 
policies is not only,  or even perhaps primarily,  required at the top. 
A good example of what they have in mind is the British Steel Cor-
poration's introduction of employee directors at Product Division 
leval.  Looking in one direction,  there is a case for applying the 
idea of a supervisory board or of employee directors of the British 
Steel Corporation type down to the level of the individual plant or 
even department.  But,  equally,  when one looks  not downward 
but upward in any enterprise,  experience shows that there is no level 
at which employee representation ceases to be relevant.  It is hard -46-
to take seriously the objection of the Union of Industries of the 
European Community to the introduction of a works council at 
holding company level in the European Company,  on the ground 
that it is 
11 inconceivable" that such a council could carry out 
"important and reasonable" tasks on behalf of workers in the group of 
companies controlled.  It is precisely the major decisions about 
the deployment of resources,  the trading relation between sub-
sidiaries~  and the criteria of management success which are made at this 
level which are likely to have the most far-reaching effects for 
workers.  in the subsidiaries and countries which they affect. 
There is no escaping the fact that the top level of a  company is 
not only the place where many key decisions are made but the final 
court of appeal in the case of decisions lower down. 
(iv)  I cannot repeat too often that employee 
representation at any level~  and with whatever degree of control 
or influence~  must always be thought of.)not in isolation  ;but as part 
of a total network of representation using various channels; union 
machinery,  board representation,  works councils,  or whatever 
they may be.  Board representation does not cease to be relevant 
merely because it is inevitably  remote from the ordinary worker. 
It is a powerful supplement to other forms of representation,  but 
has its full usefulness only if effective transmission belts link it 
to other lines of representation both at its own level - through the 
union- and lower down.  As the Biedenkopf Commission rightly 
recognised for Germany,  there is everything to be said for including 
in the team which represents employees at board level both 
representatives from an enterprise•s own staff,  fully informed 
of its conditions~ and others from outside with a wider viewpoint 
and an independent power base. -47-
(v)  Recogn1tion that an enterprise involves 
more than one interest,  and that interests other than those of share-
holders have a right to a voice in its affairs,  has of course implica-
tions for the information which the enterprise needs to make avail-
able to the representatives of each interest and to the public. 
A number of these implications are already written into different 
countries' companies acts and works constitution laws or,  in Britain, 
the Industrial Relations Act of 1971.  But I draw attention again 
to a further implication which I mentioned earlier: the case for 
moving from profit-and -loss to net value added accounting,  so 
allowing the financial claims of all the parties to an enterprise., 
including the community as well as employees,  to be treated on an 
equal footing. 
(vi)  Distinctions in the machinery for sharing 
in control over general management and economic decisions will 
clearly be needed according to the size,  stage of development,  and 
type of market of enterprises: the distinction between public and 
private ownership is for this purpose less important.  The case 
for separate measur~Qr  giant concerns has been particularly 
thoroughly debated in Germany.  I emphasise rather the other 
end; the case for a measure of employee control even in owner-
managed firms.  I am watching at the moment,  from the angle of an 
old customer, the crumbling of a family firm where the current 
successor,  through no fault of his own,  has proved to be an effec-
tive second in command but not fitted for the top job.  This could 
be a case for moch-Laine  's magistrature economique et sociale 
\lL 
to step in and withdraw the successor's licence to direct".  But 
it is also worth renecting that the origin of the German super-
viso~y board was the need,  in Kommandit companies, to give the 
*  F.  Bloch-Laine,  Poor Une Reforme de l'Entreprlse,  SevU, 
1963,  Chs.  III and VII. -48-
active shareholders their head,  yet at the same time to provide 
a watchdog on behalf of the passive shareholders who normally 
have no hand in directing the business.  There is a case for a 
similar arrangement in small companies today.  Normally the 
"master craftsman" who is likely to head such a company should 
be left the same full freedom to act as an active shareholder under Kom.-
mandit.  But employees as well as other shareholders need also 
the right not only to be informed but in the last resort to intervene 
before it is too late. 
fb)  The vertical and horizontal integration of participation. 
Decisions of importance and interest to 
employees are made at every level of the economy and at every 
level and in every part of an enterprise,  and many of these 
decisions are or should be systematically related to each other. 
Therefore the network of participation,  whether in the form of 
bargaining,  consultation,  or direct membership of controlling 
bodies must cover them all,  and in an integrated way.  That is the 
principle,  and it is no more than obvious common sense.  The 
problem is to apply it.  I distinguish again between aspects which 
may need hard work and tough bargaining,  but are matters of 
straighforward evolution from past experience,  and one major 
aspect which calls for decisions of a sort not yet generally 
accepted. -49-
In the first category I include all aspects of 
integrating systems of participation within the enterprise; the 
integration of autonomous work groups with shop steward and other 
representative systems,  the link between shop floor and plant-
wide or company and group-wide representation,  including repres-
entation at the top level of holding and multi-national companies, 
and the linking and balancing of the representation of units at the 
same level of each enterprise.  None of these is easy,  whether 
a 
in a capitalist or/socialist economy.  There is room for strong 
disagreement about methods.  There is a good deal of innovation 
going on,  and considerable shifts of emphasis; towards shop fioor 
power and company-wide bargaining,  away from the more gener-
alised type of bargaining found at industry-wide or regional level. 
But none of these aspects of ~tegration raises any principle out-
side and beyond the established practice of collective bargaining 
and other forms of representation,  and for all of them we have 
at least some models to work from.  The problem is to extend and 
develop existing practice rather than to break away into something 
wholly new. 
When for example I read a paper by Mr. 
Charles Levinson of the International Federa.tion of Chemical 
and General Workers' Unions on bargaining and participation 
in the multi-national corporation,  or follow other· work of the 
International Trade Secretariats or the ECFTU,  or the debate 
on representation in the European Company,  I recognise,  cer--50-
tainly,  that here is an under-developed area of participation in 
which much work remains to be done.  As the British Trades 
Union Congress noted in its 197 0 report on International Companies:-
"As yet ... international trade union coordination 
could not be said to amount to a  major counter-
vailing force to the multi-national corporation", 
and,  as regards : -
!'Presentation of internationally agreed bargaining 
demands to international companies as a  whole,  and 
coordination of tactics to realise these demands ... 
In the world as currently organised this .... is a 
very long way off''. 
There is a  mass of work still to be done by unions and employers. 
International institutions,  in particular the institutions of the 
European Community,  have still to build a  code of good practice 
for industrial relations at the multi-national level which will stand 
comparison with those now taken for granted in individual countries. 
Some of the provisions of such a code might with advantage be taken 
from the field of company rather than labour law.  There could for 
instance be an interesting lesson for trade unionists in the provisions 
of the German Companies Act of 1965 which require a  holding com-
pany either to give shareholders in a  controlled company legally 
binding guarantees against discrimination,  or to report annually 
on its transactions with the controlled company,  particularly those 
not conducted at arm's length.  The right to guarantee$and infor-
mation of this kind is precisely tb.e sort of safeguard which employees 
in  a  multi-unit and especially a  multi-national company  n~ed. 
But in all this we remain on familiar ground. 
Bargaining along with other forms of participation in the multi-
national corporation belongs basically to the same world as bar-
gaining and participation in multi-unit companies of similar size 
within one country,  and there is already a  good deal of experiment -51-
with it from which to learn.  So also at the other end of the scale, 
though few enterprises would yet claim to have solved successfully 
the problem of integrating autonomous work groups with traditional 
trade union representation~ it is clear that there need be no basic 
contradiction between the two~ and there are at least some models 
on which to draw. 
Where a different and much tougher problem 
arises is over reconciling the claims of enterprises with the needs 
of the economy and community as a  whole~ particularly over incomes 
policy.  In disputes over pay in a firm or industryJtop-level and 
shop fioor level union negotiators may have their differences.  But 
they are heading in the same direction,  towards the maximum settle-
ment obtainable for their members.,  and the question is simply of what 
tactics to employ.  When on the other hand it comes to incomes 
policy~ union negotiators at national or industry-wide level may 
and regularlyie find themselves expected.,  for the sake of maximising 
real income and employment prospects in the longer run,  to ask 
their officials and members at enterprise level to forgo short-term 
gains which employers would be willing to grant.  Incomes policy 
or no incomes policy~ many employers - as a number of them 
made clear at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research's 
conference on British incomes policy in January 1972 - will not of 
their own accord risk shutting down their firms to resist infl.ationary 
claims which their own particular market conditions would let them 
meet.  For both unions and employers.,  especially at enterprise level., 
incomes policy stands in direct contradiction to key assumptions of 
ordinary collective bargaining. -52-
An incomes policy is several things at once. 
It is first and foremost a prices policy.  Its primary aim is to 
defeat inflation by holding down the components of prices~ but this 
may need to be supplemented with more direct control over prices 
themselves.  It needs to take account of all the types of income 
which enter into prices and of the special problems of particular 
groups of income receivers.  Though for example the chief cause 
of incomes inflation is usually wage and salary claims rather than 
profits,  in practice an incomes policy has no  need of continuing 
success unless profit levels~  dividends~  and now also the level 
and ownership of reinvested profits are regulated as well as wages. 
Incomes policies have arisen particularly out of concern with the 
overall,  average~ increase of incomes,  but cannot escape being 
judged on whether they do or do not help the low-paid or favour 
the rich.  Except in a time of extreme national crisis~  they can 
hope to succeed only if associated with an overall climate and 
policy for social progress.  In the past I would have said 
11 for 
growth
11
;  but,  for the reasons I have already given~ that particular 
lubricant is likely to be less available in the future than in the past~ 
at least in so far as it refers to enabling people in industrialised 
countries to consume more physical resources.  An incomes 
policy has to be all-embracing,  ·differentiated~  and detailed enough 
to take account of a great variety of circumstances in particular 
occupations and groups.  It has to be felt effectively at all the 
levels,  right down to the individual enterprise and the shop floor, 
at which significant decisions about incomes are made.  Yet at 
the same time it has to be simple,  easily understood~ and seen to 
be based on clear and generally acceptable principles. -53-
A policy as many-sided as this must depend 
heavily on the support of employers and workers,  for only the 
people in each enterprise and occupation have the knowledge needed 
to apply the necessarily broad and simple principles of an incomes 
policy flexibly enough and with enough attention to local circumstances 
But an incomes policy cannot be left to employers and workers or 
their unions alone,  for it too often clashes with particular employers' 
of workers' interests.  It is concerned by definition with balancing 
claims against the resources of the community as a whole,_  and 
employers and unions,  even collectively, let alone individually, 
have neither the motivation nor the breadth of vision to do this. 
The Government has therefore to appear on the scene,  not .as a 
detailed regulato-r,  but as a third bargainer and to use its power, 
on behalf of the community,  to insist that unions and employers 
shall play their detailed part in incomes policy in spite of their 
reluctance. 
This is the essential point which has emerged 
from the experience of incomes policies in a number of countries: 
that the Government's relation to the other parties to incomes policy 
must be both a limited and a bargaining one.  It cannot be one merely 
of persuasion,  nor· of detailed and continuing compulsion.  Persuasion 
is too weak.  Detailed and continuing compulsion can be and has been 
made to work under the Stalinist type of socialism.  In a market economy 
and a democracy it is simply not acceptable,  except in short periods of 
extreme crisis.  There remains only the possibility of a  relationship 
in which the Government bargains with the other parties,  on the same 
basis as in any other sort of collective bargaining,  for their cooperation 
in carrying out policies which the Government ought not normally to carry 
out in detail itself.  What the Government wants is the agreement of 
employers and unions,  at all the levels at which significant decisions 
define and accept fit •t 
about incomes are made,  first to /of broad and clear principles about -54-
incomes policy,  and secondly to administer the agreed policy in 
detail,  with a  minimum of direct intervention on the Government's 
own part.  What it has to do to get this agreement is to convince the 
other parties - again at all levels - that the Government has enough 
favours to grant and penalties to threaten to make it worth while for 
them to reach this agreement. 
A particularly effective type of argument is 
likely to be for the Government to convince the other parties that in 
the last resort it can and will itself enforce a policy,  though crudely 
and on lines which employers and unions would prefer to avoid by 
handling the policy: the more objectionable,  in a  sense,  the better. 
Ordinary collective bargaining depends on the availability of a  strike 
or a lockout as the ultimate deterrent; it is to the advantage of all 
parties that this deterrent be not used,  or at least not used too often 
but it must be there.  The Government too needs for the purposes 
of incomes policy bargaining to equip itself with a  set of strong bar-
gaining counters. 
Governments can if they wish mobilise a 
whole armoury of inducements and deterrents.  The impact of some 
is general,  at the national level.  At the end of 1970 the Irish Govern-
ment broke a deadlock between employers and unions,  and made possible 
a highly successful National Employer-Labour Conference Agreement 
against inflation,  by bringing in a  Prices and Incomes Bill on lines 
highly unwelcome to both sides,  showing that it meant business with 
it,  and then withdrawing the bill when the deadlock broke and agree-
ment was reached.  A wage freeze is another very useful threat. 
There can also be bargaining over a Government's own fiscal and 
social policies. -55-
But more detailed means of persuasion are 
also necessary, for the practical problem of incomes policy is 
less to get a national agreement on broad principles than to stop 
individual industries and enterprises from breaking away from it. 
My own favourite scheme is a heavy tax on the wage bill,  payable 
partly by employers and partly by workers,  with exemption or 
repayment for enterprises which can satisfy an appropriate employer-
union body,  or in the last resort the Government itself,  that they 
have kept within incomes policy norms.  It is of the essence of the 
plan that the onus of proof should be,  not on some outside body to 
prove that an enterprise has violated the norms,  but on the enter-
prise to satisfy the guardians of incomes policy that it has kept to 
them.  But there are many other weapons available,  some fiscal, 
some of other kinds.  Overpayments can be disallowed for cor-
poration tax,  prices or incentive earnings can be limited by order, 
subsidies and tariffs can disappear,  government decisions and 
services from government departments can be unaccountably delayed, 
government contracts can suddenly go elsewhere.  A government 
which is determined to use its bargaining power will find that it has 
no lack of cards in its hand,  provided that it organises itself to use 
them and learns to play that game.  There is admirable sense in 
the doctrine - his methods were less attractive - of a French Prime 
Minister of seventy years ago: the Republic owes justice to all,  but 
favours only to its friends. 
I said earlier that it is hard to conceive how 
a European fiscal and monetary union could work without a net-
work of incomes policies covering all the Ten.  It is a matter for 
consideration,  not only how the European institutions can best help -56-
to bring these policies to birth in individual countries..  but what use they 
can make of their own considerable and growing bargaining power 
to help this process along,  particularly by intervening in decisions 
relevant to incomes policy which may be made at European level 
either through employer-union bargaining or directly by manage-
ments. 
II!.  SUMMARY!TASKS FOR THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 
The field dealt with in this report is one where 
action,  even if coordinated or harmonised,  will remain largely at 
the enterprise or at most the national level.  The role of European 
institutionsJpublic or private - of U.N. I. C. E.  or the trade union 
bodies at European level as well as of the Commission - will there-
fore be largely.,  as I  s~id earlier that of the gardener who helps a 
hundred flowers to bloom,  each in its own style and place.  This 
role ought not to be under-estimated.  Some of us late-comers· 
to Europe may be better placed to appreciate this than long-
established members of the Six.  In the British Isles we have 
experienced lately a remarkable 'impression of fresh stimulation 
and of windows opening,  simply from having actually to talk to 
our neighbours and take seriously their strange and peculiar 
ways of solving problems similar to our own.  But I have of course 
also mentioned a  range of issues, such as European-level collec-
tive bargaining or even incomes policy,  in which the Commission 
or the European organisations of trade unions or employers need to 
be involved by way of their own direct action.  I close with a  summary 
of issues of both sorts and of the conditions in which they have to 
be solved. -57-
Summary 
,,  We can expect strong upward pressure to harmonise the 
conditions of work at enterprise level, but in the context of resistance 
to standardisation and central or bureaucratic control, based on 
considerations of national identity and tradition,  of the management 
style appropriate today,  and of the quality of life.  The problem is to 
reconcile this with necessary central planning.  The formula is 
that of the gardener helping his hundred flowers to bloom.  (pp~ It - «:, 
~.  We have to expect a  cutoff to growth iQ the richer countries, 
a  swing to quality rather than quantity in the standard of living,  and 
resulting pressures for equality within as well as between countries,. 
more accent on the social responsibilities of enterprises,  and down-
grading of arguments against participation on the ground that it limits 
the material efficiency of production.  (pp. 1  -9  ) 
·~  The climate of proble:m-solving will not become more 
peaceful or less full of tensions.  Some particular issues may pass 
from controversial to routine,  but other controversial issues will 
replace them.  (pp.  ~ - tt) 
't·  The timetable and occupational pattern of careers is· likely 
in future to be much more flexible than in the past,  and more adapted 
to individual cases.  Contributing factors are the speeding up of 
technical progress,  more job-changing in formerly stable occupations, 
more married women in the labour market,  and better appreciation of 
the problems of workers nearing retirement.  It will be important to 
help employers,  unions,  and manpower planning agencies to handle 
this new pattern of careers successfully.  (pp.  \\  - L(') 
K.  Policies are needed to enrich jobs at all levels to match 
the higher quality of people available to fill them,  and to develop both 
individual and group motivation to achieve.  (pp. ((' -t}) -58-
b.  Policies against job insecurity should not be confined to 
its more obvious forms,  such as dismissals .and unemployment 
Flexible careers and the replacement of bureaucracy with network or 
participative management deprive many of their f.ixed place and role. 
For women,  immigrants,  or older men insecurity often means being 
denied access to  favoured jobs,  or to any jobs at all.  The central 
need is to guarantee to all a  secure "professional base",  chiefly 
through the  trade union movement,  but legal and political action is 
needed as well.  (pp. t? -2.2,) 
No modern state can avoid having a  policy for incomes 
and wealth,  whatever it may choose to call it.  The market produces 
!: distribution and growth rate of incomes and wealth,  and ..§.Q!!l§  impact 
of them on inflation,  exchange rates and the balance of payments, 
But which pattern it produces depends on the rules which custom and 
policy impose on it.  A  European monetary and fiscal union could 
not work successfully without coordinated - not necessarily identical  -
policies for incomes and wealth.  (pp.~~ -~ 
~- There is no longer any question that practicable policies 
for a  massive dispersal of the ownership of wealth,  and especially of 
currently accumulating business capital,  are available and in demand. 
The question is for what to use them.  For creating a  population of 
small investors or for a  share in the control of industry,  since these 
two objects conflict?  How to allot a  fair share to people in the non-
profit sectors?  Individual or collective control of dispersed wealt~J.? 
A marginal change or a  revolutionary  switch to a  capital market based on 
the small man,  including his investment in pension funds,  or a  step 
further to communes?  In any case the profit and investment plans 
of enterprises are now matters for bargaining and political decision. 
(pp.u'  -~1.\ -59-
Demands for the sharing of power in enter-
prises are likely to increase; see the summary of PP·l- u .  It is 
the whole network of participation in power that matters,  not any 
one section of it on its own.  Two main areas need special attention: 
participation in the general  and 
11 economic" control of entreprises, 
and the vertical and horizontal integration of participation at different 
levels or in different units of enterprises.  (pp. 3:t.  -\() 
to .  In many areas of enterprise participation the 
outlook is for further evolutionary change within established national 
patterns,  with some convergence between them.  But as regards 
sharing power at board level,  and generally power over executives., 
"economic" decisions,  accepted patterns have still to be worked out. 
The problem is to reconcile control over executives with freedom 
for entrepreneurs and executives to perform their role,  with which 
neither shareholders (Jenkins Committee on Company Law) nor 
any other group must be allowed to interfere.  The elements of 
a  solution to the problem of employee control have been worked 
out and practical models are available for each of them.  Objec-
tions based on executive efficiency,  entrepreneurial dynamism, 
unified direction,  the working of the market,  the role of profit and 
decentralised ownership,  and the independence of trade unions can 
be overcome.  But whereas in the case of the shareholder-executive 
relationship there is a long tradition of how these elements can be 
assembled into a  good working model,  in the case of employee control 
this task of constitution-making has still to be completed.  This rather 
than a debate on principles is the next task in this area.  (pp.l(- "t~) -60-
11.  Some points towards this task are as follows. 
We can assume today far better understanding of the executive's 
role and of the freedoms which he needs than in the past,  though with 
some changes from the past: the executive needs to be more of a 
politician than in the past and needs the backing of his  own union . 
The idea of a Supervisory Board as a basis for sharing in control 
over executives is sound and applicable at all levels,  not only at the level 
of the Board.  But the mechanism for applying it need not take the form 
of a Supervisory Board.  Shared control is in fact required at all levels, 
from plants or major divisions up to and including group level in multi-
unit and multi-national companies.  Board or equivalent representation 
is valid as part of a  whole network of employee representation from 
inside and outside the enterprise,  rather than on its own.  The case 
for including in it representatives from outside as well as- inside the 
enterprise is valid.  The idea of an enterprise as involving many interest: 
has implications for the information it should make available,  including 
the question of changing from profit-and-loss to net value added accoun-
ting,  which puts the shareholders on the same footing as the employee 
or the community.  Special provisions are needed both for giant enter-
prises and for the owner-managed firm.  A lead for the latter can be 
found in the fact that the Supervisory Board originated as a  watchdog 
for inactive shareholders in Komm~dit  companies.  (pp.  44-48) 
12.  Many aspects of the vertical and horizontal 
integration of forms of participation are today,  like many aspects of 
enterprise generally,  matters for evolutionary change within estab-
lished patterns.  Even the new field of collective bargaining in multi-
national companies is an extension fromfamiliar ground.  (pp. 48-51) -61-
13.  An exception is bargaining ever incomes policy, 
which can require national union officials to resist their members' 
immediate interests,  and employers also to act contrary to their own 
immediate interests,  so contradicting the ordinary assumptions of 
employer-union bargaining.  Incomes policy necessarily becomes 
all-embracing and highly detailed,  and must therefore be administered 
by employers and unions,  who alone can do so with enough knowledge 
and detailed flexibility.  Governments however can alone provide its 
dri:ving force.  Persuasion is too weak,  detailed compulsion is accep-
table in a democracy and market economy only for short periods in an 
emergency.  The role of a government must therefore be as a bargainer, 
offering enough inducements and threatening enough deterrents to make 
it worwh  ·while for employers and unions to collaborate and to administer 
incomes policy in detail themselves.  It is particularly important that 
a government should show that it could enferce an incomes policy on its 
own,  even if crudely and on lines to which employers and unions would 
object : in a sense, the more objectionable the better.  (pp.  51-54) 
14.  The counters used by governments in incomes 
policy bargaining may be general,  such as the threat of a wage freeze 
or a Prices and Incomes Bill or bargaining over the government's own 
social and fiscal policies.  There must also be detailed inducements 
or deterrents 'reaching down to every level,  including the shop floor, 
where significant decisions about incomes are made.  These can include 
wage taxes with exemption for enterprises which prove they have held 
to incomes policy norms: and the possibility to limit prices or incentive 
earnings by executive order,  or to grant or withdraw subsidies,  tariffs, 
access tQ government services,  or government contracts.  The maxim 
to apply is :- the Republic owes  justice to all,  but favours only to its 
frtends.  (pp.  54-56) -62-
15.  Though a number of European institutions 
will be involved in the field of this report through direct action at their 
own level,  the primary task will be (see the summary of pp.  2-6)  that 
of the gardener who helps his hundred flowers to bloom in their own 
was (p.  56). 